Certo Is this judgment real?
Beta, Supreme Court only. We check Supreme Court of India judgments only for now: a High Court citation reads "Not in our corpus", which never means it does not exist.

Supreme Court of India

SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, PROHIBITION AND EXCISE DEPARTMENT versus L. SRINIVASAN

Decided
15 February 1996
Judges listed
K. RAMASWAMY, G.B. PATTANAIK (as the open data lists them; this may not name the whole bench)
Disposal
Appeal(s) allowed

Citations

Official
[1996] 2 S.C.R. 737 · 1996 INSC 265
Also cited as
  • (1996) 3 SCC 157 (48 citing judgments)
  • (1996) SCC(L&S) 686 (14 citing judgments)
  • MANU/SC/1108/1996 (2 citing judgments)

Learned from how other judgments cite this one, in their text or in the official Supreme Court Reports' lists of cases they refer to: each is cited this way by at least two judgments, and at least twice as often as any other citation to this judgment in that report. We hold no commercial reporter's text, only these citation strings.

Cited by

Cited in 4 other Supreme Court judgments we hold.

Counted only in the Supreme Court judgments we hold whose text we could read, not in High Court judgments. We match each citation to a judgment automatically, so a citation we cannot match is not counted. "Cited" says only that a judgment refers to this one, not whether it followed, distinguished or overruled it.

The Court's text

Paragraphs from our copy of the Supreme Court Reports print, with the Court's own paragraph numbers, the printed page and, where printed, the margin letter. The Court did not number this judgment's paragraphs, so they are listed by page. Link to paragraph N with #para-N.

Leave granted. We have heard the counsel on both side.

p. 737, margin F

Order dated November 12,1993 in O.A. No. 1702/93 and ~206/93 of the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal, Madras is in question before us. The respondent while working as Assistant Section Officer, Home, Prohibition and Excise Department had been placed under suspension.

p. 737, margin G

737 Departmental inquiry is in process. We are informed that charge sheet was laid for prosecution for the offences of embezzlement and fabrication of false records etc. and that the offences and the trial of the case in pending. The Tribunal had set aside the departmental enquiry and quashed the charge on the grol.llld of delay initiation of disciplinary proceedings. In the nature of the charges, it would take long time to detect embezzlement and fabrication of false record which should be done in secrecy. It is not necessary to go into the merits and record any finding on the charge levelled against the charged officer since any finding recorded by this Court would gravely prejudice the case of the parties at the enquiry and also at the trial. Therefore, we desist from expressing any opinion on merit or recording any of the contentions raised by the counsel on either side. Suffice it to state that the Administrative Tribunal has committed grossest error in its exercise of the judicial review. The member of the Administrative Tribunal appear have no knowledge of the jurisprudence of the service law and exercised power as if he is an appellate forum de hors the limitation of judicial review. This is one sucli instance where a member had exceeded his power of judicial review in quashing the suspension order and charges even at the threshold. We are coming across frequently such orders putting heavy pressure on this .Court to examine each case in detail. It is high time that it is remedied.

pp. 737–738, margin H

The appeals are accordingly allowed and the order of the Tribunal is set aside. The controversy is at large; the disciplinary authority would be free to proceed with the enquiry and trial also be proceeded in accordance with law. No costs. G.N. Appeals allowed.

p. 738, margin E