Certo Is this judgment real?
Beta, Supreme Court only. We check Supreme Court of India judgments only for now: a High Court citation reads "Not in our corpus", which never means it does not exist.

Supreme Court of India

NASIK MUNICIPAL CORPORATION versus HARBANSLAL LAIKWANT RAJPAL AND ORS. ETC.

Decided
9 December 1996
Judges listed
K. RAMASWAMY, G.T. NANAVATI (as the open data lists them; this may not name the whole bench)
Disposal
Appeal(s) allowed

Citations

Official
[1996] SUPP. 9 S.C.R. 701 · 1996 INSC 1452
Also cited as
  • (1997) 4 SCC 199 (13 citing judgments)

Learned from how other judgments cite this one, in their text or in the official Supreme Court Reports' lists of cases they refer to: each is cited this way by at least two judgments, and at least twice as often as any other citation to this judgment in that report. We hold no commercial reporter's text, only these citation strings.

Not shown
1 other citation string that other judgments attach to this one, on evidence too thin or too divided to publish.

Cited by

Cited in 1 other Supreme Court judgment we hold.

Counted only in the Supreme Court judgments we hold whose text we could read, not in High Court judgments. We match each citation to a judgment automatically, so a citation we cannot match is not counted. "Cited" says only that a judgment refers to this one, not whether it followed, distinguished or overruled it.

The Court's text

Paragraphs from our copy of the Supreme Court Reports print, with the Court's own paragraph numbers, the printed page and, where printed, the margin letter. The Court did not number this judgment's paragraphs, so they are listed by page. Link to paragraph N with #para-N.

Unnumbered paragraph

Leave granted.

p. 701, margin H

Unnumbered paragraph

These appeals by special leave arise from the judgment of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court dated October 14, 1994, made in W.P. No. 4023/89. Proceedings were initiated under the Maharashtra Regional & Tol\n Planing Act, 1966, (for short, the 'Act') for framing a scheme and for acquisition of the land in that behalf. The fmal development plan was made on November 29, 1980. Notification under section 126(4) of the Act was published on August 6, 1987. It was published in the local newspaper on July 18, 1987 and in the village Chavadi on September 25, 1987. It would appear that subsequently, after Section4(1) notification and declaration under Section 6 of the (Land Acquisition Act 1/1894) were published, notice was issued under Section 9 of the said Act on September 16, 1989. Award came to be passed on September 22, 1989. The respondents filed writ petitions on September 25, 1989. The award was published on September 27, 1989. It would appear that the draft plan was issued for reservation of certain lands for the public purpose and no objections were filed. In the meanwhile, by proceedings dated December 26, 1990, the same came to be deleted by publication of the notification on June 28, 1993 and final plan was published on September 30, 1993.0n a representation made by the Corporation, the Government had issued a corrigendum on August 19, 1994 restoring the status quo ante with a slight modification. The High Court in the impugned order, while upholding the validity of the notification under section 4(1) and declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, held that the award was not valid in law since there was a corrigendum issued by the Government. Consequently, the procedure provided under the Act was to be followed by operation of Section 37 of the Act. Thus these appeals by special leave.

p. 702, margin A

Unnumbered paragraph

Mr. U.R. Lalit, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents, contends that once the reservation has been deleted., status quo ante stands restored. As a consequence, the entire process required under Section 28 and Section 31 read with Section 37 requires to be followed. In this case, that was not done. The High Court was right in quashing the award. We find no force in the contention.

p. 702, margin F

Unnumbered paragraph

It is true that if any scheme is modified and the plan has become final, the procedure contemplated under Sections 28 and 31 read with Section 37 of the Act is required to be adopted. But in this case, it is seen that as per the corrigendum what has been modified is that the entire site is now reserved for 'informal housing' and stable. Originally, the entire area was reserved for stables and 100' wide road. The reservation was deleted earlier, as stated above, and western part was included in commercial zone and eastern part was included in the residential zone on the plan. In view of the fact that status quo ante of the final plan was restored, though a part of it is now said to be used for residential purpose, the question is : whether the entire process of the issuance of the notice under Section 28 involving consideration of the objections and passing of the final plan after consideration is required to be gone through? It is seen that by operation of Section 127 of the Act where any land is included in any of scheme as being reserved, allotted or designated for any purpose specified therein or for the purpose of Planning Authority or Development Authority or Appropriate Authority and the State Government is satisfied that the same land is needed for public purpose different from any such public purpose or purpose of the Planning Authority, Development Authority or Appropriate Authority, the State Government may notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, acquire such land under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Sub-section (3) envisages that on the land vesting in the State Government under Section 16 or 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as the case may be, the relevant plan or scheme shall be deemed to be suitably varied by reason of acquisition of the said land. Thus it could be seen that once a notification under Section 4(1) was published and the declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act came to be published, the public purpose becomes conclusive and for any variation without substantial formalities, it is not necessary that the entire process of re- publication of the notification under Section 28, fmding having been recorded under both the Section 31 read with Section 37, requires to be followed. The view of the High Court, therefore, was not correct.

pp. 702–703, margin G

Unnumbered paragraph

It is then contended by Mr. U.R. Lalit, that the respondents had not been given the information of the notification under Section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act. Therefore, the award is bad in law. We find no force in the contention. In the absence of notice or failure to serve notice, the award does not become invalid. Due to the fact that immediately after the award and before the publication of the award, the writ petition came to be filed on September 25, 1980, we direct the appel- !ants to make an application within six weeks under Section 18(1) of the Land Acquisition Act seeking reference. The Land Acquisition Officer is directed to refer the matter to the competent civil Court for disposal within two months according to law.

pp. 703–704, margin F

Unnumbered paragraph

The appeals are accordingly allowed but without costs. T.N.A. Appeals allowed.

p. 704, margin A