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Supreme Court of India

SOW CHANDRA KANTA AND ANOTHER versus SHEIK HABIB

Decided
13 March 1975
Judges listed
V.R. KRISHNA IYER (as the open data lists them; this may not name the whole bench)
Disposal
Dismissed

Citations

Official
[1975] 3 S.C.R. 933 · 1975 INSC 71
Also cited as
  • (1975) 1 SCC 674 (67 citing judgments)
  • (1975) SCC(TAX) 200 (17 citing judgments)
  • AIR 1975 SC 1500 (14 citing judgments)
  • (1975) SCC(L&S) 184 (12 citing judgments)
  • (1975) SCC(CRI) 305 (11 citing judgments)

Learned from how other judgments cite this one, in their text or in the official Supreme Court Reports' lists of cases they refer to: each is cited this way by at least two judgments, and at least twice as often as any other citation to this judgment in that report. We hold no commercial reporter's text, only these citation strings.

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The Court's text

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KRISHNA IYER, J. Mr. Daphtary, learned counsel for the petitioners, has argued at length all the points which were urged at the earlier stage when we refused special leave thus making out that a review proceeding virtualLy amounts to re-hearing. May be, we were not right in refusing special leave in the first round; but, once an order has been passed by this Court, a review thereof must be subject to the rules of the game and cannot be lightly entertained. A review of a judgment is a serious step and reluctant resort to it is proper only where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility. A mere repetition, through different counsel, qt old and over-ruled arguments, a second trip over ineffectually covered ground or minor mistakes of inconsequential import are obviously insufficient. The very strict need for compliance with these factors is the ratio_nale behind the insistence of counsel's certificate which should· not be a routine affair or a habitual step. It is neither fairness to the court which decided nor ·awareness of the precious public time lost what with a huge back-log of dockets waitili1g in the queue for disposal, for counsel to issue easy certificates for entertainment of review and fight over aga.in the same battle which has been fought and lost. The Bench and the Bar, we are sure, are jointly concerned in the conservation of judicial time for maximum use. We regret to say that "this case is typical of the upfortunate but frequent phenomenon of repeat perfonnance with the review label as passport. Nothing which we did not hear then has been heard now, except a couple of rulings on points earlier put forward. May be, as counsel now urges and then pressed, our order refusing special leave was capable of a different course. The present stage is not a virgin ground but review of an earlier order which has the normal feature of finality. ·

pp. 933–934, margin E

We dismiss the petition unhesitatingly, but wi.th these observations, hopefully. · V.M.K. Review dismissed .

p. 934

petition

p. 934