Certo Is this judgment real?
Beta, Supreme Court only. We check Supreme Court of India judgments only for now: a High Court citation reads "Not in our corpus", which never means it does not exist.

Supreme Court of India

M/S STAR WIRE (INDIA) LTD. versus THE STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS.

Decided
25 September 1996
Judges listed
K. RAMASWAMY (as the open data lists them; this may not name the whole bench)
Disposal
Dismissed

Citations

Official
[1996] SUPP. 7 S.C.R. 6 · 1996 INSC 1107
Also cited as
  • (1996) 11 SCC 698 (23 citing judgments)

Learned from how other judgments cite this one, in their text or in the official Supreme Court Reports' lists of cases they refer to: each is cited this way by at least two judgments, and at least twice as often as any other citation to this judgment in that report. We hold no commercial reporter's text, only these citation strings.

Cited by

Cited in 6 other Supreme Court judgments we hold. The 5 most recent:

Counted only in the Supreme Court judgments we hold whose text we could read, not in High Court judgments. We match each citation to a judgment automatically, so a citation we cannot match is not counted. "Cited" says only that a judgment refers to this one, not whether it followed, distinguished or overruled it.

The Court's text

Paragraphs from our copy of the Supreme Court Reports print, with the Court's own paragraph numbers, the printed page and, where printed, the margin letter. The Court did not number this judgment's paragraphs, so they are listed by page. Link to paragraph N with #para-N.

Delay condoned .

p. 7, margin C

This special leave petition arises from the judgment of the Punjab & Haryana High Court made on April 25, 1996 in LPA No.437/96. Notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, the 'Act'] was published on June 1, 1976. Declaration under Section 6 of the Act was published on February 16, 1977. The award was passed on July 3, 1981. Thereafter, the reference also become final. The petitioner has challenged the notification, the declaration and the award as illegal, it contends that the award does not come in the way of the petitioner in filing the writ petition on January 21,1994. The High Court has dismissed the writ petition on the grounds of laches.

p. 7, margin D

Shri P.P. Rao, learned senior counsel for the petitioner, contends that the petitioner had no knowledge of the acquisition proceedings; as soon as it came to know of the acquisition, it had challenged the validity of the acquisition proceedings and, therefore, it furnishes cause of action to the petitioner. He further contends that the writ petition could not be dismissed on the ground of laches but was required to be considered on merits. We find no force in the contention. Any encumbrance created by the erstwhile owner of the land after publication of the notification under Section 4( 1) does not bind the State if the possession of the land is already taken over, after the award came to be passed. The land stood vested -in the State free from all encumbrances under Section 16. In Gunnukh Singh & Ors. v. The State of Haryana, JT (1995) 8 SC 208, this Court has held that a subsequent purchaser is not entitled to challenge the legality of the acquisition proceedings on the ground uf lack of publication of the notification. In Y.N. Garg v. State of Rajasthan, [1996] 1 SCC 284 and Sneh Prabha v. State of U.P., [1996] 7 SCC 325,.this Court had held the alienations made by the erstwhile owner of the land after publication of the notification under Section 4(1), do not bind either· the State Government or the beneficiary for whose benefit the land was acquired. The purchaser does not acquire any valid title. Even the colour of title claimed by the purchaser was void. The beneficiary is entitled to have absolute possession free from encumbrances. In U.P. Jal Nigam, Lucknow through its Chainnan & Anr. v. M/s. Katra Properties (P) Ltd., Lucknow & Ors., [1996] 1 SCC 124, this Court had further held that the purchaser of the property, after the notification under Section 4(1) was published, is devoid of right to challenge the validity of the notification or irregularity in taking possession of the land before publication of the declaration under Section 6. As regards )aches in approaching the Court, this Court has been consistently taking the view starting from State of Madhya Pradesh ,& Anr. v. Bhailal Bhai & Ors., AIR (1964) SC 1006 wherein a Constitution; Bench had held that it is not either desirable or expedient to lay down a rule of universal application but the unreasonable delay denies to the petitioner, the discretionary extraordinary remedy of mandamus, certiorari or any other relief. The same was view reiterated in catena of decisions, viz., Rabindranath Bose & Ors. v. The Union of India & Ors., (1970] 1 SCC 84; State of Mysore & Ors. v. Narsimha Ram Naik, AIR (1975) SC 2190; Aflatoon & Anr. v. Lt. Govemor of Delhi [1975] 4 SCC 285; Mis. Tilokchand Motichand & Ors. v. H.B. Munshi, Commissioner of Sales Tax, Bombay & Anr., AIR (1970) SC 898; State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. Etc. v. L. Krishnan & Ors. Etc., JT (1995) 8 SC 1; Improvement Trnst, Faridkot & Ors. v. Jagjit Singh & Ors., [1987] Supp. SCC 608; State of Punjab & Ors. v. Hari Om Co-operative House Building Society Ltd., Amritsar, (1987] Supp. SCC 687; Market Committee, Hoda/ v. Krishan Murari & Ors., JT (1995) 8 SC 494 and State of Haryana v. Dewan Singh, [1996] 7 SCC 394 wherein this Court had held that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the acquisition proceedings. This Court in the latest judgment in Municipal Corporation of Great Bombay v. The Industrial Development & Investment Co. Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., JT (1996) 8 SC 16, reviewed the entire case law and held that the person who approaches the Court belatedly will be told that laches close the gates of the Court for him to question the legality of the notification under Section 4(1), declaration under Section 6 and the award of the Collector under Section 11.

pp. 7–9, margin E

In this case, admittedly, the petitioner has purchased the property covered by the notification J1nder Section 4(1) after it was published and, therefore, it's title is a void title. It has no right to challenge the acquisition proceedings much less the award. The Division Bench of the High Court has exhaustively reviewed the case law to negate the claim of the petitioner. We do not find any illegality in the judgment of the High Court warranting interference.

p. 9, margin A

The special leave petition is accordingly dismissed. R.P . Appeal dismissed.

p. 9, margin C