Supreme Court of India
KARAN SINGH AND ORS. versus UNION OF INDIA
- Decided
- 7 August 1996
- Judges listed
- K. RAMASWAMY, G.B. PATTANAIK
- Disposal
- Dismissed
Citations
- Official
- [1996] SUPP. 4 S.C.R. 375 · 1996 INSC 846
Cited by
We found no other Supreme Court judgment we hold that cites this one.
Counted only in the Supreme Court judgments we hold whose text we could read, not in High Court judgments. We match each citation to a judgment automatically, so a citation we cannot match is not counted. "Cited" says only that a judgment refers to this one, not whether it followed, distinguished or overruled it.
The Court's text
Paragraphs from our copy of the Supreme Court Reports print, with the Court's own paragraph numbers, the printed page and, where printed, the margin letter. The Court did not number this judgment's paragraphs, so they are listed by page. Link to paragraph N with #para-N.
This appeal arises from the Judgment dated July 23, 1984 of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court made in R.F.A. No. 281 of 1979.
p. 375, margin G
Notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, the "Act") acquiring a large extent of land was published on March 8, 1957. The land of the appellant admeasuring one bigha and 14 biswas formed part of that land. Reference Court relying upon judgment of the High Court inA.N. B!ia11dari v. U11io11 of India, LPA No. 81 of (1979) decided on May 1, 1990 awarded compensation @ Rs. 10 per square yard. On appeal, it was confirmed. The High Court relied upon a single sale deed in similar case in which market value had been fixed @ Rs. 12 per square yard. Therefore, the appellant also claimed that rate. Since he was not awarded the rate claimed by him, he has filed appeal in this Court challenging the impugned judgment of the High Court.
pp. 375–376, margin G
Shri Juneja, learned counsel for the appellant contended that the High Court, having found that the market value of the land in question could fetch was Rs. 12 per square yard, would have granted compensation at that rate. Though p1ima fade we find the contention plausible and acceptable, in view of the legal position that at least 1/3rd of the market value has to be deduced towards development charges and that the said consideration was not adopted in the case on which reliance is placed, the fact boils down that if the award is to be interfered with, the appellant would get Jess than what has been granted to him by the High Court. However, since the State has not filed any appeal and in the facts and circurr.stanccs of the casc we are of the view that it is not a case warranting interference.
p. 376, margin B
The appeal under Section 54 of the Act would not lie lo this Court.. A reading of Section 54 would clearly indicate that the appeal shall lie in any proceedings under the act only to the High Court against the award and decree of the reference Court and further appeal to this Court would be under Article 136 of the Constitution read with Section 11, CPC. by way of special leave and not under section 54 of the Act.
p. 376, margin E
Accordingly, this appeal cannot be treated to be an appeal under Section 54 of the Act but one by special leave under Article 136. In either case, we do not find any ground warranting interference. Hence the appeal is dismissed. No costs. R.P. Appeal dismissed.
p. 376, margin F