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Supreme Court of India

RANGNATH SHAMAO DHAS & ORS. versus STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

Decided
27 February 2009
Judges listed
ARIJIT PASAYAT (as the open data lists them; this may not name the whole bench)
Disposal
Dismissed After

Citations

Official
[2009] 3 S.C.R. 526 · 2009 INSC 276
Also cited as
  • (2009) 4 SCC 33 (2 citing judgments)

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The Court's text

Paragraphs from our copy of the Supreme Court Reports print, with the Court's own paragraph numbers, the printed page and, where printed, the margin letter. Link to paragraph N with #para-N.

Paragraph 1

Challenge in this to the judgment of a Division Bench of the Bombay upholding the conviction of the appellants for offence under Section 304 Part II read with Section 149 of Penal Code, 1860 (in short the 'IPC'). Two appeals disposed of by a common order. Criminal Appeal 1985 was filed by the present appellants questioning their conviction while Criminal Appeal No.608 of 1985 the State of Maharashtra contending that the conviction should have been under Section 302 Section 149 IPC.

p. 527, margin D

Paragraph 2

Background facts in a nutshell are as follows: The informant Murlidhar Krishna Ronge (PW-4) of Krishna (hereinafter referred to as the 'deceased'). time of the incident, the informant, Manik Suryabhan (PW-5), Vasant Bhagwan Dhas (PW-6) and the were living in Village Dhas Pimpalgaon within the limits of Taluka Barshi, District Solapur. The appellants are closely interconnected. Appellants Rangnath and Ganpati are brothers and appellant Govardhan is their relation. Appellants Narsing and Dattu are also brothers. There was enmity between the deceased, the informant on one hand and the appellants on the other. There were two pieces of land known by the name of Vanjechi Patti and Chinchechi Patti. The former was admeasuring two acres and the latter one- and-half acres. The land known as Chinchechi Patti originally belonged to one Atmaram Ronge and was purchased in auction by the deceased Krishna. After purchasing it, the deceased started cultivating it. One Dnyandeo Ronge, who was a tenant of the said land, had given up his rights. Appellant Govardhan's niece was married to the son of the said Dnyandeo Govardhan and Dnyandeo wanted that the land known as Chinchechi Patti should be sold without consideration. The deceased, on account of threats of Govardhan, executed sale deed of that land in favour of Dnyandeo. About one-and-half years prior to the incident, the marriage of the informant Murlidhar was settled with the daughter of one Vithal, resident of village Dhas Pimpalgaon. The appellants were irked by this because they did not want the deceased to settle the marriage of informant with Vithal's daughter. The appellants used to also threaten the informant and the deceased, saying that they should give up the land Vanjechi Patti. On 22nd November, 1984 at about 7.30 a.m., the informant Murlidhar, his father Krishna (deceased), his labourers Manik Dhas and Vasant Dhas came to land gat No.98, where crops of sugarcane, jowar and gram were standing. They started cutting the sugarcane crop. At about 2.00 p.m. all of them had lunch, which was brought by the informant's mother. Thereafter, the informant went to take a round and the deceased Krishna directed Manik and Vasant to get to the northern side of the field for p.m., the informant. Manik and Vasant Krishna "Melo Melo" (I am dying, I am they rushed towards the place from coming. They saw appellants Rangnath with swords, appellants Ganpat, Narsing axes, chasing K~ishna. They also saw Krishna in the jowar crop, and thereafter, him with weapons in their hands resulting The informant asked them not to assault him from being assaulted fell on his appellants stopped assaulting Krishna. When tried to intervene, appellants Rangnath threatened them with dire consequences. appellants ran away. As a consequence of the assault, and down on Krishna's person to save him by the appellants, the clothes of Krishna blood. After the appellants had run away, the brought a bullock cart, put his father Krishna cart, and proceeded with him to village outskirts of the said Village, Krishna Thereafter, the informant carried the corpse house and proceeded to Pangari Police F.l.R. On completion of investigation charge Charges were framed and as the accused innocence, trial was held. PWs 4, 5 and eye witnesses and placing reliance on Court recorded the conviction in terms IPC and imposed 7 years of rigorous

pp. 527–529, margin G

Paragraph 3

In appeal before the High Court that the offence under Section 304 Part A and the evidence of so called eye witnesses is unworthy of credence. It was submitted that the time as indicated by the eye witnesses is unacceptable because the medical evidence shows that there was no undigested or semi-digested food. It was also submitted that the doctor's evidence clearly showed that the injuries could not have caused death cumulatively in some cases. That being so, the conviction under Section 304 Part IPC is not proper. The High Court held that the medical .. evidence did not wholly belie the prosecution version and did not render the eye witnesses' version suspect. The High Court did not accept appellants' stand and observed that the doctor has given a hypothetical answer that in some cases it might cause death and in some cases it might not cause death, but stated in clear terms that in the instant case it has caused death. The High Court held that the conviction as recorded by the trial Court under Section 304 Part II IPC is in order.

pp. 529–530, margin G

Paragraph 4

In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the parties re-iterated the respective submissions before the High Court.

p. 530, margin B

Paragraph 5

It is to be noted that the First Information Report was lodged within a very short time. The alleged occurrence took place around 2.45 p.m. and the FIR was lodged at 7.15 p.m. at the Police Station which was situated at about 22 K.M. from the place of incidence. The evidence of PWs 4, 5 and 6 clearly .. established the complicity of the accused persons. ·Added to • that, as rightly noted by the High Court the medical evidence is not at total variance with the ocular evidence. It was observed in Solanki Chimanbhai Ukabhai v. State of Gujarat (AIR 1983 SC 484 at para 12) as follows: "12. Ordinarily, the value of medical evidence is only corroborative. It proves that the injuries could have been ~ caused in the manner alleged and nothing more. The use which the defence can make of the medical evidence is to prove that the injuries could not possibly have been caused in the manner alleged and thereby discredit the eye-witnesses. Unless, however the medical evidence in its turn goes so far that it completely rules out all possibilities whatsoever of injuries taking place in the manner alleged by eyewitnesses, the testimony of the eyewitnesses cannot be thrown out on the ground of alleged inconsistency between it and the medical evidence."

pp. 530–531, margin B

Paragraph 6

In the instant case as noted above the doctor has categorically stated that the cumulative effect of the injuries was the cause of death. That being so, the judgment of the High Court affirming that of the trial Court cannot be said to be in any way unsustainable. The appeal is without merit, deserves dismissal which we direct. The appellants who were released on bail in terms of the order dated 3.12.2001 shall surrender to custody forthwith to serve the remainder of sentence. B.B.B. Appeal dismissed.

p. 531, margin B