Certo Is this judgment real?
Beta, Supreme Court only. We check Supreme Court of India judgments only for now: a High Court citation reads "Not in our corpus", which never means it does not exist.

Supreme Court of India

M/S. RAJASTHAN PREM KRISHAN GOODS TRANSPORT CO. versus REGIONAL PROVIDENT FUND COMMISSIONER, NEW DELHI AND ORS.

Decided
20 May 1996
Judges listed
M.M. PUNCHHI (as the open data lists them; this may not name the whole bench)
Disposal
Dismissed

Citations

Official
[1996] SUPP. 3 S.C.R. 1 · 1996 INSC 689
Also cited as
  • (1996) 9 SCC 454 (9 citing judgments)

Learned from how other judgments cite this one, in their text or in the official Supreme Court Reports' lists of cases they refer to: each is cited this way by at least two judgments, and at least twice as often as any other citation to this judgment in that report. We hold no commercial reporter's text, only these citation strings.

Cited by

Cited in 4 other Supreme Court judgments we hold.

Counted only in the Supreme Court judgments we hold whose text we could read, not in High Court judgments. We match each citation to a judgment automatically, so a citation we cannot match is not counted. "Cited" says only that a judgment refers to this one, not whether it followed, distinguished or overruled it.

The Court's text

Paragraphs from our copy of the Supreme Court Reports print, with the Court's own paragraph numbers, the printed page and, where printed, the margin letter. The Court did not number this judgment's paragraphs, so they are listed by page. Link to paragraph N with #para-N.

PUNCHHI, J. This appeal by special leave is against a liminc dismissal of a \Vrlt petition preferred by the appellant before the Delhi High Court.

p. 2, margin F

The appellant before us is M/s. Rajasthan Prem Krisban Goods Transport Co. (in short hereafter lo be referred as 'the goods transport Company'). The concerned party with it is the 3rd respondent - M/s. Rajasthan Prem Krishan Transport Co. - (in short hereafter referred to as the Transport Company). The appellant is aggrieved against the act'Lon and orckrs of the authorities established under Employees provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (for short 'the Act') in treating the appellant and the 3rd respondent as one and the same entity, holding the ostensible separate existence of these two as artificial and non-existent.

pp. 2–3, margin G

Significantly, both these companies are partnership concerns. According to the appellant, 'the Goods Transport Co.' was constituted on 16.4.1976, composing of 10 partners. Beforehand, the third respondent, that is, 'the Transport Co.' stood composed of 13 persons; 10 of whom compose the 'Goods Transport Company'. Their place of business and address is common, being Behind Fire Brigade, S.P. Mukherjee Marg, Delhi. Their telephone numbers are also common. The management of the two was also common. From this, it was inferred by the Inspectorate functioning under the aforementioned Act that there \Vas unity of ownership, management, supervision and control, employment, finance and general purpose to justify both the units being treated as a single establishment under the Act, as, they constituted one integrated whole.

p. 3, margin A

It is beyond dispute that if the two supposed ent1t1es were to be tr9ated separate, the provisions of the Act would not apply. But, if they be treated as one, the provisions of the Act would apply. It can otherwise be not disputed that on proper facts being established, two apparently separate entities can be clubbed into one to carry out the purposes of the Act and a fraudulent device adopted by a designing management can be exploded and matters put to their proper perspective.

p. 3, margin D

The appellant and the third respondent received the requisite notices to show cause why the provisions of the Act be not made applicable treating both of them as one. The appellant and the third respondent showed cause. Their main defence was that these entities for the purpose of the Income-tax Act, were being treated separate and that fact should g7vern the fate to keep these entities separate and singular. The Regional Ptovident Fund Commissioner, after thorough enquiry, ordered on 31.3.1978, clubbing of the two entities together, with effect from 1.6.1976. Tpe application of the appellant under Section 19 of the Act to the Central Government was dismissed on 7.12.1982, upholding the order of the Regional provident Fund Commissioner. The writ petition against the orders of the Central Government was dismissed in limine. This is how the appellant is before us.

p. 3, margin E

The finding recorded by the Regional Prm,dent Fund Commissioner is that there is unity of purpose on each count inasmuch as the place of business is common, the management is common, the letterheads bear the same telephone numbers and 10 partners of the appellant are common out of the 13 partners of the third respondent. The trucks plied by the two entities are owned by the partners and are being hired through both the units. The respective employees engaged by the two entiilies when added together, bring the integrated entities within the grip of the Act; so is the finding. Now, this finding is essentially one of fact or on legitimate inferences drawn from facts. Nothing could be suggested on behalf of the appellant as lo why could the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner not pierce the veil and read between the lines within the outwardliness of the two apparents, No legal bar could be pointed out by the learned counsel as to why the views of the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, as affirmed by the Central Government, be overturned.

pp. 3–4, margin H

For the reasons aforestated, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed but without any order as to costs. V.S.S. Appeal dismissed.

p. 4, margin C