SAKURU versus TANAJI

llALAKRISllNA El!ADI, J. In this appeal filed by special E leave granted by this Court against the judgment dated April 12, 1978 of a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, the sole question arising for decision is whether the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 can be invoked for condoning the delay in the filing of an appeal before the Collector under section 90 of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana F Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 - Act 21 of 1950 (hereinafter called 'the Act').

p. 111

The facts which have led up to the present controversy m.:.y now be briefly set out. The Revenue Divisional Officer, Adilabad declared the respondent- Tanaji to be the owner of an extent of 6 G acres, 39 guntas comprised in Survey Nos. 289 a11d 290 of Hasnapur village under section 38-E of the Act on the ground that he (the respondent) was a "protectd tenant". Though an appeal lay to the Collector under section 90 of the Act against the said order passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer the appellant land holder did not prefer an appeal but, instead, filed a Writ H Petition - W.P.No. 2064 of 1976 before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh challenging the legal! ty and correctness of the order passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer. That Writ Petition dismissed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court on 1976. Writ Appeal No.385 of 1976 filed against the the learned Single Judge was subsequently dismissed by Bench of the High Court on December 6, 1976. Long thereafter, August 22, 1978, the appellant preferred an appeal Uistrict Collector purporting to be one filed against dated January 22, 1975 passed by the Revenue Divisional together with an application for condonation of section 5 of the Limitation Act. That application and were opposed by the respondent herein. But his objections overruled, the delay was condoned and the appeal was the Collector on October 24, , 1977. The respondent thereupOn moved the High Court by filing a revision under section 91 of the Act. By the judgment impugned appeal, the learned Single Judge of the High Court allowed revis~on petition holding that the Collector had no jurisdiction to condone the delay in the filing of the appeal section 5 of the Limitation Act following an earlier Di visiorl .Hench of the same High Court reported in Ors. K.Veokateswara Rao & Aor. A.I.R. 1978 A.P. 166. decision the Uivision Bench of the High Court had taken that the Limitation Act applies only to proceedings

pp. 111–112

vil or Criminal Court and since the Collector before appeal is filed under section 90 of the Act is not Criminal Court, the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 have no application to the proceedings before him unless express provision in the special enactment whereunder tor is exercising appellate jurisdiction, making any section' of the Limitation Act specifically applicable proceedings. It was further held by the Division Bench tion 93 of the Act, as it then stood, made applicable dings before the Collector only those provisions of tior. Act which related to the 'computation of the limitation' and since section 5 did not fall within the sections (sections 12 to 24 of the Limitation Act) dealing computation of the period of limitation, the provisions tion 5 -were not c:.pplicable to the proceedings CollectOr. The learned counsel for the appellant has before us the correctness of the view so taken by Berich in Verikaiah's case.

p. 112, margin A

After hearing both sides we have unhesitatingly conclusion that there is no substance in this appeal view taken by the Division Bench in Venla1ah's case

p. 112, margin G

v. TANAJI [ BALAKRISHNA ERADI, J • ] correct and sound. It is well settled by the decisions Court in Town Municipal C<Jomci I , Athan! v. Presiding Labour Court, llubli & Ors. [1970] 1 s.c.R. 51, Joshi & Ors. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India 1. S.C.R. 396 and Susbila Devi v. Prasad [1976J 2. s.c.R. 845 that the provisions of the Limitation 1903 apply only to proceedings in "Courts_" and not applications before bodies other than Courts such cial Tribunals or executive authorities, notwithstanding that such bodies or authorities may be vested with fied powers conferred on Courts under the Codes Criminal Procedure. The Collector before whom preferred by the appellant herein under section 90 being a Court,the Limitation Act, as such, had no to the proceedings before him. But even in such a relevant special statute may contain an express ferring on the appellate authority, such as the power to extend the prescribed period of limitation cause being shown by laying down that the provisions of the Limitation Act shall be applicable to such proceedings. lie.nee it becomes necessary to examine whether the any such provision entitling the Collector to invoke sions of section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation delay in the filing of the appeal. The only provision by the appellant in this connection is section 93 which, as it stood at the relevant time, was in terms~- "93. Limitation - Every appeal and every for revision under this Act shall be sixty days from the . date of the order the appeal or application is filed.and of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 shall

p. 113

purpose of the computation of the said On a plain reading of the section it is absolutely effect is only to render applicable to the proceedings Collector, the provisions of the Limitation Act relating putation of the period of limitation • The provisions computation of the period of limitation are Contained 12 to 24 included in Part III of the Limitation Act, 1963. tion 5 is not a provision dealing with computation of limitation . It is only after the process of completed and it is found that an appeal or application filed after the expiry of the prescribed period that of extension of the period under section 5 can arise. We are, therefore, in complete agreement with the view expre•sed by the Di vision Bench of the High Court in Venkaiah' s case that section 93 of the Act did not have the effect of rendering the provision of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applicable to the l proceedings·before the Collector.

pp. 113–114, margin F

Our attention was drawn to the fact that subsequent to the decision of the High Court, the State Legislature has enacted the ADdhra Pradesh Tenancy Laws ( Amendment) Act, 1979 - Act 2 of 1979, whereby section 93 ·of the Act has been amended and the

p. 114

provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 have now been expressly made appll.cable to appeals and revisions preferred Wider sections 90 arid 91 of the Act. We see no force in the contention advanced on behalf of the appellant that the said amendment is clarificatory in nature. The provisions of section 93 as they stood prior to this amendment were free from any ambiguity and called fot no clarification. The Legislature has also not given any indication of any intention to clarify but, on the other hand> what has been done by it is to amend the section wHh only prospective effect. The amended provisions of section 93 are, therefore, of no assistance to the ·appellant in this c-...ase which is governed by the Section as it was originally enacted.

p. 114

The c:Onclusion that emerges from the foregoing discussion is that this appeal is devoid of merits and has only to be dlsmissed. We accordingly dismiss this appeal but in the circumstances without any order as to costs.

p. 114, margin C

Appeal dismissed.

p. 114, margin C