Supreme Court of India
BOKARO AND RAMGUR LTD. versus THE STATE OF BIHAR AND ANOTHER
- Decided
- 14 March 1962
- Judges listed
- T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYYAR
- Disposal
- Dismissed
Citations
- Official
- [1962] SUPP. 3 S.C.R. 831 · 1962 INSC 94
- Also cited as
- AIR 1963 SC 516
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J.-We consider that this petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution is entirely devoid of merits and deserves to be dismissed as misconceived as it does not involve any question of the infringement of any fundamental right.
p. 833
The petition is substantially for the issue of a writ of prohibition directing the Collector ofHazaribagh not to proceed with an enquiry pending before him under s. 4(h) of the Bihar Land Reforms Aot and a writ of certiorari to quash the said proceedings. The property regarding which a contention is raised that the fundamantal rights of . the petitioner under Arts.19(l)(f) and 31(1) of the constitution are alleged to have been infringed, is a plot of land within the municipal limits of Hazari- . bagh in Bihar together with certain buildings and structures thereon. The property originally belonged to the Ramgarh Raj. There is a dispute as to the manner in which this property was being <mjoyed by the then proprietors and so we shall at this stage refrain from saying anything about it. On January 16, 194& the Raja of Ramgarh granted a lease of this property in favour of his younger brother Basant Narain-for a term of 99 years. On April 7, 1949 the Raja settled his reversionary interest in the property for the benefit of a Trust under a registered deed of settlement. The estate of Ramgarh was notified under s. 3(1) of the Bihar La.nd Reforms Act (Bihar 1 of 1950) for being taken over by the Government of Bihar and in consequence the estate statutorily vested in the State on and from November 3, 1951. Section 4(h) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act enacts:
p. 833
"The collector shall have power to make inquiries in respect of any transfer including the settlement or lease of any land comprised ~ such estate or the transfer of any kind of interest in any building used primarily as office or kutdwry for tbc collection of rent of such estate or tenure or part thereof, made at any time after t,ho first day of January 1!!46 and if he is satisfied that such transfer was made with thP. object of defeating any provisions of this Act or causi1ig t.o the ~tate or obtaining higher compensation thereunder the Collector may, after giving reasonable notice to the parties concerned to appear and be heard and with the previous sanction of the State Government, annul such transfer, dispossess the person claiming under it and take possession of such property on such terms as may appear to the Collector tu be fair and
pp. 833–834
equitable." It will ho noticed that the lease in favour of the H.aja's younger brother was dated January 16, 1948 and therefore was well within the period specified in the provision. It was the contention of the State that the buildings on the property which were tho subject of the lease <lated January 16, 1948 were being used by the Haj primarily as an office or kutcheri for the collect' on of rent-a fact which however was disputed .,,_(: ia a sul'ject of contest in tho proceedings now sought to ~e quashed. On Kovember 27, 1955 a notice was issued to Basant Narain to show cause why the lease cxecutt,>d in his favour on January 16, 11!48 should not be set aside under the power conforred upon the CollPctor by ~. 4(h). Basant Narain submitted his objections and stated that the leased properti!'s were not covered by s. 4(b). Before however this enquiry was completed, llasant !\arain surrendered his leasehold interest to the assignee of the reversion, viz., the Trust, by a rcgibterc<l deed" dated January I, l!J57. Subsequently on June ,I, 1959 the Trust which thus became entitled to the entire interest. in the property in its turn leased the property to one B~nsidhar and about a m1 nth later, on July 3, 1959 3 S.d.R. s:i5 Bansidhar assigned his leasehold interest i11 the property to the petitioner-company and that is how the petitioner came upon the scene.
pp. 834–835
On November 13, 1959 the Collector pessed an order cancelling the lease. The petitioner who laid claim to a title to the property under the assignment in its favour dated. July 3, 1959, applied to the Collector to set aside his order both on the merits and also on the ground that the order of November 13, 1959 had been passed to its prejudice without giving it an opportunity to make its objections even though by that date it had obtained title to the property and therefore a locus standi to be heard. We are not now concerned with the correctness or otherwise of the contention raised by the petitioner, because the State of Bihar set asidA the order of the Collector and directed a re-enquiry and in this re-enquiry the petitioner filed a petition before the Collector on August 9, 1960 setting out its case.
p. 835
It was during the progress of this last enquiry that the petitioner moved this Con.rt by the present petition for the reliefs which we have already set out. Pausing here it is necessary to add that the constitutional validity of s. 4(h) is not challenged and the case therefore turns on whether the property satisfies the conditions on which the section is attracted. The relief sought in this petition is based on two allegations: (I) that the land on which the buildings stand is raiyati land and therefore could not be taken possession of by the State under the Bihar Land Reforms Act and (2) that the buildings standing thereon were previously used for the'residential purpose of the Raja and his family and not as a kutoheri. The enquiry has been proceeding before the Collector in regard to these two points and it may be mentioned that when the petitioner applied to this Court for a stay of proceedings before the Collector this Court passed an order permitting the enquiry to continue, though it stayed the passing of any order by the State Governm•mt. It will thus be seen that if the contention of the State is correct
pp. 835–836
regards th" tenure of the property am! as regards the purpo;e for which thp buildings were used, the title of the State to the.property wonld be made out and the petitioner could have no legitimate grievance. If, on the other hand, the petitioner cstab. lishcs in the enquiry the case that it has put forward in the petition it is bound to succeed. Thus the question whether petition has a.ny right to the property which it claims depends wholly on questions of fact which are plainly within the jurisdiction of the authorities constituted under the Bihar Land Reforms Act. Before a party can complain of an infringement of his fundiimental right to hold property he must establish that he bas title to that property and if his title itself is in dispute and is the subject of adjudication in proceedings legally constituted, he cannot obviously put forward any claim bi.sect on hi8 title until as a result of that enquiry he is able tu establish his t.itlc. It is only thereafter that the que8tion whether his rightH in or to that property have been improperly or ilkgally infringed could arise.
p. 836
In the circumstances we consider that the petitioner can complain of no infringement of its fundamental right, a8 to justify pd·ition undor Art. 32. The petition is dismissed with costs.
p. 836
Petition dismissed.
p. 836