H.G. RANGANGOUD versus M/S. STATE TRADING CORPORATION OF INDIA LIMITED & ORS.

Petitioner, aggrieved by the order passed by the Division Bench Karnataka High Court initiating proceeding for contempt exercise of its suo motu power, has preferred these leave petitions.

p. 101, margin A

Leave granted.

p. 101, margin C

Bereft of unnecessary details the facts giving rise present appeals are that the appellant applied on 16th 2003 for grant of mining lease for iron ore over an area acres in Yeshawanthnagar Range of the Kumarswamy Forest Area within Sandur Taluk in Bellary District of of Karnataka. The State Government processed the and in exercise of powers under Section 5 (1) of the Mines Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') by its letter dated 9th of February, recommended to the Central Government for grant of lease in favour of the appellant to the extent of 16.8 hectares. However before any decision could be taken, the Government issued notification dated 27th of June, exercise of the power under Section 17 A ( 1 A) of the reserved iron ore deposits in the area in question for exploitation by State Trading Corporation of India Limited, public sector undertaking. In view of the aforesaid reservation the Central Government returned the proposal of the Government to grant mining lease to the appellant by dated 21st of July, 2005. Aggrieved by the aforesaid notification appellant preferred WP No. 19339 of 2005 Rangangoud v. Minister of Coal & Mines, represented Secretary & Ors.) before the Karnataka High Court, praying for quashing the notification reserving the deposits in favour of the State Trading Corporation Limited. The writ petition filed by the appellant was with another writ petition filed by Salgaocar Mining Private Limited and the learned Single Judge and order dated 14th of August, 2007 quashed notification dated 27th of June, 2005. Armed with the High Court, appellant represented to the State to consider his application for grant of mining representation dated 18th of September, 2007. of filing of the representation i.e. on 20th of September, the State Trading Corporation, aggrieved by learned Single Judge preferred appeal before Said appeal was posted for consideration on 2007 and the Division Bench of the High Court consideration the 'enormity' of the case and finding parties have been served and represented, directed disposal on 11th of October, 2007. However, was passed. As directed, the matter was heard for judgment but before the judgment could be State Trading Corporation, the appellant before brought to its notice that "when the matter was process, Government of Karnataka has sent a to the Union of India for mining lease in favour petitioners". The Division Bench of the High informed about the aforesaid fact "called upon Advocate to explain this situation". The explanation furnished in which it was inter alia stated that "as interim order granted in the writ appeal and the fact that if the mining area is not sanctioned petitioners the existing mining operation would close down and keeping in view the jeopardy to such recommendation has been made." The forth by the State Government did not find favour Court and on its prima facie finding that the aforesaid "amounts to interference with the due course of initiated suo motu criminal contempt proceedings appellant herein and K. Jayachandra, Under Secretary Government of Karnataka, Commerce and Department. While doing so the High Court observed as A follows: " ........ On going through the affidavit as well as the records, prima facie it appears to us that there is a clear attempt on the part of the writ petitioner Mr. H.G. Rangangoud and the concerned official to take such action when the grant of lease/licence itself was seized and was under consideration by this Court thereby cause on the merit or decision of this court."

pp. 101–103, margin C

Mr. P. Vishwanatha Shetty, Senior Advocate appearing C on behalf of the appellant submits that the appellant had filed the representation in the light of the order of the learned Single Judge even before the appeal was filed against the judgment of the learned Single Judge and hence it cannot be said that the appellant in any way interfered with the due course of judicial D process. Accordingly he submits that the order initiating the proceeding for criminal contempt deserves to be set aside. Ms. Anitha Shenoy appears on behalf of the State of Karnataka and submits that the act of filing the representation by the appellant and the recommendation made by the Under Secretary in no E way interferes with the due course of judicial process and in such a state of affairs she is not in a position to defend the order of the High Court. At the same breath she reminds us that contempt is a matter between the court and the contemnor and this Court may take the view which it considers just and F proper.

p. 103

We have given our most anxious consideration to the submissions advanced and at the outset we may observe that this Court seldom interferes with an order initiating a contempt proceeding and ordinarily relegates the person charged with G contempt to file a show cause before the court which had initiated the proceeding. But this is not an absolute rule and in the facts of a given case when this Court comes to the conclusion that the allegation made, even when not denied do not constitute contempt, interferes with the order initiating H contempt proceeding so as to avoid unnecessary harassment to the person served with contempt notice. We proceed to consider the present appeal bearing in mind the aforesaid principle.

pp. 103–104

It is relevant here to state that the proceeding has been initiated against the appellant for criminal contempt on the ground that the act done by the appellant amounts to interference with the due course of judicial process. The. expression "criminal contempt" has been defined under Section 2 (c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and in the present case we are concerned with Section 2 (c) (ii), the same reads as follows: "2. Definitions. - In this Act, unless the contex1 otherwise requires, xxx xxx xxx (c) "criminal contempt" means the publication (whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representation, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which xxx xxx xxx (ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceeding; or xxx xxx xxx.· From a plain reading of the aforesaid provision it is evident that an act which prejudices or interferes or tends to interfere with the due course of judicial proceeding comes within the mischief of criminal contempt. The power to punish for contempt is inherent in Courts of record and described as a necessary incident to every court of justice. The power is inalienable attribute of court and inheres in every Court of record. This power though inherent to the High Court is given a constitutional status by Article 215 of the Constitution. It is to A secure public respect and confidence in the judicial process. Rule of law is the basic rule of governance of any civilized democratic polity. It is only through the courts that rule of law unfolds its contours and establishes its concept. For the judiciary to carry out its obligations effectively and true to the B spirit with which it is sacredly entrusted the task, constitutional courts have been given the power to punish for contempt, but greater the power; higher the responsibility.

pp. 104–105, margin A

In the present case, even before filing of the appeal the appellant has brought to the notice of the State Government the C order passed by the learned Single Judge and sought its implementation. In the representation he had not voiced and could not have voiced any opinion on the appeal as the same was not filed till then. The Under Secretary while making recommendation also did not voice any opinion on the pending D appeal. It has to be borne in mind that any attempt to influence the outcome of the matter pending before the court to prejudice the parties therein may prejudice or interfere with the due course of any judicial proceeding but in our opinion, mere filing of the representation and making recommendation thereon in no way E prejudices or interferes or tends to interfere with the due course of any judicial proceeding. In our opinion, it is criminal contempt to voice opinion on a case pending in court as that would seem to influence the outcome of the matter and to prejudice the parties therein. However, we hasten to add that fair reporting F of court proceedings and fair comments on the legal issues do not amount to contempt. The order of the learned Single Judge was not stayed. Further, mere filing of the appeal would not operate as a stay of order appealed from.

p. 105

When tested on the aforesaid anvil we are of the opinion that the act alleged in no way prejudices or in~erf~r~s or tends to interfere with the due course of any 1ud1c1al proceeding. From the conspectus of the discussi~n a~o~~said we have no doubt in our mind that the proceeding 1mt1ated H A against the appellant as also the Under Secretary t0 the Government of Karnataka, Commerce and Industries Department is not just and appropriate and an abuse of the process of the court. This being so, we are duty bound to interfere at this stage itself.

pp. 105–106

True it is that Under Secretary to the Government of Karnataka, Commerce and Industries Department against whom the contempt proceeding has been initiated by the impugned order, not chosen to file any petition before this Court but in view of what has been observed above we are of the opinion that it shall be too technical to deny him the relief by this Court, which has jurisdiction for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it. Therefore, he shall also be entitled to the same relief as that of the appellant.

p. 106

Accordingly, these appeals are allowed, the impugned judgment and order is set aside. R.P. Appeals allowed.

p. 106, margin D