Certo Is this judgment real?
Beta, Supreme Court only. We check Supreme Court of India judgments only for now: a High Court citation reads "Not in our corpus", which never means it does not exist.

Supreme Court of India

THE STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ANR. versus T. VENKATARAMANAPPA

Decided
20 September 1996
Judges listed
M.M. PUNCHHI (as the open data lists them; this may not name the whole bench)
Disposal
Disposed off

Citations

Official
[1996] SUPP. 6 S.C.R. 607 · 1996 INSC 1086
Also cited as
  • (1996) 6 SCC 455 (14 citing judgments)

Learned from how other judgments cite this one, in their text or in the official Supreme Court Reports' lists of cases they refer to: each is cited this way by at least two judgments, and at least twice as often as any other citation to this judgment in that report. We hold no commercial reporter's text, only these citation strings.

Not shown
1 other citation string that other judgments attach to this one, on evidence too thin or too divided to publish.

Cited by

Cited in 1 other Supreme Court judgment we hold.

Counted only in the Supreme Court judgments we hold whose text we could read, not in High Court judgments. We match each citation to a judgment automatically, so a citation we cannot match is not counted. "Cited" says only that a judgment refers to this one, not whether it followed, distinguished or overruled it.

The Court's text

Paragraphs from our copy of the Supreme Court Reports print, with the Court's own paragraph numbers, the printed page and, where printed, the margin letter. The Court did not number this judgment's paragraphs, so they are listed by page. Link to paragraph N with #para-N.

Unnumbered paragraph

Leave granted.

p. 607, margin F

Unnumbered paragraph

This is an appeal against the order of the Karnataka Administrative Tribunal (the Tribunal) at Bangalore whereunder the respondent seemingly was absolved from facing a departmental enquiry on the charge of having contracted a second marriage in the presence of the one subsisting with his acknowledged wife and, as a result of which, the orders of suspension passed against the respondent were lifted conferring consequential benefits. It appears from the record that the respondent, a Police Constable, faced prosecution at the instance of his wife, before the criminal court and was discharged for want of evidence of the_ 2nd marriage. On the other hand, a departmental enquiry was instituted against the respondent for which, priorly, he was suspended. He, in turn, approached the Tribunal for the twin relief of (i) lifting the suspension order and (ii) to stop the enquiry on the ground that the criminal court had on 14.1.1988 discharged him of the offence of bigamy. These pleas found favour with the Tribunal and, resultantly, the departmental proceedings were quashed and the suspension lifted.

pp. 607–608, margin G

Unnumbered paragraph

When this matter was brought to this Court, it was pleaded that the said order of the criminal court, dated 14.1.1988 had been subjected to revision and there was a likelihood of the view of ·the Magistrate being reversed. Now, it transpires that the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge concerned vide order dated 11.9.1990, has affirmed the view of the Trial Magistrate with the result that the respondent remains discharged. This apparently is on the basis that strict proof of solemnisation of thf~ second marriage must be proved before conviction can be recorded for such offence. There is a st!ing of judgments of this Court whereunder' strict proof of solemnisation of the second marriage, with due observance of rituals and ceremonies, has been insisted upon. The prosecution evidence in the criminal complaint may have fallen short. of those standards but that . does not meari th~.t the State was in any way debarred from invoking Rule 28 of the Karnataka Civil Service Rules, which 'forbids a Government servant tci marry a second time without the permission of the Government. But, h~re, the respondent being a B:indu," could never have been granted permission by the Government to marry a second time because of his personal law· forbidding such marriage_. It was thus beyond the ken of the Tribunal to have scuttled the dep~rtmental proc~edings against the respondent on the footing that such question of bigamy should normally not be taken up for decision in departmental enq~iries, as tlie decisions of competent courts tending to be decisions in rem would stand at the highest pedestal. There was a clear fallacy in such view because for purposes of Rule 28, such strict standards, as would warrant a conviction for bigamy under Section 494 IPC, may not, to begin with, be necessary. We therefore explain away the orders of the Tribunal to the afore extent that Rule 28 can be invoked, but would certainly maintain the orders of revocation of suspension since in the presence of the orders of discharge in favour of the A respondent, his continued suspension during the enquiry was totally unwarranted. Let the enquiry be held.

pp. 608–609, margin C

Unnumbered paragraph

There is thus partial success for both the parties. The appeal stands ordered with these observations and directions. G.N. Appeal disposed of.

p. 609