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Supreme Court of India

DILIP KUMAR GARG AND ANOTHER versus STATE OF U.P. AND OTHERS

Decided
3 March 2009
Judges listed
R.V. RAVEENDRAN (as the open data lists them; this may not name the whole bench)
Disposal
Dismissed

Citations

Official
[2009] 3 S.C.R. 955 · 2009 INSC 305
Also cited as
  • (2009) 4 SCC 753 (18 citing judgments)

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The Court's text

Paragraphs from our copy of the Supreme Court Reports print, with the Court's own paragraph numbers, the printed page and, where printed, the margin letter. Link to paragraph N with #para-N.

Unnumbered paragraph

1. This appeal by special leave has been filed against the judgment and order dated 3.11.2006 in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 78513 of 2005 of the High Court

p. 958

Unnumbered paragraph

of Judicature at Allahabad. Ill 2. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

p. 958

Paragraph 3

The dispute in this appeal is regarding the validity of Rule 5(ii) of the U.P. Public works Department Group-B Civil Engineering Service Rules 2004 (in short 'the 2004 Rules').

p. 958

Paragraph 4

Rule 5 of the 2004 Rules states : "5. Recruitment to the posts in the service shall be made from the following sources: (i) Fifty percent by direct recruitment through the Commission. (ii) Fifty percent by promotion through the Commission from amongst the substantively appointed Junior E Engineers (Civil) and Junior Engineers (Technical) who have completed seven years service as such on the first day of the year of recruitment. Provided that the promotion shall be made in such a manner that ninety percent posts shall be filled up • by Junior Engineers (Civil) and ten percent posts shall be filled up by Junior Engineers (Technical)."

p. 958

Paragraph 5

The dispute is between the Junior Engineers of the PWD department of the U.P. Government who are degree holders and those who are only diploma holders.

p. 958, margin D

Paragraph 6

The submission of Shri B.A. Bobde, learned counsel for the appellants (the degree holders) is that while the U.P. Service of Engineers (Building and Road Branch) (Class II) Rules, 1936 (in short 'the 1936 Rules) provided in Rule 9(ii) thereof that no Junior Engineer who was only diploma holder would be promoted as Assistant Engineer unless he has passed the qualifying examination that the Government may prescribe, this requirement has been done away with by rule 5 of the 2004 Rules.

pp. 958–959, margin G

Paragraph 7

It may be mentioned that in 1966 there was an amendment to the 1936 Rules which provided that a Junior Engineer who is a diploma holder could be promoted as Assistant Engineer provided he either acquired the qualification prescribed in Rule 9(1) or he passed the qualifying examination.

p. 959, margin B

Paragraph 8

Thereafter certain amendments were made to the Rules, but in our opinion they are not relevant in the present case.

p. 959, margin C

Paragraph 9

The submission of Shri Bobde is that Rule 5(ii) of the 2004 Rules violates Article 14 of the Constitution, because it makes unequals as equals by completely divesting the requirement for the Junior Engineers who are only diploma holders either of acquiring the requisite technical qualification or passing a qualifying examination for promotion as Assistant Engineer. It is submitted that Article 14 can be violated not only by treating equals as unequals, but also by treating unequals as equals.

p. 959, margin C

Paragraph 10

In State of Jammu & Kashmir vs. Triloki Nath Khosa & others AIR 1974 SC 1, the rule which provided that only degree holders in the cadre of Assistant Engineers shall be entitled to be considered for promotion to the next higher cadre of Executive Engineers while the diploma holder Assistant Engineers were not eligible for such promotion was challenged as violative of Article 14. However, the Constitution Bench of this Court repelled this challenge and observed that though the persons appointed directly and by promotion were integrated into a common class of Assistant Engineers, they could, for the purpose of promotion to the cadre of Executive Engineers, be classified on the basis of educational qualifications.

p. 959, margin E

Paragraph 11

However, in Mohammad Shujat Ali & others vs. of India & others, Al R 197 4 SC 1631, another Constitution Bench of this Court struck a different note and observed for promotion to a higher post, discrimination based educational qualifications not obligated by the nature or responsibilities of the higher post would be violative 14 of the Constitution.

p. 960, margin A

Paragraph 12

In Roop Chand Adlakha & others vs. Development Authority & others, AIR 1989 SC 307, this while taking note of T.N. Khosa's case (supra) and Shujat Ali's case (supra) observed in para 7 as under: " 7 ....... If the differences in the qualification reasonable relation to the nature of duties and responsibilities, that go with and are attendant promotional-post, the more advantageous treatment those who possess higher technical qualifications legitimized on the doctrine of classification. There conceivably, be cases where the differences educational qualifications may not be sufficient to preferential treatment to one class of candidates against another. Whether the classification is reasonable or not must, therefore, necessarily depend upon each case and the circumstances obtaining at the time. When the state makes a classification between sources, unless the vice of the classification is writ on the face of it, the person assailing the classification show that it is unreasonable and violative of Article wooden equality as between all classes of employees irrespective of all distinctions or qualifications, requirements is neither constitutionally compelled practically meaningful. This Court in General Manager, South Central Railway vs. A. V.R. Siddhanti, (1974) 207 at p. 214: (AIR 1974 SC 1755 at p. 1'760 observed: " .... A wooden equality as between all classes employees regardless of qualifications, kind nature of responsibility and performance of the employees is not intended, nor is it practicable if the administration is to run. Indeed, the maintenance of such a 'classless' and undiscerning 'equality' where, in reality, glaring inequalities and intelligible differentia exist, will deprive the guarantee of its practical content. Broad classification based on reason, executive pragmatism and experience having a direct relation with the achievement of efficiency in administration, is permissible .... "

pp. 960–961, margin A

Paragraph 13

In P. Murugesan and others vs. State of Tamil Nadu and others, (1993) 2 sec 340, this Court upheld the validity of the rule prescribing the ratio of 3:1 between graduates and diploma holders in promotion as also the longer qualifying period for service for diploma holders. While noting the earlier decisions a three-Judge Bench of this Court observed: "14. This decision clearly supports the appellant's contention and goes to sustain the validity of the impugned amendment. If the diploma holders can be barred altogether from promotion, it is difficult to appreciate how and why is the rule-making authority precluded from restricting the promotion. The rule-making authority may be of the opinion, having regard to the efficiency of the administration and other relevant circumstances that while it is not necessary to bar the diploma holders from promotion altogether, their chances of promotion should be restricted. On principle, there is no basis for the contention that only two options are open to a rule-making authority - either bar the diploma holders altogether or allow them unrestricted promotion on par with the graduates."

p. 961, margin C

Paragraph 14

In J. Ranga Swamy vs. Govenrment of Andhra Pradesh and others, AIR 1990 SC 535 and in State of Rajasthan and others vs. Lata Arun, AIR 2002 SC 2642, this Court observed that the eligibility qualification for admission to a course or for recruitment or promotion in service are matters to be considered by the appropriate authority, and not by the Courts.

pp. 961–962, margin G

Paragraph 15

In the present case, what we find is that Rule S(ii) of the 2004 Rules has done away with the requirement of passing a qualifying examination for the diploma holder Junior Engineers for promotion as Assistant Engineers, and they have been placed at par with degree holder Junior Engineer for this purpose. We see no unconstitutionality or illegality in the same. It is entirely for the authorities to decide whether the degree holders and diploma holders should be treated at par or not for the purpose of promotion from the post of Junior Engineer to the post of Assistant Engineer.

p. 962, margin A

Paragraph 16

Shri Bobde, learned counsel for the appellants submitted that degree holders Junior Engineers have always been treated differently from Junior Engineers who are only diploma holders for the purpose of promotion, and that the latter have always been required either to get the requisite qualification or pass the qualifying examination. In our opinion, merely because in the past they have been treated differently does not mean that they cannot be treated identically subsequently.

p. 962, margin C

Paragraph 17

In our opinion Article 14 should not be stretched too far, otherwise it will make the functioning of the administration Impossible. The administrative authorities are in the best position to decide the requisite qualifications for promotion from Junior Engineer to Assistant Engineer, and it is not for this Court to sit over their decision like a Court of Appeal. The administrative authorities have experience in administration, ~nd the Court must respect this, and should not interfere readily with administrative decisions. (See Union of India vs. Pushpa Rani and others 2008 (9) sec 242 and Official Liquidator Oayanand and others 2008 (10) sec 1).

p. 962, margin E

Paragraph 18

The decision to treat all Junior Engineers, whether DILIP KUMAR GARG AND ANR. v. STATE OF U.P. AND 963 ORS. [MARKANDEY KAT JU, J.] degree holders or diploma holders, as equals for the purpose A of promotion is a policy decision, and it is well-settled that this Court should not ordinarily interfere in policy decisions unless there is clear violation of some constitutional provision or the statute. We find no such violation in this case.

pp. 962–963, margin H

Paragraph 19

In Tata Cellular vs Union oflndia, AIR 1996 SC 11 SC, it has been held that there should be judicial restraint in administrative decision. This principle will apply all the more to a Rule under Article 309 of the Constitution.

p. 963

Paragraph 20

For the reasons afore-mentioned, this appeal fails and C is hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.

p. 963

Paragraph 21

The Interlocutory Application for intervention stands dismissed as the same becomes infructuous in view of our decision given in Civil Appeal No. 5122/2007. ' 0 R.P. Appeal dismissed.

p. 963