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Supreme Court of India

NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD. versus M/S ABHILASH JEWELLERY

Decided
22 January 2009
Judges listed
MARKANDEY KATJU, RAJENDRA MAL LODHA (as the open data lists them; this may not name the whole bench)
Disposal
Appeal(s) allowed

Citations

Official
[2009] 1 S.C.R. 476 · 2009 INSC 55
Also cited as
  • (2009) 2 SCC 661 (3 citing judgments)

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The Court's text

Paragraphs from our copy of the Supreme Court Reports print, with the Court's own paragraph numbers, the printed page and, where printed, the margin letter. Link to paragraph N with #para-N.

Paragraph 1

Heard learned counsel for the parties. This appeal has been filed against the order of the National Consumer Disputes F Redressal Commission, New Delhi dated 15.03.2002.

p. 477

Paragraph 2

The respondent had a business establishment at Vellappad i~ Trissur District in the State of Kerala. It took a Jeweller's !:flock Policy for Rs. 1, 15,00,000/-. During the G currency of the policy, the complainant-respondent lodged a claim with the appellant for the loss of gold ornament weighing 587.870 grams. The claim was repudiated by the appellant on the ground that the loss of gold was occasioned as it was in the custody of an apprentice, who was not an employee.

p. 477

Paragraph 3

The relevant clause in the Insurance Policy stated; "S. 11(a) property insured whilst in the custody of the insured, his partner or his employees".

p. 478, margin A

Paragraph 4

The question, therefore, is whether an apprentice is an employee.

p. 478, margin A

Paragraph 5

The National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission has held that an apprentice is an employee because Section 2 (6) of the Kerala Shops and Commercial Establishments Act defines an employee to include an apprentice. The National Commission has also relied on the definition in the Employees State Insurance Act and some other enactments.

p. 478, margin B

Paragraph 6

We are of the opinion that the view taken by the Natinal Commssion is not correct. The present case is covered solely by the contract of insurance. That contract of insurance no doubt uses the word 'employee', but it does not say that the word 'employee' in the contract of insurance will have the same meaning as in the Kerala Shops and Commercial Establishments Act or the Employees State Insurance Act or any other enactment.

p. 478, margin C

Paragraph 7

In various enactments, the word 'employee', has no doubt, been defined to include an apprentice, but that is only a deeming provision and a legal fiction by which the meaning of the word 'employee' has been extended.

p. 478, margin E

Paragraph 8

Legal fictions are well-knwon in law. For example, Section 43 (3) of the Income Tax Act defines 'plant' to include a book. Ordinarily a plant means a factory, and by no stretch of imagination can we call a factory a book. However, the Income Tax Act deems a book to be a plant for the purpose of depreciation.

p. 478, margin F

Paragraph 9

Many such illustrations of deeming clauses or legal fictions can be given. The definition of employee in various enactments which include an apprentice within the ambit of the A definition is such a piece of legal fiction. That, however, does not mean that in common parlance an apprentice is an employee.

pp. 478–479, margin G

Paragraph 10

In the present case, since the word 'employee' has not been defined in the contract of insurance, we have to give it the meaning which it has in common parlance. In common parlance, an apprentice is a trainee and not an employee. Even if he is given a stipend, that does not mean that there is a relationship of master and servant between the firm and the C apprentice. Hence, we cannot agree with the view taken by the National Commission. In our view , the claim before the National Commission was not maintainable.

p. 479

Paragraph 11

Hence we set aside the order of the National Commission. D

p. 479

Paragraph 12

The appeal is allowed. No orders as to costs. G.N. Appeal allowed.

p. 479