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Supreme Court of India

DATTATRAYA LAXMAN KAMBLE versus ABDUL RASUL MOULIALI KOTKUNE AND ANR.

Decided
28 April 1999
Judges listed
S. SAGHIR AHMAD (as the open data lists them; this may not name the whole bench)
Disposal
Appeal(s) allowed

Citations

Official
[1999] 2 S.C.R. 912 · 1999 INSC 209
Also cited as
  • (1999) 4 SCC 1 (20 citing judgments)
  • AIR 1999 SC 2226 (4 citing judgments)

Learned from how other judgments cite this one, in their text or in the official Supreme Court Reports' lists of cases they refer to: each is cited this way by at least two judgments, and at least twice as often as any other citation to this judgment in that report. We hold no commercial reporter's text, only these citation strings.

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The Court's text

Paragraphs from our copy of the Supreme Court Reports print, with the Court's own paragraph numbers, the printed page and, where printed, the margin letter. The Court did not number this judgment's paragraphs, so they are listed by page. Link to paragraph N with #para-N.

Unnumbered paragraph

THOMAS, J. Leave granted.

p. 914, margin E

Unnumbered paragraph

This litigation, even by now a quarter of a century old, shows fortune fluctuations as between a landlord and his tenant. The latest gainer is the tenant when the High Court of Bombay saved him from the peril of eviction. It is now the tum of the landlord and hence he challenged the judgment by filing this appeal by special leave.

p. 914, margin F

Unnumbered paragraph

In the year 1975, appellant-landlord spread his net so wide with multispoked grounds, as to catch the tenant by an order of eviction on the expectation that at least one of the grounds would click and the tenant could be evicted from a shop room situated at Solapur (Maharashtra). But the trial court found none of the grounds in his favour and consequently non-suited him. However, the appellate court, after testing all the grounds employed by the landlord, found all of them but one, unsubstantiated. The one on which appellate court favoured the landlord was the ground envisaged in Section J3(I)(g) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging.House Rites Conirol Act, 1947 (for short 'the Act'). Resultantly the appellate court granted a decree for eviction .with a rider that the' tenant need vacate the premises only within four months. The.appellate court passed the judgment on 30.8.1982.

pp. 914–915, margin G

Unnumbered paragraph

The tenant very soon filed a writ petition in the Bombay High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution hi challenge of the decree for eviction and got it stayed. It took 15 long years for the High Court to dispose of the writ petition as per the impugned judgment. A single judge of the High Court interfered with the finding on facts and h_eld that the landlord has failed to prove the bona fides of his claim for requirement of the building to start a business therein., Learned Single Judge observed that the landlord has not . proved that he has the know~how to do such a business. _ ...

p. 915, margin B

Unnumbered paragraph

. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the High Court adopted an erroneous view that a man can think of starting a new business only if he has experience in that business field. Alternatively learned counsel . contended that the High Court has over-stepped its jurisdictional contours under Article 227 of the Constitution in upsetting a finding on fact entered by the fact finding court.

p. 915, margin C

Unnumbered paragraph

The relevant provision, under which a landlord can seek decree for ·eviction of his tenant for his own occupation of the building, is Section 13(1)(g) of the Act. It reads thus: . _.

p. 915, margin E

Unnumbered paragraph

"13. When.Landlord may recover possession. (I) Notwithstanding - e---aliyth.ing contained in this Act but subject to the provisions of sections 15 and .ISA; a landlord shall he entitled to recover possession of any premises if the Court is satisfied- -

p. 915, margin E

Unnumbered paragraph

(g) that the premises are reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for occupati~n by himself or by any person for \\'hose benefit the premises are held or where the landlord is a trustee of public charitable trust that the premises are required for occupation for the . purposes of the trust."

p. 915, margin F

Unnumbered paragraph

Sections 15 and 15A are not ~pplicable in this case and hence we are . not bothered about their implications. The grounds mentioned in clause (g) is couched in a language to provide emphasis to the genuineness of the requirement of the landlord by using the words 'reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord'. In fact both terms (reasonably and bona fide) are complimentary to each other in the context, for, any unreasonable requirement is not bona fide. Vice-versa can also be spelt that if the requirement has to be bona fide it must necessarily be reasonable also. But when the legislature employed the two terms together the message to be gathered is that the requirement must be really genuine from any reasonable standard. All the same, genuineness of the requirement is not to be tested on a par with dire need of a landlord because the latter is a much greater need.

pp. 915–916, margin G

Unnumbered paragraph

When a landlord says that he needs the building for his own occupation there is no doubt he has to prove it. But there is no warrant for presuming that his need is not bona fide. The statute enjoins that the court should be satisfied of his requirement. So the court would look into the broad aspects and if the court feels any doubt about the bona fides of the requirement it is for the landlord to clear such doubts. Even in a case where the tenant does not contest or dispute the claim of the landlord the court has to look into the claim independently albeit landlord's burden gets lessened by such nondispute. In appropriate cases it is open to the court to presume that the landlord's requirement is bona fide and put the contesting tenant to the burden to show how the requirement is not bona fide.

p. 916, margin B

Unnumbered paragraph

In this case appellate court found that landlord's requirement to occupy the building is to start a business in electric goods. The fact that landlord is a holder of diploma in Electrical Engineering was counted as a factor lending assurance that he would be genuinely contemplating such a business idea. Regarding the contention of the respondent tenant that landlord has not acquired practical experience in the business of electric goods the appellate court has observed that it is not necessary in every case that the landlord should establish previous experience for starting a new business.

p. 916, margin D

Unnumbered paragraph

But the High Court took a different view. This is what the learned single judge of the High Court has said in the impugned judgment:

p. 916, margin E

Unnumbered paragraph

"In order to establish that he is in a position to start the said business, it was necessary for the landlord to place material on record to show that he has the know-how necessary for starting business of sale of electrical goods. For considering, whether the landlord has necessary know-how to start the business of selling electrical goods only, the fact that he holds a diploma in electrical engineering, in my opinion, would not be sufficient. It was necessary for the landlord to place material on record which would show that either he has experience of the business that he proposes to start or that even though he has no experience of the business he has knowledge of the business sufficient to start the business of his own."

pp. 916–917, margin E

Unnumbered paragraph

Learned single judge opted to interfere with the fact finding only on the , premise that in his opinion "if the landlord is really in a position to commence the business one of the ingredients that has to be established by the landlord is that he possesses the know-how necessary for doing the business."

p. 917, margin A

Unnumbered paragraph

If a person wants to start new business of his own it may be to his own advantage if he acquires experience in that line. But to say that any venture of a person in the business field without acquiring past experience reflects lack of his bona fides is a fallacious and unpragmatic approach. Many a business have flourished in this country by leaps and bounds which were started by novice in the field; and many other business ventures have gone haywire despite vast experience to the credit of the pro pounders. The opinion of the learned single judge that acquisition of sufficient know-how is a precondition for even proposing to start any business, if gains approval as a proposition of law, is likely to shatter the initiative of young talents and deter new entrepreneurs from entering any field of business or commercial activity. Experience can be earned even while the business is in progress. It is too pedantic a norm to be formulated that 'no experience no venture'.

p. 917, margin B

Unnumbered paragraph

That apart, appellant is not a total novice in the field of dealings in electrical equipme11:t,Xll.e fact t~at the discipline in his academic specialization was Electrical Engfriee~lng is quite indicative of some knowledge he has in the subject, though a business in sue,}) commodities may have differe.nt phases. Learned single judge seems to have written him off as a person totally unfamiliar with any transaction in electrical goods. Such an angle is not a ·charitable view towards the landlord. At any rate there may be differing views for different people on how to start a business. The High Court has committed jurisdictional error in upsetting a fact finding merely on the individual view held by the learned judge about a business venture. We have no doubt that reversal of the appellate court order on the above ground is unsupportable in law and hence is liable to be interfered with. We do so.

p. 917, margin E

Unnumbered paragraph

But there is one point which the respondent-tenant urged in the High Court and which learned single judge avoided discussing on the premise that dislodgment of the appellant in the suit on one ground is enough. This is what the High Court said about it:

p. 917, margin G

Unnumbered paragraph

"In the pres.ent petition, the landlord ha~ filed a civil application to point out that the tenant has some other premises where he can shift his business. There is a rejoinder filed by the tenant, disputing that statement of the landlord and it is pointed out that it is the landlord himself who has other premises available to him fot starting his business. That fact is also disputed by the landlord by filing a rejoinder. However, ·since I have held that the landlord failed to establish one of the necessary ingredients for establishing that he needs the suit premises bona fide for his own business, it is not necessary for me to consider the Civil Application filed by the Jandlqi;-d."

p. 918, margin A

Unnumbered paragraph

Now that point needs consideration by the High Court as we have upset the finding in the impugned judgment regarding the first point. Hence the writ petition has to go back to the High Court for disposal afresh. We therefore allow this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and remit the writ petition to the High Court for.disposal after deciding the remaining point referred to above. A.Q. Appeal allowed.

p. 918, margin C