STATE OF HARYANA versus DHARAMRAJ

Heard learned counsel appearing for the parties.

p. 706

Leave granted.

p. 706

The present appeal fi led by the State of Haryana seeks cancellation of anticipatory bail granted to the sole respondent vide Order dated 03.12.2021 (hereinafter referred to as the “Impugned Order”) passed in CRM-M No.49115/2021 by a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh. The respondent is accused in First Information Report No.0239 dated 31.07.2020 at Police Station Badshahpur, Gurugram lodged under Sections 147, 148, 149, 323, 325, 341, 342 and 427 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as the “IPC”). Later, Sections 186, 353 and 364 of the IPC were also included.

pp. 706–707

Learned counsel appearing for the appellant submits that in the background of the nature of the allegations and the materials collected as well as the respondent having been declared a proclaimed off ender , grant of indulgence under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal anticipatory bail, which does not serve larger public interest.

pp. 707–708

Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent, supporting the Impugned Order, submitted that the Investigating Agency has tried to unnecessarily harass and implicate the respondent which would be clear from various manipulations done in the record in the course of investigation. Further, it is submitted that the State is trying to show the respondent as the culprit only on the ground that he shares common name with one accused.

p. 709

Learned counsel for the State disputes that fact and submits that the respondent is the person who has been duly identifi ed and against him the allegations levelled are found true, per the Investigation Agency.

p. 709

A foray, albeit brief, into relevant precedents is warranted. This Court considered the factors to guide grant of bail in Ram Govind Upadhyay v Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598 and Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496, the relevant principles were restated thus: ‘9. ... It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are: (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the off ence; (ii) nature and gravity of the accusation; (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fl eeing, if released on bail; (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused; (vi) likelihood of the off ence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being infl uenced; and (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.’

pp. 709–710

In Mahipal v Rajesh Kumar alias Polia, (2020) 2 SCC 118, this Court opined as under: ‘16. The considerations that guide the power of an appellate court in assessing the correctness of an order granting bail stand on a diff erent footing from an assessment of an application for the cancellation of bail. The correctness of an order granting bail is tested on the anvil of whether there was an improper or arbitrary exercise of the discretion in the grant of bail. The test is whether the order granting bail is perverse, illegal or unjustifi ed. On the other hand, an application for cancellation of bail is generally examined on the anvil of the existence of supervening circumstances or violations of the conditions of bail by a person to whom bail has been granted. …’

p. 710

In Bhagwan Singh v Dilip Kumar @ Deepu @ Depak, 2023 INSC 761 , this Court, in view of Dolat Ram v State of Haryana, (1995) 1 SCC 349; Kashmira Singh v Duman Singh, (1996) 4 SCC 693 and X v State of Telangana, (2018) 16 SCC 511, held as follows: ‘13. It is also required to be borne in mind that when a prayer is made for the cancellation of grant of bail cogent and overwhelming circumstances must be present and bail once granted cannot be cancelled in a mechanical manner without considering whether any supervening circumstances have rendered it in conducing to allow fair trial. This proposition draws support from the Judgment of this Court in Daulat Ram and others v. State of Haryana reported in (1995) 1 SCC 349, Kashmira Singh v. Duman Singh (1996) 4 SCC 693 and xxx v. State of Telangana (2018) 16 SCC 511.’

p. 710

In XXX v Union Territory of Andaman & Nicobar Islands, 2023 INSC 767 , this Court noted that the principles in Prasanta Kumar Sarkar (supra) stood reiterated in Jagjeet Singh v Ashish Mishra, (2022) 9 SCC 321.

p. 711

The contours of anticipatory bail have been elaborately dealt with by 5-Judge Benches in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565 and Sushila Aggarwal v State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 5 SCC 1. Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v State of Maharashtra, (2011) 1 SCC 694 is worthy of mention in this context, despite its partial overruling in Sushila Aggarwal (supra). We are cognizant that liberty is not to be interfered with easily. More so, when an order of pre- arrest bail already stands granted by the High Court.

p. 711

Yet, much like bail, the grant of anticipatory bail is to be exercised with judicial discretion. The factors illustrated by this Court through its pronouncements are illustrative, and not exhaustive. Undoubtedly, the fate of each case turns on its own facts and merits. In Vipan Kumar Dhir v State of Punjab, (2021) 15 SCC 518, taking note of Dolat Ram (supra) and X v State of Telangana (supra), the Court cancelled the anticipatory bail granted to the accused therein. Keeping all the aforesaid in mind, we turn our attention to the facts in praesenti.

p. 711

Having considered the matter, this Court fi nds that, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, it was not proper for the High Court to have granted anticipatory bail to the respondent.

p. 711

As would be manifest from the Impugned Order, the reasoning thereof is contained in Paragraphs 7-12. Closer perusal reveals what weighed with the High Court: (a) That the maximum sentence for the off ences in the First Information Report did not exceed 7 years. (b) That the possibility of the respondent infl uencing the investigation, tampering with evidence et al, could be taken care of by imposing stringent conditions. (c) That the respondent’s declaration as a proclaimed off ender was not on account of him deliberately avoiding court. (d) That the respondent was a fi rst-time off ender and deserved a chance to ‘reform and course correct’.

pp. 711–712

The logic of the High Court does not commend itself to us. The High Court placed reliance on Arnesh Kumar v State of Bihar, (2014) 8 SCC 273 to the eff ect that where the off ence is punishable with imprisonment for a term which may be less than seven years or which may extend to seven years, whether with or without fi ne, there is to be no automatic arrest. Having gone through the said judgment as also its most recent reiteration in Md. Asfak Alam v State of Jharkhand, 2023 INSC 660 , we are in full agreement with the propositions enunciated therein. However, Section 364, IPC carries a term of imprisonment for life or rigorous imprisonment of ten years and fi ne. We are a bit perplexed as to how, despite addition of Section 364, IPC, the High Court took the view that Arnesh Kumar (supra) would aid the respondent in his quest for pre-arrest bail.

p. 712

What the High Court (also) lost sight of was that the respondent was a declared proclaimed off ender. The High Court notes, at Paragraph 28, that it was not dealing with the prayer seeking quashing of the proclamation proceedings as the same were not made part of the petition before it. As things were, the respondent was declared a proclaimed off ender on 05.02.2021, and sought anticipatory bail from the High Court only in October, 2021. As such, it was not correct for the High Court to brush aside such factum, on the basis of averments alone, purporting to explain the backdrop of such declaration by mere advertence to a similar-sounding name, in the petition before it, as recorded at Paragraphs 9 and 10 of the Impugned Order. The declaration of the respondent as a proclaimed off ender, and such declaration subsisting on the date of the Impugned Order, we are unable to agree with the High Court that the respondent was entitled to ‘reform and course correct’. 16. The respondent, without fi rst successfully assailing the order declaring him as a proclaimed off ender, could not have proceeded to seek anticipatory bail. Looking to the factual prism, we are clear that the respondent’s application under Section 438, CrPC should not have been entertained, as he was a proclaimed off ender. We may note that in Lavesh v State (NCT of Delhi), (2012) 8 SCC 730, this Court was categoric against grant of anticipatory bail to a proclaimed off ender. In the same vein, following Lavesh (supra) is the decision in State of Madhya Pradesh v Pradeep Sharma, (2014) 2 SCC 171, where this Court emphasised that a proclaimed off ender would not be entitled to anticipatory bail. Of course, in an exceptional and rare case, this Court or the High Courts can consider a plea seeking anticipatory bail, despite the applicant being a proclaimed off ender, given that the Supreme Court and High Courts are Constitutional Courts. However, no exceptional situation arises in the case at hand. Following Pradeep Sharma (supra), in Prem Shankar Prasad v State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 955, this Court was unequivocal that the High Court therein erred in granting anticipatory bail ignoring proceedings under Sections 82 and 83, CrPC. In Abhishek v State of Maharashtra, (2022) 8 SCC 282, this Court concluded: ‘68. As regards the implication of proclamation having been issued against the appellant, we have no hesitation in making it clear that any person, who is declared as an “absconder” and remains out of reach of the investigating agency and thereby stands directly at confl ict with law, ordinarily, deserves no concession or indulgence. By way of reference, we may observe that in relation to the indulgence of pre-arrest bail in terms of Section 438 CrPC, this Court has repeatedly said that when an accused is absconding and is declared as proclaimed off ender, there is no question of giving him the benefi t of Section 438 CrPC. [For example, Prem Shankar Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 14 SCC 529: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 955] …’

pp. 712–713

Accordingly, in view of the discussions made hereinabove, the Impugned Order granting anticipatory bail to the respondent is set aside. The respondent shall surrender before the Court concerned within four weeks from today and may seek regular bail which will be considered on its own merits without being prejudiced by the present judgment.

pp. 713–714

The appeal stands allowed in the aforesaid terms. Pending applications stand consigned to records. As far as the submission of the State is that the Impugned Order is the basis for co-accused to obtain anticipatory bail, it is for the State to take steps, if so advised, in accordance with law, in that behalf.

p. 714