DAGI RAM PINDI LAL AND ANR versus TRILOK CHAND JAIN AND ORS.

DR. A.S. ANAND, J, This appealt by special leave, is directed against the .iudgment of the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court, dated 14.12.1973 in Suit No. 64/69, delivered in a reference made by a learned Single Judge for opinion of th~ Full Bench. The questions referred by the learned Single Judge to the Full Bench revolved around the scope and effect o~ the provisions of Sections 54 and 59B of the Indian Income Tax Act 1922

p. 550, margin F

(hereinafter referred to as the '1922 Act') and Sections 137 and 138 of the • Income Tax Act 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the '1961 Act') as amended from time to time in 1964 and 1967 the conln1 of the claim of privilege by the Income Tax Department. [~_)r the production of the do.cuments relating to assessment of an ~sessee summoned by the Civil Court. The following ~ree questions were referred to and considered by the Full Bench: · ' - . · · · · · .. "1. What is the position of law relating to privilege prior to 1964?

pp. 550–551, margin G

2. What is the position of law relating to privilege after 1964 ?;

p. 551, margin B

and

p. 551, margin B

3. What is the effe~t of the production of certified copies relating to income-tax assessment records. and how far certified

p. 551, margin B

copies can be admitted in evidence ?"

p. 551, margin C

The circumstances under which these questions arose, briefly put, are as follows:

p. 551, margin C

The plaintiff, Trilok Chand ~ain, insti~utcd a suit for recovery of Rs. 1,39,722.86 against the defendantS, M/s. Dagi Ram Pindi Lal and Smt. Budh Wanti Gulat~ w/o Shri Pindi Lal Gulati, the appellants herein. During the course of proceedings in the suit, when evidence was being recorded, the plaintiff obtained summons fro~ the court requiring the Income Tax Department to produce in the court records relating to the Income Tax Assessment of the defendants, M/~. Dagi Ram Pindi Ui), for the assessment years 1964-65 to 1971-72. The Income Tax Officer to whom the summons were issued, sent the record in a scaled cover through an l~pcctor alongwith a letter, dated November 1, 1972, claiming that the said record was privileged under Section 137 of the 1961 Act. The plaintiff also applied for and obtained summons requiring the Income Ta;~ Officer to produce the income tax record relating to M/s Borizcon Industrial Products (P) Ltd. and Bishamber Nath Kaul. That recoru was also sent by the Income Tax Officer in a seated cover alongwith a letter in which it was submitted that no disclosure of information regarding income p~rtaining to an income tax assessee could be made. The plaintiffs, it appears, in the meanwhile filed in the court. a number of certified copies of the accuunts of the defendants which be had been able to obtain from tb~ Income-tax authorities and sought permission of the Court to tender the certified copies in e\'idcncc. Arguments were addressed by the parties before the learned. Single Judge on the question of privilege as claimed by the Income Tax Officer. Being of the opinion that the question of privilege, claimed by the lricome Tax Officer, was important and lil<ely to aris~ in · the course of trial, of suits in future also, a r.efcre~ce ·was made by the learned Single Judge to the Full Bench. In dealmg With the three questions (supra) referr~d to it, the Full Bench considered different situations. It co~s idered the first question in the following four situations ~ : . "(~j Wh~re · ihe document~, 'records, etc. in respect ~f which privilege is claimed were flied by an assessee or a third party before April 1, 1962, with effect from .which date the Indian Income-Tax Act, 1922, was· repealed, in respect of assessment · years up to and including assessment year 1961-62 in proceed- . ings for the said assessment years t~king place under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922; (b) Where the documents, records, etc. were filed by an assessee or a third party after April 1,1962, but before Aprill, 1964 in respect of assessment years up to and including assessment · year 1961-62 in proceedings for the said assessment years taking place under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922; (c) Where the document, records, etc. were filed by an assessee or a third party after April 1, 1962, but before April 1,. 1964, in respect of assessment years up to and including assessment year 1961-62 in proceedings for the said assessment years taking place under the Income-tax Act, 1961; and (d) Where the documents, rcc~rds, etc. were filed by an assessee or a third party after April1, 1962, but before April 't, 1~64, in respect of assessment years l962-63 and 1963-64 in proceedings for the said assessment years taking place under the Income-lax Act, 1961:' ~ and sustained the claim of privilege by the Income Tax Dep~rtinent in each one· of the situations. · The Full Bench while considering the second question,-dealt with the following situations: · (a) Where the documents, records, etc. in respect of which privilege is claimed were filed by an assessee or a third party after April 1, 1964, in respect of assessment years up to and including assessment year ·1%1-62 in proceedings for the said assessment years taking place under the ladian lncome~tax Act, 22· . .. . 19 ' . (b) Where the documents, records etc. were filed by an asscS.Se'e or a third party after April 1, 1964, in respect of assessment years up to and including year 1961-62 in proceedings for the ~aid assessment years taking place under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1961; . · ... . (c) Where the documents, records, etc. were tiled by an assessee or a third party after April!, 1964, in respect of assessment years 1962-63 and 1963-64 in proceedings for the said ao;sessmc years taking place ~nder the Income-tax Ac~ 1961; and (d) Where the documents, records, ct~. were filed by an assessee or a third party after April 1, 1964, in respect of assessment years 1964-65 onwards." the claim of privilege was sustained in all the above situations also.

pp. 551–553, margin F

Dealing with the effect of omission of Section 137 and substitution Section 138 (1) (a) and (b), the High Court opined; ....... ;that when a party to a proceeding in a Court applies for ~ummoning any documents, records etc. from the income-tax authorities, the Court may summo·~ the said docum~nts, records,. etc. But on receipt or summons, it is open to the Commissioner of Income-tax to consider the matter as provided under section 138 {1) (b), and decide whether it 'Yould be (sic) in the public interest to produce or furnish · the documents, · records, etc.- summoned for, and submit his view to the Court · in answer to the summons. case, he i's satisfied that tire production, etc. would not be ;,. lhc public imcrest, Iris decision is fit~ul atrd tire Court to which tlte said dcc:i.rion is communicated cannot question the same." . . . ., {EMPHASIS SUPPLIED] The FuiJ Bench, however, did not express any opinion on the third QUestion. · ·: ·

p. 553, margin D

learned counsel for the ap~Liant has not questioned .the ftndings full B~nch in so far as they relate to the claim of privilege in r~ spect documen~s filed prior to the repeal of the 1922 Act or before ·on of Section 137 from the 1961 Act. She has questioned the omtsst . . . of the FuU Bench .only as regards the power and JUnsdiction of to summon the documents, after the repeal of the 1922 Act and de.letion · r Section 137 from the 1961 Act by tJ:t: Finance Act, 1964 the interpretation pl~ced by the Bench on SectiOn 138 {1) (b) of The controversy before ~s bas b:~n confined to the fi~ding of Court relating to the clatm of pnvtlege for the productiOn of ~hich were filed after. the repeal of Section 137, with effect from in respect of assessment yeel!s 1964-65 onWards. Thus, it is the situation (d) of the second question as rendc~ed by the Full Bench alone has been questioned and debated ~cfore us. . . The precise argument of the learned counsel for.the appellant aft~r the repeal of Section 137 of the 1961 Act by Act V of 1964, no longer any impediment left in the way of a civil court to summon production of documents filed by an assessee during the proceedings before an Income-tax Officer after 1.4.1964 in asseSsment years 1964-65 onw.ards, and that the finality attached order of the Commissioner with regard to claim of privilege under 138 (1) (b) has no relationship to the power of the court to summon record.

pp. 553–554, margin G

For a proper appreciation of the question debated before would be desirable to refer to the relevant provisions of the 1922 1961 Act, as amended from time to time, and notice the changes about in the matter of claim of privilege by the Income Ta-< Dep~tment Section 54 (1) and (2) of the 1922 Act provided -as fellows: "54. Di~closure of infomration by a public serrant- · (1) All particulars contained in any stat~ment made, furn~s?ed or accounts or documents produced proviS~~ns . of this Act or in any c'.-idcnce given, or deposition made, in the course of any proceedings Act other than proceedings under this Chapter, or record of any assessment proceeding or anv proceeding • , • m~ to the recovery of a demand, prepared for the thas Act, shaU be treated as confidential and notwithstandmg . ' ,. . , . anything contained in t~e Indian Evidence .Act, 1872 ( 1 of 18n) · • no Court ·shall, save as provided in this Act,· be entitled to require any public servant to produce before it any such return, '' . :. :. accounts, documents or record or any part of any such record, ... . . · or to give evidence .before it in respect thereof. (2) If a public servant discloses any particulars contained in any such statement, return, accounts, documents, evidence, affidavit deposition or record, he shall be pun!shablc with imprisonment which may extend to six months, and shall also be liable 'to fine.n

pp. 554–555, margin E

By Section 9 of the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act of 1960, Section 59-B was inserted in the 1922 Act with effect from April 1, 1960. It provided as under :- ' "59-B Disclosure of infonnation IY!garding tax payable- ,· Where a person makes an application to the Commissioner in . the prescribed form and after payment of the prescribed fee .. for information as to the amount of tax determined as payable by any assessee in respect of any assessment made on or aftl!r the 1st day of April, 1960, the Commissioner may, notwithstanding anything contained in section 54, if he is satisfied that there are no circumstances justifying its refusal, furni.c;h or cause to be furnished the information asked for." ... · Both the aforesaid pro\~sions dealt with the confidential nature nf the documents filed, before the Income Tax authorities and the claim of privilege to disclose the same to anyone, including a court of law. Section 54(1) declared that the various documents referred to therein shall be treated as confidential and prohibited a court from requiring any public· servant to produce before it any such document or to give evidence bdl)rC it in respect thereof, notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Sub-Section (2) of Section 54 made punishable, the disclosure by a public servant, of any information contain~d in those documents. The effect of introduction of Section 59-B by Taxation La\vs (Amendment) Act 1960 was that it entitled a person to make an application to the .Commissioner to obtain information thereafter as to the amoulll of tax detem1ined, as payable by an assessee in respect of any asscssmt!nt made .. on or before April1, 1960, and authorised the. Commissioner to furnish ·cause to. be furnished. the sought for information, if he was · satisfied there we~e no circumstances justifying its refusal. This legal positioin tinued to prevail till April 1, 1960, when the 1922 Act was reP.ealed by 1961 Act. In the· 1961 Act, provisions were made corresponding to tions 54 and 59-B of the 1922 Act in SectiQns· 137 and 138. The relevant portions of Sections 137 and 138 the Act provided as follows: of . . ·.. .. · .: :: ~137. Disclosure -of in[on11ation prolribitcd- . . . . . ' . . : (1) All particulars contained in any slatemcnt made, return ·furnished or accounts or documents produced under . provisions of this Actt or in any evidence given or affidavit ·: 1 ;deposition made in the course of any proceedings under Act, other than proceedings under Chapter XXII, ~r in record of any assessment proceedings, or any proceedings .. relating to recovery of a demand, prepared for the purpases this Act, shall be treated a5 confidential, and notwithstanding · ·. ;,.anything contained in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, no Court : shall, save as ·provided in this Act, be entitled to require · public servant to produce before it any such return, accounts, documents or record or any part of any such record, or to evidence: bcf~re it in respect thereof. (2) No public servant shall disclose any particulars contain . in any such statement, return, accounts, documents, evidence, affidavit, deposition or record. · (3) .......... . ,. ~( 4), ~ .. ~ ~ .... .. (5) ....... ._. "138. Disclosure of illfomaatiotr respectfng tax payable- ~HERE A ~crs~n makes an applici'tion to the Commiss.ioncr l~e prescnbcd form and pays the prescribed fcc for mfor: malton as to the amount of tax determined· as payable by assessee in respect of any ac;sessmt!nt made ~either under Act or the Indian lucome·tax Act, 1922. on or after the 1st ' . . . of 'April, 1960, the Commissioner may, not~th.standing any~ . · . thing contained in Section 137, if he is satisfied that there ·are . . · ~ . no circumstances justifying its refuSal, furnish c.ause to be or fu~bed the information asked for.• . . . .. 7. The provisions of Section 137(1) of the 1961 Act were, as is seen, almost identical to the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 54 of the 1922 Act and Section 137 (2} prohibited a public servant from d~closing the particulars contained in any of the documents mentioned in Section 137 (1). The provisions of Section 138 of the 1961 Act were almost identical to the provisions of Section 59·B of the 1922 ~ct. ·, B. With effect from April 1, 1964, Section 137 of the 1961 Act was omitted from the Statute vide Section 32 of the Finance Act No. V of 1964, . and Section 138 was substituted by a new Section vide St:ction 33. of the Finance Act No. V of 1964. The substituted Section 138 rca<ls as under:- "138. Disclosure of infortnarion respecting assessees:~ . . (1}' Where a person makes an applicatio~ to the Commissioner in the prescribed form for any information relating· to any assessee in respect of any assessment m~de either under this . Act or the Indian Income-tax Act, 19n,' on or after the 1st day of April, 1960, the Commissioner may, if he is satisfied that it is in the public interest so to do, fur~isb or cause to be furnished the information asked for in respect of that assessment only · · · and his decision in this behalf shall be final a nd shall not be '· called in question in any Court of law. · • (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) or any. other law for the time being in force, ·the Central Government may, having regard to the practices and usages customary or any other relevant factors, by order notified in the Official Gazette, direct that no information or d.ocumcnt shall be furnished or produced by public servant in rc~ p ect of such matters relating to such class of assessee~ .or except to such authoritie~ as· may be specified in the ~rdcr."

pp. 555–557, margin C

The scope of Section 138 of the 19~1 Act was, as can be .s:en, enlargt:d by the substituted provisions of Section 138. Under the anginal (b) Where a person makes an application to the Commissioner . in the prescribed form for any information relating to any assessee in respect of any assessment made under this Act or the Indian Income-tax Act 1922, on or after the 1st day of April, 1960, the ~ommissioner mayt if he is satisfied that it is in the pubijc interest so to do, furnish or cause to be furnished the information asked for in respect of that assessment only and his decision in this behalf shall be final and shall not be called in question in any court of law." The provisions of sub-Section (1) of Section 138 as they originally stood were incorporated in clause (b) of the substituted sub-Section (1) and a new provision was incorporated in clause {a) of sub-Section (1) which empowered the Board or any other income-tax authority specified by it by a general or special order in that behalf to furnish or cause to be furnished, information relating to any assessee to such officer, authority or ·body as is mcntiont.-d in the provision to enable him or it to perform its functions under the Act. Vide clause (b) of the substituted sub-Section (1} of Section 138", finality has· al~o been attached to an order of the Commissionert made on an application filed by any persoll seeking information relating to an asses.";ee in respect of any assessment. The Commissioner, has to make an order after bdng satisfied that it is in the public interest so to do, to furnish or cause to be furnished such information and that decision of the Commissioner is immune from challenge in any court of law. · · :.

pp. 557–559, margin G

The controversy, as already noticed. before us is limited to the jurisdiction or lack of it of a civil court to seck production of ·documents relating to assessments filed after April 1, 1964 in assessment proceedings 1964-65 onwards after the omission of Sl!ction 137 of the Act.

p. 559, margin E

The .Full Bench, in the impugned judgment, came to the conclusion that the omission of Section 137 did not make any difference and that the ban on the courts as contained in the repealed Section 137 continued to remain in force by virtue of the prO\·isions of Section 138( 1) and after 1967 by Section 138 (l)(b) of the Act even. in respect of the documents filed in the . as!'cssmcnl proceedings after April lt 1964 for a<>Scssmcnts rel::tting to the period 1964-65 onward~:Thc Full Bench also pressed into aid the provisions of Section 6 of the Gcnl!ral Clau~cs Act hold that the repeal of Secti~n 137 did not remove the ban on the courts to summon any documents from the income-tax authorities, even in respect of documents which had been flied before the income~t~ authorities after ·the repeal of Section 137 after April1, 1964. .. · 13: In ·our opinion, the High Court fell. in error in coming to· that conclusion. It not only ignored the legislative intent manifest in' the omis- . sion of Section 137 of the 1961 Act, after the repeal· of the 1922 Act, but also ignored the powers of a court under the general law, to sUmmon such documents, record etc. as is found relevant to a case pending before the court, in the absence of any specific prohibition, under any law for the time being in force. The High Court assumed that by Section ~4 of the 1922 Act anq Section 137 of the 1961 ~ct, the jurisdiction of the courts to call for documents from the income-tax authorities had been .taken away for all times to come, notwithstanding the repeal ~f the 1922 Act or the omission of Section 137 specifically from the 1961 Act. The High Court appears to have lost sight of the position that under the Code of Civil Procedure, the courts of law have always possessed the jurisdiction to call for the production of documents relevant to the case before the court from anybody having custody of tho~e documents. Section 54 of the 1922 Act and after its repeal Section 137 of the 1%1 Act had only placed fetters on the exercise of that jurisdiction, in respect of the specified documents, by the courts, · notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time bei1,1g in force. The exercise of .the jurisdiction to seek production of documents had, thus, only been put under a cloud in so far as the record of assessment is concerned. With the repeal of the 1922 Act and omission of Section 137 of the 1961 Act~ the fetters on the exercise of that jurisdiction were removed with th'e result that the exercise of the jurisdiction to call for the production · ?f documents relevant to the case pending before the court, even from the mcome-tax authorities~ revived. Neither Section 54 of the 1922 Act nor Section 137 of the 1961 Act had taken away for all times the jurisdiction of th.e .courts to call for the record from the income-tax authorities. Those proVJstons, as already noticed had, only put the exercise 'of that jurisd1c~on ·under a cloud and those fetters were coterminous with the life of Section 54 of the 1922 Act or Section 137 of the 1961 Act. 14 . · The finality which has b.een attached to the order or the Comniis~ stonlicr u~de: Section 138(1)(b) of the Act is applicable only in cases where app cation as made to the c · . ommtsstoner by a party or any other person :: for receiving documents or information. It has nothing to do ·with the ~ · powers of the courts to summon the production of assessment record of . an assessee, filed after 1.4.1%4. The Privilege as to 5ecrecy, which the assessee had acquired under Section 54· of the 1922 Act remained unimpaired ~y the repeal of that Act or even by the omission of Section 137 ~f . the 1951 Act in respect of record filed prior to 1.4.1964 and relating to the assessments prior to that date~ Thtlt privilege did not extend, after Aprill, 1964, to record filed before the income-tax authorities, for the assessment years 1964-65 onwards. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act as weil as Sectio·n.138(1)(b) of the 1961 Act. cannot extend the ban on the exercise of the jurisdiction by the courts to summon the production of documents from the income-tax authorities after April 1, 1964 relating to assessment . year 1964-65 in·respect o~ the record fLied after Aprill, 1964 . .

pp. 559–561, margin F

Section 6(c) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 on which reliance was placed by the High Court reads as under :- "6. Where this Act, or any Central Act or regulat.ioo made after· the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention · appears, the repeal shall not ., ............... " ................... . (c) affect any right, privilege, obligatjon or liability acquired or incurred under any enactment so repealed: A plain reading of the Section shows that the repeal of any enactment, unless a different intention appears, shall not affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under the repealed enactment. ln respect. of the documents filed after the repeal of Section 137 of the 1961 Act, with effect from April 1, 1964, relating to ~ ·~ as. essments for the period 1964-65 onwards, no right, privilege, obligation or liability can be said to have been acquired, accrued or incurred prior to the omission of Section 137 of the Act. Therefore, the ban contained in Section 137 of the 1%1 Ac' on tht! exercise ol the. powers of a civil court to can for production of documents etc. could not be said to have con- ~ . tinucd to exist, in matters arising subsequent to the omission of that ~cction with effect from April 1, 1964 and that ban came to an end in respect of the period after April 1, 1964. The general principl~ is thaJ an enactment which is repealed, is to be treated, except as .to lr8fSB~ions p~t and closed, as if it had never existed. The assessee had acqutred no nght or privileg~ under the .repealed Act, since the pr~vision is only a procedural restriction and did not create any substantive right on the assessee, in respect of assessments for the period after the omission of Section 137 of the 1961 Act. Thus, reliance placed on the provisions of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act to hold the continuation of the ban on the exercise of jurisdiction by th~ courts was misplaced.

pp. 561–562, margin C

Deal~g with}he scope of Section 138(1)(b) ·of the Act,' the High Court held that' the said provisions attached a finality to an order of the Income Tax, Commissioner and applied to the cases where the record was summoned even by ·a court of law. The High Court opined : "The complete omission of the declaration of the confidential oature·of the documents, records, etc. and the removal of the ban on courts and public servants no doubt,· suggests that the 'power of a court under the general law to summon such documents, records, etc. relevant to the case before it has been restored . . But., at the same time, ,the legislature which empowered the Commissioner of lncomc·tax to furnish the infor- . · ... mation if he is satisfied that it iii in the public interest so to do made the decision _of the Commissioner final .and un~ques­ tionablc in a Court of law. Wbcn two powers arc thus vested in two legal authorities, neither of them can be ignored, and both of them have to be reconciled and given effect to. In the case of the two powers under consideration, it has to be noted that the power to summon which vests in a court is under the · · general law; while the power 'of the Commissioner lias been conferred upon him by a special law and has, therefore, to prevail over the former. In view of the same, it has to be held ··· that while it is ope.n to a court to· summon the documents, records etc. from the Income-tax Commissioner, it is equally open to the Commissioner on receiving the summons to consider whether the · production/furnishing ·of the documents, records etc. would be in the public interest, and submit the same to the cou~t in answer to the summons." We arc unable to subscribe to the above view. . . . . . 11. Clau.sc (b) of ~~b-Scction (1) of Section 138 is limited in its scope and application. Under it, any person can make an application to th~ ~::·- Commissioner for any information relating to an assessee in respect of any · assessment made either under the 1922 Act or under the 1961 Act on or after the 1st April 1960 and the Commissioner of Income Tax has the authority to furnish or cause to be furnished the information asked for on being satisfied tba't it is in the public interest so to do and such an order ~ -· of the Commissioner is final and cannot be called ill question in any court · . of law. The Commissioner of Income Tax under this clause performs only an administrative function, on his subjective satisfaction as to whether it is in the public interest to furnish the information or not to any person seeking such information and his decision in that behalf is final and the aggreived person cannot question it in a court of law. By enacting this provision, the legislature could not be said to have intended that the ~ :; Commissioner of Income Tax would have the authority ·to sit in judgmcm over the requisition made by a court of law requiring the production of record of assessment relating to an assessee in a case pending before the court. When a court of law, in any matter pending before it desires the . production of record relating to any assessment after applying its judicial mind and hearing the parties and on being prima fa~ie satisfied that. the rccQrd required to be summoned is relevant for the ~ecis ion of the controversy before it - it passes a judicial order .summoning the prod~ction ~ of that record from the party having possession ·of the record. The Commissioner of Income Tax cannot, therefore, refuse to send the record, as he certainly is not author~ed to set at naught a judicial ord.er of a court of law. He must obey the order ~f the court by sending the record to the court concerned. Indeed, it is open to the Commissioner of Income Tax to claim privilege, in respect of any document or record so summoned by a court of law, under Sections 123 and 124 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872 and ........... even then it is for the court to decide whether or not to grant that pri'\.ilcge. Had the legislature intended that no document from the assessment record of an assessee should be produced in a court on being summoned by it, without the approval of the Commis.c;ioner of Income Tax, it would have said so in Section 138 of the Act itself. The repeal of Section 137 of the ~ Act clearly di5closes the legislative intent that it was felt by the legislature that it was no more necessary to keep the records of assessment by the Income Tax Department relating to an assessee as. confidential from the corms and the bar with regard to the production of any part the .record ?f was removed in so far as the courts are concerned. The fmahty whtch has been attached to the order or the Commissioner under Section 138(1)(b) of the Act is, thus, restricted to the cases where the information etc. contemplated by the Section is called for by anypers_oll, other than a court of Jaw by a judicial order. The High Court, therefore, fell i.n error holding that the assessment records of an assessee filed before the income· tax authorities, even after April 1, 1964, are immune from production court of law on summons for their production being issued by the court · and that the disclosure of any information from the record even to courts is subject to the veto powers of the Commissioner of Income Tax. Section 138{1)(b) does not affect the powers of the cmtrts to require production of assessment records or the disclosure of any information therefrom to it, in a case pending before the court when the court, by judicial order, requires the production of the record, considered relevant by it for decision of a case pending before it.

pp. 562–564, margin B

As a result of the above dh.cussion, 'we, therefore, find that answer given by the Full Bench of the High Court in the impugned judgment, to situation (d) of the second question. (supra) as formulated it, is erroneous and· we set it ·asidc. Consequently, we hold that after repeal of Section 137 of tbe Act, there is no longer any impediment left the way of a ·court to summon the production of documents filed by assessee before the incomc·tax authorities arter April 1, 1964 relating ac;scssment proceedings for. 196+65 onwards and that the finality attached to an order of the Commissioner under Section 138(1)(b) has no relevance to the exercise of powers by a court to summon the production of documents in a case pending before the Court. Since, the challenge before had been con~ne.a to the answer given by the High Court to situation of the second question as rormulatcd by it and no other finding of the High Co~rl .was ~lied in question, we have refrained from expressing opinion ·on the other findings recorded by the Full Bench of the High Court. The appeal consequently succeeds to rhc extent indicated above is allowed. We, however, make no order as to costs . V.P.R. Ap~eal allowed.

p. 564, margin C