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Supreme Court of India

GHAZIABAD DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY AND ORS. versus SRI VIKRAM CHAUDHARY AND ORS.

Decided
14 July 1995
Judges listed
K. RAMASWAMY, B.L. HANSARIA (as the open data lists them; this may not name the whole bench)
Disposal
Disposed off

Citations

Official
[1995] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 171 · 1995 INSC 401
Also cited as
  • (1995) 5 SCC 210 (12 citing judgments)
  • AIR 1995 SC 2325 (4 citing judgments)
  • (1995) SCC(L&S) 1226 (2 citing judgments)

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The Court's text

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Delay condoned. Shri Pramod Swarup, Advocate takes notic~ for the respondents. Leave granted:

p. 172, margin F

We have lieared the counsel on either side. The appeal arises from the order of single Judge of Allahabad High Court dated 28.2.1994 made . in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 11535 of 1991. The appellant in its planned development of urban areas, pursuant ~o U.P. Urban Planning and Development· Act, 1973, .had engaged the respondents on daily wages in the project on hand. They filed a writ petition claiming parity in appointment and pay with the regular employees and also for regularisation of their services. The single judge, while negating the relief of regularisation, given directions to follow the principles in ss.25F and 25G of the Industrial Disputes Act.

pp. 172–173, margin G

Objection taken by the appellants is that ss.25F and 25G have no· application. It is stated that as regards the State of U.P. there is a local Industrial Disputes Act and the provisions therein would be attracted, if Industrial Disputes Act is at all applicable to the appellant. It is contended that the appellant is not an industry and that, therefore, the principles contained in pari materia provisions in the local Act have no application.

p. 173, margin B

We have gone through the judgment of the High Court. The learned judge did not intend to lay down that the appellant is an industry and that the principles contained in the Industrial Disputes Act, Central or the State Act stands attracted. What the learned Judge appears to have intended to lay down is that so long as the appellant has work on hand, if appellant has no power to terminate the contingent employees engaged on daily wages and that in the event the appellant needs to terminate their services the principle of last come first go should be followed and in the event of there being need for re-employment, preference be given to the displaced respondents. The observation made by the learned Judge is consistent with the well-established principles of natural justi-.::e and equity, justice and good conscience. Therefore, the learned judge had rightly extended those principles with regard to the persons employed by the appellant on daily wages.

p. 173, margin C

It is stated that by implication of the order there is need for the appellant to keep engaging the respondents even though there are no projects on hand. That apprehension also does not appear to be correct. The appellant needs to take the services of the persons according to the requirement in the projects on hand. On completion of the exisiting projects in which the respondents are working, if the appellant undertakes any fresh project, instead of taking the services of fresh hands at the place of the new project, the appellant needs to take the services of the ·existing temporary daily wage respondents. In the event of the appellant not having any project on hand, the obligation to pay daily wages to the respondents does not arise. However, the appellant shall maintain the order of seniority of the daily wage employees and shall take the services of the senior most persons in the order of seniority according to the requirement of work.

pp. 173–174, margin F

Since they are temporary daily wage employees, so long as there is no regular posts available for appointment, the question of making pay on par with the regular employees does not arise. But the appellant should necessarily and by implication, pay the minimum w.ages prescribed under the statute, if any, or the prevailing wages as available in the locality.

p. 174, margin A

The appeal is accordingly disposed of. No costs. G.N. Appeal disposed of

p. 174, margin B