IN RE: MEPUNG TADAR BAGE, MEMBER, ARUNACHAL PRADESH PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION versus

Consequent upon appointment and joining of Ms. Mepung Tadar Bage as Hon’ble Member, APPSC on 13th August, 2021, the earlier order even no. and dated 9th June, 2021 stands modified. Hence, for better supervision and timely monitoring of recruitment related activities of the Commission, the following distribution of works is ordered with immediate effect:

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1. Shri Tsering Naksang, Hon’ble Member–I (i) A.P. Secretariat service matters thereof (ii) Deptt. of Higher & Technical Education (iii) Deptt. of Secondary Education (iv) Deptt. of Elementary Education (v) Environment & Forests (vi) Deptt. of Disaster Management (vii) Rectt. of JE(Civil)/AUPO (viii) Finance, Planning & Disinvestment (ix) Power (Electrical/Civil) (x) Hydropower (xi) Library

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(xii) IPR

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2. Major General Ganesh Singh Bisht, VSM (Retd), Hon’ble Member–II

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(i) Arunachal Pradesh Public Service Combined Competitive Examination (APPSCCE) (ii) Tourism (iii) Tax & Excise (iv) Department of Home (v) Information Technology (IT) (vi) Annual Reports of APPSC (vii) Audit & Pension (viii) Textile & Handicraft (ix) Youth Affairs & Sports (x) Agriculture (xi) Horticulture (xii) AH & Veterinary

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3. Major General Jarken Gamlin, AVSM, SM, VSM (Retd.), Hon’ble Member–III (i) RD & Panchayati Raj (ii) Accounts & Treasuries (iii) RWD (iv) Asstt. Engineer (Civil) (v) Political Department

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(vi) Tomo Riba Institute of Health & Medical Science (TRIHMS) (vii) Administrative Training Institute (ATI) (viii) DPC (ix) Periodic weeding of records & management. (x) Fishery

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(xi) Transport & Civil Aviation

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4. Ms. Mepung Tadar Bage, Hon’ble Member–IV (i) Law & Judicial (ii) Social Welfare, Women & Child Development (iii) Health & Family Welfare (iv) State Election Commission (v) Right to information Act, 2005 (vi) State Chief Election Office (vii) State Election Commission (viii) State Legislative Assembly (ix) All legal matters including (PILs). (x) Art & Cultural Affairs (xi) Food & Civil Supply

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(xii) Social Justice, Empowerment & Tribal Affairs Any matter/subject/Department not specifically allotted to any members shall be submitted to the Chairman. All files shall be routed through the concerned Hon’ble Members before submission to the Chairman.

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Sd/- Nipo Nabam Chairman

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APPSC Memo No. PSC-R(A)/23/2017

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Dated Itanagar, the 18th August, 2021.”

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62. Upon reading the work allotment order reproduced above, it is clear that it was issued by the Chairman after appointment of the Respondent for better supervision and timely monitoring of recruitment activities of the Commission. The matter relating to the recruitment of Assistant Engineer (Civil) was assigned to Major General Jarken Gamlin, AVSM, SM, VSM (Retd.), Hon’ble Member–III of the APPSC and Ms. Mepung Tadar Bage was assigned the work relating to ‘Law & Judicial’ and ‘All legal matters including (PIL)’, among other responsibilities. When learned counsel for the APPSC was further asked to show how the Respondent being in charge of legal matters was exclusively responsible for revising 2017 Guidelines, in reply, nothing was placed on record to prove the said allegation. In fact, by an additional affidavit dated 17.03.2025, it has been admitted by the APPSC that firstly, there is no document or order which clarifies the specific nature of duties to be discharged by a member of the Commission; secondly, no member of the Commission was solely or exclusively assigned the task of revising the 2017 Guidelines. Hence, it cannot be said that the Respondent was assigned any work of the Commission to be performed by her and because of not discharging the work to bring the new guidelines, she failed to perform her duty, for which she may be held liable for an act of misbehaviour. It was also stated by the APPSC that the Respondent’s individual failure has resulted in an institutional failure as there was a collective duty of the APPSC to ensure security and confidentiality. Nothing has been brought on record to support this argument even during hearing. Simultaneously, failure in discharge of individual duties by the Respondent has also not been proved and such being the case, attributing the institutional failure in bringing about reforms in examination process and to initiate the new guidelines to her solely appears to be speculative and untenable.

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63. Learned Attorney General of India has made a valiant attempt to persuade us that there are certain common functions of a Public Service Commission which have to be performed by every member of that Commission to ensure a fair, transparent and smooth functioning and the Court must look at the charges framed in the Presidential Reference and assess whether the intention was to address the individual dereliction of duty or collective dereliction by the Commission. He argues that Article 317(1) of the Constitution of India encompasses misbehaviour on an institutional level as well, where a Public Service Commission may be responsible collectively in failing to discharge its duties and thereby guilty of misbehaviour. It was also submitted by the learned Attorney General of India that the report of the Inquiry Committee looked at the incident as another episode of leakage in terms of collective duties of APPSC. We have given due consideration to the submissions made by the learned Attorney General of India, and we find it difficult to agree with him. As discussed above, a bare reading of Article 317(1) of the Constitution would indicate that removal on the ground of misbehaviour is individual and not collective in nature.

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Collective Responsibility

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64. Article 317 of the Constitution of India does not envisage the principle of Collective Responsibility, unlike some other provisions of the Constitution of India. Yet, we find it imperative to reproduce excerpts from judicial precedents on Collective Responsibility at this juncture in order to describe their inapplicability to the instant matter. The jurisprudence is expounded by this Court is discussed in the

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following paragraphs.

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65. In the case of Common Cause v. Union of India, (1999) 6 SCC 667, the concept of collective responsibility was elaborately discussed in the following words: - “31. The concept of “collective responsibility” is essentially a political concept. The country is governed by the party in power on the basis of the policies adopted and laid down by it in the Cabinet meeting. “Collective responsibility” has two meanings: the first meaning which can legitimately be ascribed to it is that all members of a Government are unanimous in support of its policies and would exhibit that unanimity on public occasions although while formulating the policies, they might have expressed a different view in the meeting of the Cabinet. The other meaning is that Ministers, who had an opportunity to speak for or against the policies in the Cabinet are thereby personally and morally responsible for its success and failure. 32. In the British Constitution & Politics, 5th Edn. by J. Harvey and L. Bather, it is said as under:

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“Except when a Minister explains the reasons for his resignation, Parliament hears nothing of the Cabinet’s current deliberations. These remain secret, and only decisions as a whole are reported to the House when policy is announced. Any leakage of divergent views held by Ministers would, as during Queen Victoria’s reign, seriously weaken the Government. In its decisions, ‘the Cabinet is a unity to the House’. While a Minister can speak against any proposal in a Cabinet meeting, he must either support the policy decided upon or resign. Recent resignations of this nature are Frank Cousins (Prices and Incomes Bill, 1966) and Lord Longford (Education Cuts, 1968). But such resignations are infrequent. Ministers come from the same party and, at least initially, are fairly homogeneous in their political views. In any case, a former Minister is unlikely to cross the floor of the House and join the opposition. His disagreement with the Government is usually over only one issue, and his basic political outlook remains unchanged. Thus, the Cabinet stands or falls together. Where the policy of a particular Minister is under attack, it is the Government as a whole which is being attacked. Thus, the defeat of a Minister on any major issue represents a defeat for the Government. However, today, unlike the nineteenth century, such defeats do not occur. The use of rigid party discipline ensures that the Government can always obtain a majority vote. Nevertheless, criticism may be so severe and widespread that the Government may modify its policy. If the Minister identified with it feels that his prestige with the party has been badly damaged, he may resign, e.g. Sir Samuel Hoare (1935) over the proposals to partition Abyssinia. In practice, therefore, all that collective responsibility means today is that every member of the Government must be prepared to support all Cabinet decisions both inside and outside

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the House.” It is further provided as under:

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“The doctrine of collective responsibility has practical advantages. First, it counteracts departmental separation for each Minister has to be concerned with policies of other departments. Second, it prevents the policy of one department being determined unilaterally. Since it is the Cabinet as a whole which decides, Ministers are less likely to be overinfluenced by their civil servants. Third, it ensures that Cabinet decisions are based on principles and not on personalities. Collective responsibility does not apply to a Minister’s responsibility for his permanent

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officials or for his personal mistakes.” 33. In this connection, an extract from The British Cabinet by John P. Mackintosh, 1962 Edn., is set out below as it is also extremely relevant for this case:

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“Much has been said and written about the responsibility of Ministers. The discussion can easily become confused because of the different meanings that are attached to the word ‘responsible’. Collective responsibility will be discussed below, and the first task is to consider whether there is any separate element of individual responsibility. The most common political meaning is that a certain Minister will answer parliamentary questions on a given subject. A second sense arises when those in political circles appreciate that a particular policy is largely the idea of the Minister, rather than the traditional policy of the party in power, and they may single out the Minister for attack. For instance, in 1903-05 Wyndham was pursuing his land purchase schemes for Ireland in a manner which alarmed many conservatives and would certainly have been unlikely under any other Chief Secretary. A third sense is simply that a Minister is responsible even if a policy is the work of the Cabinet as a whole but his colleagues choose to place the burden upon him. Thus, Sir Samuel Hoare thought he was acting in accordance with the views of the Ministry in concluding the Hoare-Lavel Pact and his decisions were subsequently endorsed by the Cabinet till opposition became acute. He was then asked to disavow and denounce his actions but preferred ‘accepting his responsibility’, to resign. There is, in addition, the normal moral sense of the word meaning ‘culpable’ and a Minister may, like a private individual, feel responsible if he could by greater wisdom or exertion have prevented some unfortunate occurrence. The one aspect that remains is the alleged obligation on a Minister to resign when he or one of his subordinates has blundered. The origin of this notion is fairly clear. It dates from the 1850s and 1860s when it was reasonable to assume that a Minister could watch over every significant action of his department. Even then, there would have been no need to acknowledge errors in this way but for the power of the House of Commons to move and carry a motion censuring the individual in question without necessarily dislodging the

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Government.”

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66. Thereafter, in the case of State (NCT of Delhi) v. Union of India, (2018) 8 SCC 501, this Court gave a comprehensive interpretation of the term Collective Responsibility, which is as follows: - “318. Collective responsibility is a cornerstone of the Westminster model. Initially developed as a constitutional convention in Britain between 1780 and 1832, it began to appear in textbooks in the 1860s and 1870s. In 1867, Walter Bagehot, in his classic work titled The English Constitution, called the “House of Commons” as “a real choosing body”, which decides the path that the nation would follow. The consequence of such a systemic expectation in the British Parliamentary system, Bagehot declared, was that the public can, “through Parliament, turn out an administration which is not doing as it likes, and can put in an administration which will do as it likes”. The responsibility of Ministers was set as their liability “to have all their public acts discussed in Parliament”. The Cabinet was defined as “a collective body bound together by a common responsibility”. Later, Lord Salisbury formulated this common responsibility thus:

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“[F]or all that passes in a Cabinet, each Member of it who does not resign is absolutely and irretrievably responsible, and that he has no right afterwards to say that he agreed in one case to a compromise, while in another he was persuaded by one of his colleagues.… It is only on the principle that absolute responsibility is undertaken by every Member of a Cabinet who, after a decision is arrived at, remains a Member of it, that the joint responsibility of Ministers to Parliament can be upheld, and one of the most essential conditions of parliamentary responsibility established.”

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(emphasis supplied) Ministers were liable to lose their offices, if they failed to retain the confidence of the House of Commons or Parliament. 319. In the 1880s, Dicey in Law of the Constitution, propounded that:

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“[It] is now well-established law that the Crown can act only through Ministers and according to certain prescribed forms which absolutely require the cooperation of some Minister, such as a Secretary of State or the Lord Chancellor, who thereby becomes not only morally but legally responsible for the legality of the act in which he takes part. Hence, indirectly but surely, the action of every servant of the Crown, and therefore, in effect of the Crown itself, is brought under the supremacy of the land. Behind parliamentary responsibility lies legal liability, and the acts of Ministers no less than the acts of subordinate officials are made subject to the

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rule of law.” This fixed the responsibility of the Cabinet for the “general conduct of affairs” of the Government. 320. In the twentieth century, Sir Ivor Jennings conceptualised collective responsibility of a Cabinet Government, thus:

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“A Government that cannot make up its mind on a fundamental issue ought not to be the Government and will be so regarded in the constituencies. Its fall may be regarded as

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imminent.” The conduct of the Cabinet determines the fate of the Government. 321. Collective responsibility of Ministers to Parliament is comprehended in two aspects: (i) collective responsibility of Ministers for the policies of the Government; and (ii) individual responsibility of Ministers for the work of their governments. The idea behind this bifurcation, as explained by Birch, is to hold a Government “continuously accountable for its actions, so that it always faces the possibility that a major mistake may result in a withdrawal of parliamentary support.” In the British system, collective responsibility works on basis of certain precepts which define and regulate the existence of Government. Geoffrey Marshall (1989) identifies three strands within the principle:

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(i) The confidence principle: A Government can only remain in office for so long as it retains the confidence of the House of Commons, a confidence which can be assumed unless and until proven otherwise by a confidence vote; (ii) The unanimity principle: All Members of the Government speak and vote together in Parliament, save in situations where the Prime Minister and the Cabinet themselves make an exception such as a free vote or an “agreement to differ”; and (iii) The confidentiality principle: Unanimity, as a universally applicable situation, is a constitutional fiction, but one which must be maintained, and is said to allow frank ministerial discussion within

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the Cabinet and the Government. 323. The doctrine of collective responsibility has evolved as one of the indispensable features of the parliamentary system of Government and reflects the political engagement between Government and Parliament. In a parliamentary democracy, the nuances of the doctrine are political. To maintain the notion of “collegiality and coherence”, the Ministers work as a team. In the Australian context, Wanna (2012) postulates that collective responsibility thereby acts as an underflowing current necessary for the survival of a Government:

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“… To survive as a Government, Ministries must show they can maintain the confidence of the House, put up a credible front to their political opponents and the media, and as a working Ministry find ways to deal with the business of State, much of which will involve making collective decisions and imposing collegial

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executive authority.” 324. Granville Austin observes that the Framers of India’s Constitution conceived that the democratic values of the Constitution would be achieved in “the institutions of direct, responsible Government”. The Members of the Constituent Assembly borrowed the Parliamentary-Cabinet form of Government from British constitutional theory and adopted it into our Constitution. Though the Constituent Assembly did not adopt British constitutional conventions in the written form, collective responsibility of the Cabinet was specifically incorporated into India’s constitutional framework. 325. There is a direct relationship between the principle of collective responsibility and Government accountability. This relationship is conceptualised in The Oxford Companion to Politics in India:

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“[A]ccountability can be defined in terms of outcomes rather than processes of Government.… It also includes the criterion of responsiveness to changes in circumstances that alter citizen needs and abilities.… In other words, accountability refers to the extent to which actual policies and their implementation coincide with a normative ideal in terms of what they ought to be.… In this broad sense, accountability amounts to evaluating the nature

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of governance itself, in outcome-oriented terms.” 326. The Oxford Handbook of the Indian Constitution (2016) adverts to several facets of collective responsibility:

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“Collective responsibility has several facets. First, Ministers act as a common unit; Cabinet decisions are binding on all Ministers. Disagreements, if any, may be aired in private. Ministers, however, speak in one voice and stand by one another in Parliament and in public. Those that cannot reconcile themselves with particular Government policies, or are unwilling to defend them in public, must resign. Conversely, decisions of particular Ministers, unless overruled, are decisions of the

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Government.” The principle has also been considered as a political component which political parties in power invoke to maintain party discipline. 327. Collective responsibility also exists in practice in situations where Ministers have no knowledge of the actions taken by the subordinate officers of their respective departments:

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“Governing is a complex affair; hundreds of officials in dozens of departments make many decisions on a daily basis. … These officials are also part of the executive, and Ministers are responsible for those that serve in their departments. … Ordinarily, Ministers busy themselves with policy issues; matters of implementation are usually left to officials over whom Ministers command little or no oversight. Yet, when they act, subordinates notionally do so on behalf of Ministers. Ministers, therefore, cannot seek refuge in ignorance. Nor can they absolve themselves by pointing to their officers. Both inside and outside Parliament, they are accountable for their departmental shortcomings.”

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(emphasis in original) 328. Collective responsibility, as a principle and practice, has been given effect authoritatively in several judgments of this Court. The Constitution Bench of this Court, in Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State of Punjab [Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1955 SC 549] , examined the functions of the executive. The Court held that the President is “a formal or constitutional head of the executive” and that the “real executive powers” are vested in the Ministers or the Cabinet : (AIR p. 556, paras 13 & 14)

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“13. … Our Constitution, though federal in its structure, is modelled on the British parliamentary system where the executive is deemed to have the primary responsibility for the formulation of governmental policy and its transmission into law though the condition precedent to the exercise of this responsibility is its retaining the confidence of the legislative branch of the State. … 14. … In the Indian Constitution, therefore, we have the same system of parliamentary executive as in England and the Council of Ministers consisting, as it does, of the Members of the legislature is, like the British Cabinet, “a hyphen which joins, a buckle which fastens the legislative part of the State to the executive part”. The Cabinet enjoying, as it does, a majority in the legislature concentrates in itself the virtual control of both legislative and executive functions; and as the Ministers constituting the Cabinet are presumably agreed on fundamentals and act on the principle of collective responsibility, the most important questions of policy are all formulated by them.”

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(emphasis supplied)

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67. The views of the Founding Fathers of the Constitution are equally pertinent. In the Constituent Assembly Debates, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar spoke thus on collective responsibility: (CAD Vol. 7, pp. 1159-60)

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“I want to tell my friend Prof K.T. Shah that his amendment would be absolutely fatal to the other principle which we want to enact, namely, collective responsibility. All Members of the House are very keen that the Cabinet should work on the basis of collective responsibility and all agree that it is a very sound principle. But I do not know how many Members of the House realise what exactly is the machinery by which collective responsibility is enforced. Obviously, there cannot be a statutory remedy. Supposing a Minister differed from other Members of the Cabinet and gave expression to his views which were opposed to the views of the Cabinet, it would be hardly possible for the law to come in and to prosecute him for having committed a breach of what might be called collective responsibility. Obviously, there cannot be a legal sanction for collective responsibility. The only sanction through which collective responsibility can be enforced is through the Prime Minister. In my judgment collective responsibility is enforced by the enforcement of two principles. One principle is that no person shall be nominated to the Cabinet except on the advice of the Prime Minister. Secondly, no person shall be retained as a Member of the Cabinet if the Prime Minister says that he shall be dismissed. It is only when Members of the Cabinet both in the matter of their appointment as well as in the matter of their dismissal are placed under the Prime Minister, that it would be possible to realise our ideal of collective responsibility. I do not see any other means or any other way of giving effect to that principle. Supposing you have no Prime Minister; what would really happen? What would happen is this, that every Minister will be subject to the control or influence of the President. It would be perfectly possible for the President who is not ad idem with a particular Cabinet, to deal with each Minister separately, singly, influence them and thereby cause disruption in the Cabinet. Such a thing is not impossible to imagine. Before collective responsibility was introduced in the British Parliament you remember how the English King used to disrupt the British Cabinet. He had what was called a Party of King’s Friends both in the Cabinet as well as in Parliament. That sort of thing was put a stop to by collective responsibility. As I said, collective responsibility can be achieved only through the instrumentality of the Prime Minister. Therefore, the Prime Minister is really the keystone of the arch of the Cabinet and unless and until we create that office and endow that office with statutory authority to nominate and dismiss Ministers there can be no collective responsibility.”

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68. In the present case, the Inquiry Committee’s report and the evidence brought before us does not indicate any individual responsibility or fault on the part of the Respondent, the Chairman, or any other APPSC member, much less any collective responsibility. If, on the basis of the material brought, the collective fault of the Commission is prima facie clear, then whether collective responsibility may be invoked can be decided in an appropriate case. However, in the present case, we are not impressed by the argument, as such, it

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is repelled.

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69. In Ram Ashray Yadav (Dr.), Chairman, Bihar Public Service Commission, In R/o (Special Reference No. 1 of 1997) (Supra) and Reference Under Article 317(1) of the Constitution of India, Chhattisgarh Public Service Commission, (Reference No. 1 of 2006) (Supra) where the facts are somewhat similar, the Court has clearly held that if the facts and evidence on record do not show that the Chairman or Member of the Public Service Commission was directly responsible for the irregularities alleged in the charges, then the question of them being guilty of misbehaviour under Article 317(1) of the Constitution of India would not arise. The report in Mehar Singh Saini (Supra) was in a fact-situation where the members of the Commission as well as the Chairman were under reference and there were various allegations of irregularities, such as favouritism in the selection process, not considering the representations made in this regard to the Commission, and of non-cooperation by the member of the Commission in the investigation. In that context, the Court held that the members of the Commission had a responsibility to prevent the loss of faith of the public in the working of the Commission. In the present case, the facts neither show that the Respondent was solely responsible for revision in 2017 Guidelines or to prevent leakage, nor they show any clear act or omission by the Commission which may suffice to impute responsibility on any of the members or the Chairman for such alleged lapse. As such, it cannot be stated that the APPSC is at fault for the same without having proper evidence on record. Further, the admission made by the APPSC in the additional affidavit shows that no single member was responsible for the revision of 2017 Guidelines. Hence, no case

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of collective responsibility is made out in the present case.

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70. Merely because responsibility was given to the Respondent to look into legal matters, would not make her responsible for every act conducted by the APPSC. While it could be said that it is the bounden duty of each member of a Public Service Commission to maintain utmost sincerity and ethics and to ensure absolute confidentiality in the work of the Commission, in this regard, nothing is on record to show that specifically it is the Respondent who has failed in the discharge of her duty by not ensuring the confidentiality. As a member of the APPSC, the Respondent was responsible for the work of the Commission and its duties coextensive with the Chairman and other Members, but she cannot be held liable in her individual capacity by carrying the weight of the entire Commission’s responsibilities

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exclusively.

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71. In the statement of the departmental witnesses also, nothing specific has been stated from which a conclusion may be drawn that the Respondent was assigned some specific duties and because of her act or omission she failed to discharge those duties, which would make her guilty of ‘misbehaviour’. As such the Charge No. IV is also not proved.

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As regards Charge No. VI

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72. Charge No. VI relates to the decision of the APPSC to keep in abeyance its own orders related to punishment awarded to candidates found using unfair means and duty of Respondent to advise APPSC against such abeyance. It posits that it was the duty of Ms. Mepung Tadar Bage to advise against passing such an order of abeyance. In response, the Respondent has specifically said that the APPSC had taken a decision to impose a three-year ban on candidates found to have been engaging in unfair practices. However, on the receipt of several representations from the All Nyishi Students’ Union to take a lenient view, the Secretary of the APPSC was directed to collect detailed information regarding the practices adopted in other State Public Service Commissions and the Union Public Service Commission as there were no guidelines in this regard available in the APPSC. In the absence of clear guidelines in this regard and since there was no quantum of punishment prescribed, and for want of collection of information, the decision was taken by the APPSC

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on 06.06.2022 to keep the punishment orders in abeyance.

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73. In our view, passing an order by the Commission to keep the punishment in abeyance is a discharge of quasi-judicial function of the Commission. Even a wrong decision taken bona-fide by the Commission in discharge of quasi-judicial function would not in any manner fall within the definition of ‘misbehaviour’. In respect of any collective decision of the Commission, the act of the Respondent not advising individually in a particular manner contrary to the said

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decision would not be termed even a lapse on her part.

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74. In addition to the aforesaid, it is necessary to say that after the leakage of the question paper for Mains Examination came to light, the State made a reference to the Inquiry Committee. The Chairman and fellow members of the APPSC submitted their resignation on moral ground and for other reasons. Later, Major General Jarken Gamlin, AVSM, SM, VSM (Retd.) was sworn in as State Chief Information Commissioner of Arunachal Pradesh and Mr. Tsering Naksang was appointed as Chairperson of the Arunachal Pradesh Private Educational Institutions Regulatory Commission. If the members of the APPSC who were allegedly collectively found involved in the paper leak as per the letter of Chief Minister, later resigned and got assignment of new post by the State, it is a question to ponder upon, which ought to be looked into by the State especially so when Article 319(d) of the Constitution of India bars members of a State Public Service Commission from taking up any other employment either under the Government of India or under the Government of a State after they cease to be in office. In our view, if the members were collectively involved, the act of the State Government bequeathing responsibility upon such members, giving them assignment of posts having responsibilities, clearly goes to indicate that there was nothing against the Chairman or any Member of the Commission showing their indictment in a personal capacity of committing any act or omission which may prove misbehaviour on their part. In our view, the act of the State requesting the Hon’ble President of India to initiate the

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removal of the Respondent is arbitrary, unfair and discriminatory.

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75. In view of the above, on taking a holistic approach to the charges framed in the present reference and having gone through the voluminous record and evidence which has been brought before us, juxtaposed against the body of judicial precedent in the form of previous reports under Article 317 of the Constitution of India which guide our decision-making in the present reference, it is difficult to see how the allegation of ‘misbehaviour’ on the part of the Respondent has been proved. Indeed, it is true that the members of the Public Service Commission must be put to higher standards and their conduct must be unimpeachable, but where the consequence of our fact-finding inquiry would be the removal of the Chairman / Member from a constitutional office, we must be abundantly cautioned and tread carefully. In the present case, after appreciation of evidence, we can see that from the very inception, from the report of the Inquiry Committee, no specific allegation against the Respondent qua any of the six charges was levelled. Chapter 7 of this report, which forms the very basis of the present reference, merely makes some suggestions for improvement in the functioning of the APPSC and to adopt best practices. But it makes no adverse comment or personal indictment against the Respondent. The intent of Article 317 of the Constitution of India was to give a higher degree of protection to the members of the Public Service Commission by eliminating political or any pressure otherwise. In the present case, right from the very beginning, the letter of the Chief Minister to the Governor dated 27.10.2022 states that “The Commission Members, with allegations of tainted selection procedure cannot claim any immunity and should have resigned on their own as was done by the Chairman APPSC”. Likewise, the letter of the Hon’ble Governor to the Hon’ble President of India dated 02.12.2022 states that the Respondent being the last remaining member (others having tendered resignation) must be removed and fresh Commission must be instituted to restore trust in the Commission. Both the above letters impute responsibility for the leakage of the question paper for the Mains Examination upon the members of the Commission even though there was no such finding in the Inquiry Report. In our opinion, these letters further make it clear that the State dealt with the matter with a prejudice that the Members of the Commission were responsible for the paper leakage without sufficient material or evidence to reach such a conclusion. These letters were toned in a manner that it was absolutely imperative for the Members to resign and to constitute a new Commission for

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resolving the issues of confidentiality.

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76. The actions alleged against the Respondent do not meet the threshold of ‘misbehaviour’, rather, they do not even meet the threshold of ‘lapse’ which has a lower threshold. It is not a case where the Respondent was unable to maintain the standard of conduct expected of a Member of a Commission and her actions alone brought disrepute to the APPSC. No overt act by her has been shown to meet the threshold of misbehaviour. As per the charges framed, it has been argued before us that the Respondent, in the discharge of her official duty failed to steer the Commission in a particular direction, be it towards framing of new guidelines or not advising against keeping in abeyance the punishment to those involved in unfair means. We find this allegation to be wholly conjectural and liable to be rejected outright because the Respondent could not be held responsible to ensure that good sense prevailed in the Commission of which she was a member. If the Commission by application of its collective mind makes certain decisions, how far is it justified to single out a member who has simply carried out her official duties when the decisions eventually turn out to be wrong ones. To conclude that the Respondent is liable for any of the allegations against her, it must be

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shown first that she had a duty which she failed to discharge or fulfil.

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77. When there is no evidence linking the present Respondent to the leakage of the question paper of the Mains Examination, summarily holding her responsible and seeking to remove her from office on the pretext of not maintaining confidentiality in the work of the Commission, would further erode the roots of the Constitutional intent of Article 317 to protect the Members of the Public Service Commission from political pressure. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that as per the allegations, the working of the Commission is alleged to have been marred with irregularities from as far back as in 2017. Admittedly, the APPSC exemplified institutional lethargy in bringing about new guidelines for conduct of examination, but the Respondent joined the Commission as a Member in 2021, and the incident of paper leakage occurred in 2022. She was required, as a member of the Public Service Commission, to be exemplary in her conduct, but she could not have been expected to right all wrongs which had been perpetrated in the APPSC prior to her joining or to single-handedly ensure that new guidelines are framed and the entire examination process is reformed. There is nothing to show that her conduct after joining in the form of any act or omission contributed

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in any way to bringing disrepute to the APPSC.

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78. Therefore, in our view, the reference made by the Hon’ble President of India for the charges as alleged are not based on specific allegations against the Respondent Ms. Mepung Tadar Bage in her individual or official capacity. The allegations which are general in nature, have not even been substantiated by bringing any cogent evidence before us and as such we are of the view that the allegations have not been found proved in the fact-finding enquiry conducted by us in exercise of the powers under Article 145(1)(j) of the Constitution

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of India read with Order XLIII of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013.

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79. As we have found that the charge of misbehaviour has not been proved against the Respondent, the points of determination jointly

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framed by the parties are answered accordingly.

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80. In view of the foregoing, the inescapable conclusion on the allegations of charges as made in the reference is that the allegations have not been proved. In terms of Order XLIII Rule 5 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013 and answering the reference under Article 317(1) of the Constitution of India, this report with recommendation shall be sent to the Hon’ble President of India that the charges as alleged do not bring about any act of ‘misbehaviour’ by Ms. Mepung Tadar Bage for taking action within its contours. We further recommend that her suspension be revoked forthwith and she would be entitled to all consequential and monetary benefits. Result of the case: Reference answered. Headnotes prepared by: Bibhuti Bhushan Bose

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