Certo Is this judgment real?
Beta, Supreme Court only. We check Supreme Court of India judgments only for now: a High Court citation reads "Not in our corpus", which never means it does not exist.

Supreme Court of India

STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND ORS. versus M/S. KRISHNADAS TIKARAM

Decided
21 September 1994
Judges listed
K. RAMASWAMY, N. VENKATACHALA (as the open data lists them; this may not name the whole bench)
Disposal
Appeal(s) allowed

Citations

Official
[1994] SUPP. 3 S.C.R. 747 · 1994 INSC 410
Also cited as
  • (1995) Supp 1 SCC 587 (6 citing judgments)

Learned from how other judgments cite this one, in their text or in the official Supreme Court Reports' lists of cases they refer to: each is cited this way by at least two judgments, and at least twice as often as any other citation to this judgment in that report. We hold no commercial reporter's text, only these citation strings.

Not shown
1 other citation string that other judgments attach to this one, on evidence too thin or too divided to publish.

Cited by

Cited in 2 other Supreme Court judgments we hold.

Counted only in the Supreme Court judgments we hold whose text we could read, not in High Court judgments. We match each citation to a judgment automatically, so a citation we cannot match is not counted. "Cited" says only that a judgment refers to this one, not whether it followed, distinguished or overruled it.

The Court's text

Paragraphs from our copy of the Supreme Court Reports print, with the Court's own paragraph numbers, the printed page and, where printed, the margin letter. The Court did not number this judgment's paragraphs, so they are listed by page. Link to paragraph N with #para-N.

The respondent was initially granted Mining lease in the year 1966 for a period of 20 years to extract limestone in the forest area. The Forest (Conservation) Act 69 of 1980 has come into force with effect from 25.10.80. Under Section 2 of the Act grant or renewal after the Act has comP- into force shall be made, in the event of the State Government deciding to grant lease or renewal, with the prior approval of the Central Government. The object of the Act is to maintain ecology and preservation of the forest. It is also the object under Section 3 to regenerate the forests by planting trees and the forest growth. In 1986 after the expiry of the lease the respondent had approached the Government for renewal. Though the Government had taken the decision and passed an order on February 7, 1986 to grant further renewal for a period of 20 years in terms of the original grant, it was objected to by the Forest Department Consequently it was cancelled. The respondent had approached the High Court in Miscellaneous Petition No. 2758 of 89 and the Division Bench by its order dated August 18, 1989 following the ratio in State of Bihar v. Banshi Ram Modi and Others, (A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 814) directed to grant renewal on the ground that the part of the leased area had already been broken and, therefore, renewal should be granted.

p. 748, margin C

The appellant contends that this Court in Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra v. State of U.P., (A.1.R. 1988 SC 2187) and Ambica Quarry Works etc. v. State of Gujarat a1J,d Others, (A.I.R. 1987 SC 1073) had held that even the renewal of the lease cannot be granted without the prior occurrence of the C~ntral Government. We find force in tqe contention. It is settled law that the gnmt or renewal is a fresh grant and must be made consistent with law. Section 2 prohibited the grant or renewal. In case the State Government decides to grant fresh lease or renewal of the lease it is mandatory that it should obtain prior approval of the Ceri.tral Government. Admittedly, no prior approval of the Central Government had been obtained under Section 2 of the Act. The State Government thus had realised the mistake in directing renewal when the Forest Department had objected to tjie renewal of the lease in favour of the respondent". Therefore, the cancellation of the order, before it came into effect by registering, had been proper]y made by the appellant. The High Court was, therefore, not right in directing grant of renewal of the lease.

pp. 748–749, margin G

It is brought to our notice that under contempt proceedings the leas~ deed was directed to be registered and it was according]y registered. It is declared that the registration is illegal and is invalid.

p. 749, margin C

The appeal is according]y allowed. No costs. T.NA Appeal allowed.

p. 749, margin C