NILKANTH PRASAD AND OTHERS versus STATE OF BIHAR

HIDAYATULLAH, J.-The judgment in Civil Appeal No. 534 of 1961 will dispose of Civil Appeals Nos. 535 to 539 of 1961. In these appeals, private operators of omnibuses challenge the orders of the Appeal Board of the State Transport Authority, by which it set aside the renewal of the permits on certain routes granted by the South Bihar Regional Transport Authority, Patna. The appellants held previously stage carriage permits over certain routes which were due to expire in December, l 9;i8 or in January, 19ii9. They bad applied for renewal of their permits under 58(2) of the i\fotor Vehicles Act. Under a scheme framed and notified on July 8, 1957, tide Notification No. p.2.203/5iT/ 4 794, the route, Ga ya to Khijirsarai, was notified under s. 68D of the Motor Vehicles Act. The Rajya Transport, Bihar, was exclusively allowed to operate on that route. In Civil Appeals Nos. 53;) to 538 of 1961, the Rajya Transport, Bihar, filed objections against the renewal of the permitR. In Civil Appeals Nos. 534 and 539 of 1961, no objections were filed. The route, Ga.ya to Khijirsarai, which may bn called conveniently route 'AB' formed part of routes, on which the appclls.nts were operating and in respect of which thPy bad asked for r<>newal of their permits. The south Bibar Regional Transport Authority, however, renewed the permits of the appellants, holding that route 'AB' wnR different from the routes, for which renewal was demanded.

pp. 729–730

Against the orders of the Regional Transport Authority, appeals were filed by the Rajya Transport, Bibar in all the cases, that is to say, in those cases in which the Rajya Transport, Bihar, had objected, and those in which it had not objected. While these appeals were p~nding, the State of Bihar, acting under s. 3 of the i{oad Transport Corporations Act, 1950 (64 of 1950) notified on April 20, 1959 as follows:

p. 730

"!'\o. R.T. Cor. 1/59-3090-In exercise of the powers conferred by section 3 of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950 {LXIV of 1950), the Governor of Bihar is pleased to establish with effect from th~ I st May, 1959 a Road Tre.nsport Corporation, for the State of Bihar, to be called ' the Bihar State Roa<i Transport Corporation'.

p. 730

2. The sai<l Corpora ti on shall with effect from the said date, exercise all the powers a.nd perform all the functions which are at present being exercised and performed by the Rajya Transport, Bihar.

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By order of the Governor of Bihar. _

p. 731

K. B. Sharma, Dy. Secy."

p. 731

At the hearing of the appeals, the Government Advocate, Mr. Lal Narain Sinha, appeared for the Road Transport Corporation. Objection was . taken to the competency of the appeals on two grounds. In those cases in which the Rajya Transport, Bihar, had'not objected to the renewal of the permits before the Regional Transport Authority, it was contended that it bad no locus standi to file appeals. In those cases in which it bad so objected, the ground was that the Road Transport Corpora· tion could not, in law, represent the Rajya Transport, Bihar, in the appeals filed by the latter. On merits, it was contented that the order of the Regio· nal Transport Authority that route ' AB ' though part of the routes for which renewal was asked, was a different route, and the State Corporation had an exclusive right to ply omnibuses on route ' AB ', did not affect th!' rights of the appellants to ply their omnibuses on routes, which were entirely different.

p. 731

The GovE\rnment Advocate contended that, on the analogy of the principle underlying O. 22, Re. IO of the Civil Procedure Code, the Road Transport Corporation on which devolved the powers and functions of the Rajya Transport, Bihar, could prosecute the appeals. He also contended, in the alternative, that he we.a representing also the Rajya Transport, Bihar, and that · the appeals were not defective. The Board accepted the argument of the Government Advocate, and set aside the orders of renewal passed by the Regional Tranflport Authority. The appellants then filed petitions under Arts. 226 a.nd 227 of the Constitution challenging the order of the Board on many grounds. The High Court, by its judgm<>nt dated July 5, 1961, dilomisecd all the petitions. Jn the order under appeal, the High Court considered the competency of the appeals, and held that the Ra.jya Transport, Bihar, was <:ompetent to prosecute the appeals before the .Appeal Board. In dealing with the question whether the Appeal Boa.rd was entitled to interfere with the order of the Regional Transport Authority at the instance of the Rajya Trans· port in those cases, where the Rajya. Transport had not filed objections under the Motor Vehicles Act, the High Court held that it was not ncceBBary to express an opinion on the correctness of the argu. ment, because the Regional Transport Authority was not competent to grant a renewal, inasmuch euoh a grant was a direct violation of the scheme approved by the State Government and published in the Official Gazette. On the merits, the High Court was of opinion that under s. 68F(2) (c) (iii), the Regional Transport Authority could curtail the length of the route covered by the permit, and exclude the portion, which overll\pped a notified route. The present appeals have been filed against the order of the High Court, with the special leave of this Court.

pp. 731–732

'l'he~c appeals thus fall into two groups. In one group arc Civil Appeals Nos. 534 and 539 of 1961 and in th<' other are Civil Appeals Nos. 535 to li38 of 1961. In the former, the grant of renewal of the permits has been made without any objection, and in the latter, in spite of the objections filed by the Rajya Transport. The competency of the appeals before the Appeal Board ia involved in both the groups, though on different grounds. The answer to the different objections ia, however, the same.

p. 732

In1Abdul Gafoor v. State of Mysore ('), the effect of notifying a scheme was considered by this Court, aDd it was there stated that when a scheme has been notified under Chap. IV A of the Motor Vehicles Act, and an application is made for the grant of a permit on a route notified under the scheme by a private operator, the Regional Trans· po;t Authority has no option but to refuse the permft to the private operator, if the State Transport Uii.dertaking has either applied for a permit or has all:eady been granted one. In all the present cases, the State Transport Undertaking had already been granted a permit over route 'AB', and if the private operators, that is to say, the appellants, were not entitled, in law, to the renewal of their permits for routes which embraced also route 'AB', then the Regional Transport Authority could not but refuse to renew the permits. It was observed in Abdul Gaf oar's case (') that the duty of the Regional Transport Authority was merely mechanical, and that it was required to take note of routes which had been notified and to adapt its orders so as to be in con· formity with the notified scheme. In view of the fact, therefore, that the scheme had been notified and route 'AB' had already been granted to the Rajya Transport and/or the State Transport Undertaking, the Regional Transport Authority was incompetent to renew a permit over a route embracini route •AB'. The Regional Transport Authority not having done its duty under the law, the Appeal Board was entitled, when the record was before it, to revise the order of the Regional Transport Authority, even if the appeal wii.s incompetent, in view of the vast powers of revision under s. 64A. That seotion, omitting the provisos, reads :

p. 733

"The State Transport Authority may, either on its own motion or on an application made to it, oall for the reoord of any oase in which an order has been made by a Regional Transport Authority and in which no appeal lies, and if it appears to the State Transport Authority that the order mude by the Regional Transpo1t Authority is impnper or illegal, the State Transport Authority ma.y pass such

pp. 733–734

order in relation to the ease as it. deems fit." The High Court came to the conclusion tba.t it should not intt>rfere, in it~ discretionary poweni under Arts. 226 and 2:!7, with the order of the Appeal Board, because even if the appeal for some reason we.a incompetent, the Appeal Board bad the record before it, and gave effect to the correct legal position a.rising from a. notified sch<'me. The same view was exprei>sed also in Samarth Transport Co. v. Heuional 'l'ransport Authority, Nagpur ('). In our opinion, we should not interfere on this ground either. In this connection, the difference between the two sets of cases arising from the fact whether the Ra.jya. Transport, Bihar, had objected or not, completely disappears.

p. 734

We are now concerned with the merits of the contention tha.t where the scheme notifies, as a route, a. part of a. larger route operated by a private opera.tor, the two routes must be regarded as different, s.nd the private operator cannot be prevented from running his omnibuses on tha.t portion of his route which is a. different route, although notified. Reliance is pla.ced upon a. decision of the Privy Council in Kelani Valley Motor :l'ransit Co., Ltd., v. Colombo-Ratnapura Omnibu8 Co., Ltd. ('). There, the Privy Couuoil waa concerned with two Ordina.nees promulgated in Ceylon intituled the Motor Car Ordinance (No. 45 of I 938) and the Omnibus Service Licensing Ordinance (No. 47 of 1942). By the first 1chedule, para l of the latter Ordinance, it was provided that if applica.tions were made by two or more persons for road service licence11 in respect of the sa.me route, preference should he given to (a) a.n [1~6] application from a company or partnership comprising the holders of all the licences fnr the time being in force under the Motor Car Ordinance No. 45 of 1938, authorising the use of omnibuses on such route, and (b) an application from a company or partnership comprising the holders of the majority of the licences referred to in (a) above. Section 7, sub·s. 1, provides :

pp. 734–735

"The iesue of road service licences under this Ordinance shall be so regulated by the Commissioner as to secure that different per- . sons are not authorised to provide regular omnibus services on the same section of any highway: Provided, however, that the Commissioner may, where he considers it necessary to do so having regard to the needs and c:onvenience of the public, issue licences to two or more persons authorizing the provision of regular omnibus services involving the use of the same section of a highway, if, but only if-(a) that section of the highway is common to the respective routes to be used for the purposes of the services to be provided under each of the licences, but does not constitute the whole or the maj,or part of any

p. 735

such route." The real question in the case was whether the appellant there could take into account for the purpose of the first schedule, six omnibuHes which had been licenced for the route, Panadura to Badulla via Colombo and the low level road. Panadura is 16 miles along the coast to Coloµibo and thence from Colombo to Ratnapura is 50 miles and froIQ. Ratnapura to Badulla, a further 80 miles. It was clear that the route from Panadura to Badulla was not the same or substantially the same route as the route, Colombo to Ratna.pura.; but if· a. licence for a.n omnibus on the route, Panadura. to Badulla, was one authorising the use of the omni. bus on the route, Colombo to Ratnapura, then six omnih11scs plierl hy the appellant could be taken into arcount to tum the scale between the parties. Sir ohn Beaumont in expouncling the meaning of the worn "route" observed as follows:

pp. 735–736

"If 'route' has the same meaning as •highway' in the Ordinance this argument must prevail, since admittedly an omnibuR running on tho hghwav from Pamidum to Baclulln will pass over the whole of the high· iway betwe<'n Col0mbo and Rat.napura, but in th1,ir Lorclel1ips' opinion it is impossible tn ~ay that. 'route' and 'highway' in the two Orclin~nces are synonymous terms ........... . A 'highway' is the physic11l track nlon,!? which an omnibu8 runR, whilRt a 'routo' appears to their Lorrlships to be an abstract conception of a line 0f travel betwcon one torminuR and another, and to be Romething distinct from the highway traversed."

p. 736

This distinction between "route" and "road" is relied upon by the appellants to show that the notifi<'d route, which we have called •AR' was a different route from the routes for which renewal ol permits was demanded, even though route 'AB might have been a prirtion of the "road" traversed by the omnibuses«£ the appellants plying on their "routes." The rlistinction made b:v the Privy Council ie right; but it was made with reference to the words used in the Ordinances there under consideration. The question is whether a similar distinction can be ma.de in the context of the J\fotor Vehicles Act. Mr. Viswanatha Sa.stri appear. in!! for thn appellants took us through ss. 42 to 57 of the ~fotor \'chicles Act a.nd drew our attention to those in which the word "route" has been used, contra.-distinguiehed from the word "a.rea", and contended that everywhere the word "route" is used in the sense of a notional line between two termini running a. stated course, and is used in contradistinction to what may be conveyed by the word" area". In Kondalu Rao v. Andhra Pradesh 8t,ate Road Transport Corporation (' ), this court, in dealing with the scheme of the Motor Vehicles Act declined to make any such distinction betweert "route" and "area". This Court, speaking through Subba Rao, J., observed at p. 93 :

pp. 736–737

"Under s. 680 of the Act the scheme may be framed in respect of any area or a route or a portion of any area or a portion of a route. There is no inherent inconsistency between an 'area ' and a ' route '. The proposed route is also an area. limited to

p. 737

the route proposed. The scheme may a.s well _ propose to operate a. transport service in respect of a new route from point A to point B and that route would certainly be an area

p. 737

within the meaning of s. tiSC." In any event, under s. 680 it is provided that a.. scheme may notify a route or an area or a portion ofa route or a portion of an area., and the exclusion of the private opera.tors from the whole route or the whole area or a part of the route or a. part of that area, a.s the case may be, may be either complete or partial, and under s. 68F( 2) ( c) (iii), the Regional Transport Authority may modify the terms of any existing permit so as to " curtail the area or route covered by the permit, in so far as such permit relates to the notified area or notified route ". This means that even in those cases where the notified route and the route applied for run over a common sector, the curtailment by virtue of the notified 11chem~ would be by excluding that portion of the route -:.r, in other words, the " road " common to both. The distinction between " route " as the notional line and " road " as the physical track disappears in the working of Chap. IV A, because you cannot ourtail the route without curtailing a. portion of the road, and the ruling of the Court to which we have referred, would also show that even if the route different, the area at least would be the same. The ruling of the Judicial Committee cannot be m,J.de applicable to the Motor Vehicles Act, particularly Chap. IV A, where the intention is to exclude private operators completely from running over certain sectors or routes vested in State Transport Undertakings. In our opinion, therefore, the appellants were rightly held to be disentitlod to run over those portions of their routes which were notified as part of the scheme. Those portions cannot be said to be different routes, hut must be regarded as portions of the rout~s of the private operators, from which the private operators stood excluded under s. 68F {2)(c)(iii) of the Act. Tbe decision under appeal

pp. 737–738

therefore, correct in all the circumRtances of the we.

p. 738

This leaves over for consideration Civil Appeal No. 434 of 1961. There, the question which arose was decided in the same way in which we have disposed of the other appeals on merits. Ramaawami, C.J., and Kanhaiya Singh, J., referred to an ear lier decision (M.J.C. No. 354of1960 decided on May 13, 1960) given by the Chief Justic<' and Chaudhuri, J., in which they had applied the Privy Council case, and made a distinction between a route which was longer than the notified route, though running for part of thr. way along the notified route and the notified r"'luto. In the judgment from which Civil Appeal No. 434 of l!ltii arises, the learned Chief Justice has declined to follow his earlier ruling which, he considers, w~ gi\'en perincuriam, becau.;o the provisions of s. 68 F(2)(c)(iii) of the Motor Vehic:~s Act were not taken into account. After considering the matter in the light of that section, the Didisional Bonch has reached the same conclusion as we have, and along almoHt the same line of re&Fo 1ing. In view of what we have said in Civil A 1 1•al No. 534 of 1961, Civil Appeal No. 434 of 1 J must also fail.

p. 738

In the result, the appJals are dismissed, but in the circumstances of the case, we make no order about costs.

p. 739

Appeals dismissed. RAJA RAM MAHADEV PARANJYPE AND OTHERS

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v. ABA MARUTI MALI AND OTHERS K. A. K. and

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JJ.)

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Landlord and Tenant -Ejeetment-Non-payment of r.nt /or thm years-Statutory right eject -Power of court to gram rel!£/ -Equity-Bombay Tenancy Agricultural Lan.U Act, 1948 (Bom. 67 o/ 1918), ••· 14, 25, 29. • Jn the first three. appeals the tenants were in default in paying rents for three years and due notices had been served by the landlords terminating the tenancies. The landlords thus acquired statutory rights to eject the tenants and applied to the Mamlatdar, as required by of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, for possession over the lands •. The Mamlatdar rerused to make an order for possession on the r-ound that the tenants were entitled to relief against forfeiture on equitable principles. Jn the fourth appeal also tile tenants had defaulted in paying rents for thtte yean. Jn respect of the default in the first year the tenant had been granted relief agairut forfeiture under 25(1) of the Act. The tenant contended that the default in the first year had merged in the order under 25(1) and could not relied upon for holding that he·had defaulted for three years.

p. 739

Htltl, that the landlords, were entitled to orders for poucssion in all the four cases. Upon default in payment of rent for three years a statutory right accrued to the landlords under

p. 739

25(2) to terminate the tenancy and to obtain possession. There was no provision in the Act for granting relief against forfeiture in such a case; the provision in 29(3) that the Mamlatdar "shall pass such orders as he deems fit" did not give him such a power. The Act merely empowered him grant relief where the tenant was not in arrears for more than two years. No relief against forfeiture could be granted the

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