Supreme Court of India
MOHD. ASLAM versus UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.
- Decided
- 22 March 1996
- Judges listed
- J.S. VERMA, N.P. SINGH, K. VENKATASWAMI
- Disposal
- Dismissed
Citations
- Official
- [1996] 3 S.C.R. 782 · 1996 INSC 424
- Also cited as
- (1996) 2 SCC 749
Learned from how other judgments cite this one, in their text or in the official Supreme Court Reports' lists of cases they refer to: each is cited this way by at least two judgments, and at least twice as often as any other citation to this judgment in that report. We hold no commercial reporter's text, only these citation strings.
- Not shown
- 1 other citation string that other judgments attach to this one, on evidence too thin or too divided to publish.
Cited by
Cited in 3 other Supreme Court judgments we hold.
- RADHEY SHYAM & ANR. versus CHHABI NATH & ORS.
- UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS versus MAJOR S.P. SHARMA AND OTHERS
- RUPA ASHOK HURRA versus ASHOK HURRA AND ANR.
Counted only in the Supreme Court judgments we hold whose text we could read, not in High Court judgments. We match each citation to a judgment automatically, so a citation we cannot match is not counted. "Cited" says only that a judgment refers to this one, not whether it followed, distinguished or overruled it.
The Court's text
Paragraphs from our copy of the Supreme Court Reports print, with the Court's own paragraph numbers, the printed page and, where printed, the margin letter. The Court did not number this judgment's paragraphs, so they are listed by page. Link to paragraph N with #para-N.
The prayer in this writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India is for reconsideration of the Judgment in Ma1tohar Joshi v. Nitin Bhaurao Patil and Anotlw; [1996] 1 SCC 169. The petitioner's contention, in substance, is that the judgment is incorrect.
p. 783, margin B
It . is sufficient to say that Article 32 of the Constitution is not available to assail the correctness of a decision on merits or to claim its reconsideration. This has been clearly reiterated in the recent decision in Kltoday Distilleries Limited & Anr. v. The Registrar General, Supreme Coult of India, (1995) 6 Scale 742, wherein the decision in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak & Anr., [1988] Supp.l SCR 1, has been explained. This alone is sufficient to dismiss the writ petition.
p. 783, margin C
However, in view of certain apprehensions expressed by the petitioner, we deem it proper to make some further observations now, which we had considered unnecessary to incorporate in the judgment in Manohar Joshi. We may observe that the decision of this Court in S.R. Bommai and Others. v. Union of India and Others, [1994] 3 SCC 1, did not relate to the construction of, and determination of the scope of subsections (3) and (3A) of Section 123 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 and, therefore, nothing in the decision in S.R. Bonunai is of assistance for construing the meaning and scope of sub-sections (3) and (3A) of Section 123 of the Representation of the People Act. Reference to the decision in S.R. Bommai is, therefore, inapposite in this context.
p. 783, margin E
We may also add that the challenge in the writ petition to the correctness of the decision in Manohar Joshi is based on a misreading of that decision. In the judgment, the decision on the question of law is based on earlier Constitution Bench decisions of this Court by which we are bound; and the observation therein which is challenged as incorrect in this writ petition, is not the basis of the decision but an opinion expressed on an assumption if the making of the alleged statement of the hope of Maharashtra becoming a Hindu State, in the speech is held to be proved, without recording a finding that it was so proved. This allegation was based on a police report and Manohar Joshi did not admit the making of such a statement in his speech. Moreover, strong disapproval was expressed of such a statement, if actually made. This is clear particularly from paras 62 to 67 of the decision in Manohar Joshi reported in (1996] 1 SCC 169. Specific reference has been made for this purpose in paras 64 to 67 (SCC) to the decision in Jamaat-E-Is/ami Hind v. Union of India, (1995] 1 SCC 428, to indicate the standard of proof required for proving a corrupt practice which had not been satisfied in Manohar Joshi in view of the absence of legal evidence to prove the corrupt practice alleged in the case.
pp. 783–784, margin G
A careful and dispassionate reading of the decision would show that the apprehensions and misgivings expressed in the writ petition, are imaginary and baseless. There is no occasion to read in the judgment in Manohar Joshi, something which is not said or to say that it conflicts with the concept of secularism in S.R Bommai where this question relating to the meaning of sub-sections (3) and (3A) of Section 123 of the Representation of the People Act neither arose, nor was decided. The application of the decision in Manohar Joshi in cases like Dr. Ramesh Yeshwant Prabhoo v. Shri Prabhakar Kashinath Kunte & Others, [1996] 1 SCC 130, Shri Suryakant Venkatrao Mahadik v. Smt. Saroj Sandesh Naik (Bhosale), [1996] 1 SCC 384, and Mohan v. Bhairon Singh Shekhawat, (1996) 1 Scale SP 3, is another pointer to indicate that there is nothing in the judgment in Manohar Joshi to give rise to any such apprehension that it can enable misuse of religion for making an appeal for votes in an election.
p. 784, margin C
We may add that the deficiency, if any, in the statutory prohibition enacting the corrupt practice in Section 123 of the Representation of the People Act, has to be cured by legislation and that deficiency cannot be cured by reading into a penal provision something which is not enacted therein. The proposal was made at one time to perform the legislative exercise of enacting a provision to prevent any possible misuse of religion during elections, but it was, unfortunately, abandoned. We do hope that at least now there would remain no misapprehension in the mind of anyone.
p. 784, margin F
The writ petition is, therefore, dismissed. R.P. Petition dismissed.
p. 784, margin G