Supreme Court of India
COMMISSIONER-OF INCOME-TAX, ANDHRA PRADESH versus T. N. ARAVINDA REDDY
- Decided
- 5 October 1979
- Judges listed
- V.R. KRISHNA IYER
- Disposal
- Dismissed
Citations
- Official
- [1980] 1 S.C.R. 872 · 1979 INSC 198
Cited by
We found no other Supreme Court judgment we hold that cites this one.
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J-We regard the single point, persuasively pre-
p. 872, margin C
the learned Solicitor. General on behalf of the petitioner nmissioner of Income Tax,· Andhra Pradesh), as deserving cin~ order, although in dissent; since the question may arise · needs to be silenced. · .. -----··---
p. 872, margin C
Briefly, the facts. Four brothers, members of a coparcenary, partitioned their family properties, leaving' in common a large house in the occupation of their· moth~r. The eldest, who is respondent before us, sold his own house at a price sufficient to attract handsome capital gains tax, but he pre--empted the demand for tax by acquiring
p. 873
the common house from his three brothers who executed three release ~/deeds for a consideration of Rs. 30,000/- each, adjusted towards the extra share (/esh#abhaga) agreed to be given to the eldest by the next three. It is common ground that if these release deeds did amount to purchase of the house, s. 54(1) of the Income Tax A~t,- J 961~ would save the respondent from exigibility to tax~ So the short question, neatly identified. by the learned Solicitor General is whether rekase deeds by sharers in favour of one of them whereby the joint oWnership of all became separate ownership of one amount to purchase of house property within the m~aning of s. 54(1)' of the Act. The High Court has-held it is and we concur. Undoubtedly, each release, in these circumstances, is a transfer of the releaser's share for consideration to the release. In plain English, the transferee pur-. chases the share of each of ·his brothers. It is for a price of Rs. 30,000/- each. Had this been taken from non-fraternal owners of shares or"from one stranger-owner, plain-spoken people would have · called it a purchase. \Vhy; ~hen,. shoul& legalist allowed to play
p. 873
be this linguistic distortion. The reason, supposedly supported by an English decision, is that purchase primarily means · ·acquisition for money paid, not adjuste:(J. Upjohn,. J. in Hobshaw Brvthers Ltd. v. MayerC) has circumspectly said :
p. 873
There are no doubt. to be found authorities and statutes which have extended that meaning. In Mr. T. Cyprian Williams book, the. Contract of Sale of Land, at p. 3 he says: "'sale', in the strkt and primary sen~e of th~ wcrd, 'means' an agreement for the conveyance o( property for a Brice in money; hut the word 'sale' may by used in law in a wider sense and'so applied to the conveyance of land for a price consisting wholly or partly of money's worth other: than the conveyance of some other land."
p. 873
Apparently he considered that a sale for something other than money can a wider S{!nse be properly described as a
p. 873, margin F
in
p. 873, margin F
sale. · \Ve agree. ·The signification of a word of. plural semantic shades may, in a given text, depend on the prenure ofthe context or other indicia. ··Absent 'su'ch compelling mutation of sense, the speech of the · lay is also the language of the law. I - (I) [1956] 3 A. E. R. 833 at 835.
p. 873, margin F
·We find no reason to divorce the ordinary meaning of. the word 'purchase' as buying for a price or equivalent of price by payment in kind or~ adjustment towards an old debt or for other monetar.y consideration from the legal meaning of that word in Sec. 54 ( 1 ) • If you sell your house and make a. profit, pay Caesar what is due to him. But if you buy or build another subject to the conditions· of Sec. 54(1) you -are exempt. The purpose is plain; the symmetry. iS simple, the language is plain. \Vhy. mutilate the meaning by lexical legalism. \Ve see no stress in the section on 'cash and carey', ·.The point· pressed must, therefore, be negatived- ... _ yv e have declined to hear Sri S. T. Desai's artillery fire although he was armed cap a pie. . with 1\fiwkshara lcre and law. A point of suffocating . schplarsrup sometimes· anives in court when one nostaligic~lly remembers the · escapist verse : .
p. 874, margin A
"\\<1lere ignorance is bliss,
p. 874, margin C
Tts folly to be wise., ·Amen!
p. 874, margin C
A passing reference to avoidance and evasion of tax was made at the bar, a dubious refinement of a _dated . legal culture· sanctified, though, by judicial dicta. The c;ourt. is not the mint of virtue ·and
p. 874, margin D
one day in our Welfare State· geared to Se<;ial Justice, this clever con- . E · _ cept of 'avoidance' against 'evasion' may have to be exposed. Enough unto the day is the evil thereof. · N.K.A. Petition dismissed.
p. 874, margin D
1-
p. 874, margin D