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Supreme Court of India

STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS. ETC. ETC. versus RANCHI TIMBER TRADERS ASSOCIATION

Decided
23 July 1996
Judges listed
M.M. PUNCHHI (as the open data lists them; this may not name the whole bench)
Disposal
Appeal(s) allowed

Citations

Official
[1996] SUPP. 3 S.C.R. 842 · 1996 INSC 772

Cited by

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The Court's text

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Unnumbered paragraph

Eight writ petitions were allowed by Division Bench of the Patna High Court holding that the Rules for the establishment of Saw- pits and establishment and regulation of depots framed in the year 1983 by the State Government, Bjhar in purported exercise of powers conferred under sections 41, 42 and 76 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 were in excess of delegation or authorisation, exceeding mandate, and hence a colourable exercise. On the basis of these rules, a public notice was given by the Chief Conservator of Forest, Bihar to the effect that the rules required all owners of Saw-pits and depots to obtain licences in terms by 28.2.1983, and as a consequence if any saw-pit or depot was found unlicensed from 1.3.1983, that would attract action and penalties under the rules. We arc required to examine the correctness or otherwise of such view of the High Court.

pp. 842–843, margin G

Unnumbered paragraph

Straightaway, we go to the Act and the prmisions whereunder the Slate Government claims to have framed the 1983 rules. As is clear from the prefatory portion of the rules, those are sections 4.1, 42 and 76 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927. Section 41 empowers the State Government to make rules to regulate the transit of forest produce. Sub-section l of Section 41 provides that the State Government can make rules regulating the transit of all timber and other forest produce by land or water. Clause (e) of sub-section (2) provides for the establishment and regulation of depots to which such timber or other forest produce shall be taken by those in charge of it for examination, or for the payn1ent of such money, or in order that such marks may be affixed to it; and the conditions under v. hich such tin1ber or other forest produce shall be brought to, .'\tared at and removed fron1 such depots. Section 42 is supportive of Section 41 inas1nuch as it empo\vers the Stale Govern1nent to frame rules prescribing penalties for breach of the rules in tern1s of punishment of i1nprisonn1ent and imposition of fines. Section 76 apparently is all comprehensive for it provides the State Government the additional po\vers to make rules. Clause ( d) thereof, authorises the Slate Government to make rules generally, to carry out the provisions of the Act.

p. 843, margin B

Unnumbered paragraph

Now, the High Court has taken the view that regulation of the business of timber and forest produce at Saw-pits and depots, is not covered by either of the three sections above-mentioned.

p. 843, margin F

Unnumbered paragraph

On hearing counsel for the parties on the subject, and giving our earnest consideration, we get to the view that lhe conclusion of the High Court was totally erroneous. The variety of subjects provided in the subheads of sub-section (2) of Section 41 are preluded with the expression "in particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power". wholesome power stands conferred on the Stale Government to make rules under sub-section (1) of Section 41 with regard to transit of timber and other forest produce by land or water. Conferral of such powers inheres in it the power to frame rules in order to regulate places for stoppage, reporting, cxa1nination and 1narking of ti1nber or other forest produce. Necessarily duty, fee, royalty or charges due thereon bccon1e due, if imposed. In order to avoid breach of the rules, Section 42 gets into line. Then comprehensive power on the subject is given generally to the State Government as additional powers to make rules to carry out the provisions of the Act. No one can be permitted to deny that regulating the activity of keeping a saw-pit or a' depot is not an activity to which the provisions of the Indian Forest Act, 1.927 would not be attracted. Thus, requiring all the saw-pit holders or depot holders to obtain regulatory licences, squarely fall within clause (d) of Section 76, if not, (without holding so) under the power to regulate transit by land or air available under Section 41, of the Act. These three provisions namely Sections 41,42 and 76 reflect an integrated scheme to carry out the provisions of the Act and as the preamble of the Act is suggestive to consolidate the laws relating to forests, the transit of forest produce and the duty lcviable on timber and other forest produce. The power to regulate by license the upkeep of saw-pits and Depots is in any event ancillary to the 1nain power. We, therefore, have no hesitation to upset the view of the High Court by allowing these appeals and in this manner dismissing the writ petitions which were preferred by the respondents before the High Court. We are doing so because it is otherwise not disputed that the second question framed by the High Court relating to the vires of the Act the touchstone of Articles 14, 19 and 310 of the Constitution, left undecided by the High Court, is not required to be decided by us. We allow the appeals accordingly. No costs. T.N.A. Appeals allowed.

pp. 843–844, margin F