MAHANT RAM KHILAWAN DAS versus STATE OF M.P.

This is an appeal by special ~leave against the judgment and decree dated 17th of October, 2000 of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in Second Appeal No. 443 of 1994 whereby the High Court had set aside the judgment and decree of the Additional District Judge, Panna who in his turn had allowed the appellant's appeal against the decree of the trial court dismissing the suit for declaration and permanent injunction filed by the appellant.

p. 604, margin A

The case of the appellant is that a temple in the name of "Shala Janki Raman Mandir' in village Gadhi Padrariya and the agricultural lands (in short "the suit lands") as fully described in paragraph 1 of the plaint were owned by Mahant Ramdas, who was the guru of the appellant, as Manager of the same. The temple and the suit lands were bequeathed to the appellant by Mahant Ramdas to succeed to the same as Manager. In the year 1987-88, the cl:>llector Panna started auctioning the suit lands and therefore, the appellant filed a suit for declaration of title with regard to the suit lands and also a decree for permanent injunction restraining the respondent from interfering with the enjoyment and possession of the same. The suit filed by the appellant was contested by the respondent on the ground that the temple and the suit lands were the property of the state and that Mahant Ramdas was appointed as a priest and after his death, the appellant was appointed in his place as the priest. It was furth~ralleged that when the appellant sent a resignation letter to the Collector, the same was accepted and another person was appointed in place of the appellant as the priest. .. Neither Mahant Ramdas nor the appellant owned the temple or the suit lands, which were the property of the state and the Will in question was a fabricated document, which was prepared to grab the temple and the suit lands. The trial court dismissed the suit of the appellant. Feeling aggrieved, the appellant preferred an appeal before the Additional District Judge, Panna and the same was allowed. Against this decision of the first appellate ·~ court, the respondent filed a second appeal, which, as noted herein earlier, was allowed. It is this judgment of the High Court which is impugned in this appeal.

pp. 604–605, margin B

While allowing the second appeal, the High Court had framed the following substantial question of law: - "Whether in the light of the admissions of the plaintiff that his name does not find place in the revenue records and that he was forcibly dispossessed by the Collector in 1987, the courts below have committed an error in granting decree for declaration and injunction?

p. 605, margin A

The learned counsel for the appellant contended, inter alia, that the High Court had committed an error in as much the question framed by it was not a substantial question of but in fact only a question of fact and therefore, the substantial question of law as framed by the High Court could not be treated as a substantial question of law so as to interfere with the well reasoned judgment of the first appellate court. It was also contended that the High Court had based its judgment on alleged admission of the appellant ignoring the other documents and evidence already on record on the basis of which the first appellate court had decreed the suit of the appellant. This submission of the learned counsel for the appellant was seriously contested by the learned counsel for the respondent who contended that the High Court was fully justified in reversing judgment of the first appellate court and in restoring the judgment of the trial court.

p. 605, margin A

Havin~ heard the learned counsel for the parties and after examining the judgment of the High Court as well as of courts below and other materials on record, we are of the view that the High Court had not framed the substantial question law properly in the second appeal so as to interfere with the judgment of the first appellate court. We are of the opinion that the question of law as framed by the High Court was totally based on the alleged admission of the appellant that his name did not find mention in the revenue records and that he was forcibly dispossessed by the Collector of the District. At the same time, even assuming that there was an admission on the part the appellant, before reversing court, the High Court ought to evidence on record on which its findings. It is well settled rights raise a presumption of adduce evidence, it is open that the entries in the record were erroneous. Therefore, of the appellant that his name records, it would not conclusively failed to prove his title to the evidence on record to prove whether the appellant was same was a question of fact, be a substantial question substantial question of law so a substantial question of law of the first appellate court could

pp. 605–606, margin F

It is well settled that should not substitute the findings own findings unless there is of material evidence. [See Savitribai Sopan Gujar [(1999) 3 perusal of the impugned judgment that practically, the High Court first appellate court only on the to the extent that his name record of rights in respect of herein earlier, even if such appellant, then also no inference appellant had no title to the appellant had substantiated enough material-documentary courts. It is also well settled only raise a presumption that in the record of rights is in possession same can be rebutted by adduction of evidence-documentary or oral on record. In the present case, as we have already roted that the High Court, relying only on the alleged admission of tre appellant, had reversed the findings of the first appellate court on the question of fact. However, from the findings of fact arrived at by the first appellate court, it is clear that the other material evidence on record would clearly show that the presumption of the entries in the record of rights relating to the suit lands was amply rebutted and the finding that the appellant had title to the suit lands was amply proved. The first appellate court had drawn an adverse inference against the respondent by coming to a finding that the respondent had not adduced any evidence to the effect that for doing an amendment in the Khasra or other government records, the appellant or his Guru Baba Ram Dass were given any notice under section 115 of the M.P. Land Revenue Act and accordingly, it was helq by the first appellate court that the appellant before us was not bound those entries. So far as the question of possession of the suit lands is concerned, the first appellate court, which was the final court of fact, had made the following findings: - "In addition to PWs of appellants, Angad Prasad Panda (RW-3) and K.L. Paikray (RW-4) have accepted on their cross-examination that appellant was priest of the temple and till this day, he had been cultivating the lands till the last 2 years back. Appellant has stated in para No. 3 of his statement that he has been cultivating 30 acres of land and remaining is left for cows and calves. The respondent has not examined auction purchaser Asha Ram Pujari. In the absence of his deposition, the defence become baseless and contrary to it, the presumption is that appellant is still doing puja of the temple Shala Janaki Raman and upon his lands, it is his possession. " Be that as it may, without coming to a positive conclusion on the above aspect, we are of the view that the substantial question of law was not properly framed and in that view of the matter, thl;! appeal needs to be allowed and the judgment of the A High Court set aside and the second appeal is remitted to the High Court for framing a proper substantial question of law and after framing such question, proceed to decide the appeal on merits on the evidence already on record. Whatever observations have been arrived at by us in this judgment shall R be taken to be tentative and the High Court would be free to decide the second appeal after framing a proper substantial question of law.

pp. 606–608, margin D

For the reasons aforesaid, the appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above. We request the High Court to dispose ' of the second appeal within a period of 6 months from the date of supply of a copy of this order. There will be no order as to costs. N.J. Appeal allowed.

p. 608