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Supreme Court of India

RANGASWAMI, THE TEXTILE COMMISSIONER & ORS. versus SUGAR TEXTILE MILLS (P) LTD. & ANOTHER

Decided
27 January 1977
Judges listed
Y.V. CHANDRACHUD (as the open data lists them; this may not name the whole bench)

Citations

Official
[1977] 2 S.C.R. 825 · 1977 INSC 32
Also cited as
  • (1977) 2 SCC 578 (4 citing judgments)

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The Court's text

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Unnumbered paragraph

CHANDRACHUD, J. Under the power conferred by Section 3 the Essential Suppiies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, the Central Government issued an Order called "The Cotton Textiles (Control) Order, 1948". Clause 20 of that Order, as amended, reads thus

p. 826, margin B

Unnumbered paragraph

"20( 1) The Textile Commisisoner may from time to time issue directions in writing to any manufacturer or class of manufacturers or the manufacturers generally regarding the classes or specifications of cloth or yarn, and the maximum or the minimum quantities thereof, which they shall or sha,11 not produce during such periods as n:iay be specified in the directions, and they shall comply with such directions.

p. 826, margin C

Unnumbered paragraph

20(2) In the exercise of the powers conferred upon him by sub-clause (1) the Textile Commissioner shall have regard to the capacity of the producer to produce cloth and yarn of different descriptions or specifications and to the.

p. 826, margin D

Unnumbered paragraph

needs of the general public." ... The question for our determination in these appeals is whether, the Textile Commissioner decides to issue appropriate directions any manufacturer or class of manufacturers, it is obligatory upon him to specify therein the period for which the directions will remain in operation.

p. 826, margin E

Unnumbered paragraph

As hold by this Court in State of Uttt!r Pradesh v. }ogendra -..Singh,(1) it is well settled that the" word "may" is capable of meaning "must" or "shall" in the light of the context and that where discretion is conferred upon a public authority coupled with an obligation, the word "may" which denotes discretion should be construed to mean ··a command. Considering the purpose of the relev_ant powerment and its impact on those who are likely to be affected the exercise of the power, we are clear that the power conferred the Textile Commissioner to issue directions is coupled w:th duty to specify the particular period for which the directions shall be operative. Directions of the kind envisaged by clause 20 are fluenced and justified oy exigencies which render it imperative the directions be revie\\-. d from time to time. That becomes feasible only if the directions as . mlted expressly to a determinate period [1964] 2 S.C.R. 197 at 202.

p. 826, margin F

Unnumbered paragraph

v. 827

p. 827

Unnumbered paragraph

(Chandrachud. /.) time at the end of which a fresh review of facts and circumstances becomes obligatory. There is a fear that a direction not limited in point of time may continue to operate even after it has outlived its utility for the reason merely that the need to review it is not clearly perceived. Besides, the manufacturers must know, in order that they may organize their business in their own interest as well as in . the interest of the community at large, as to how long any particular embargo is going to be operative.

p. 827

Unnumbered paragraph

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the High Court though on the ground only that the impugned Notification in so far as it prohibits the printing of any border or heading on sarees etc. for an indefinite period is ultra vires clause 20 of the Cotton Textiles (Control) Order, 1948, ~ince the aforesaid clause casts an obligation or a. duty upon the Textile Commissioner to specify the period during which the prohibition shall remain in force. We express no opinidn on the other points, including Point No. 6 urged before the High Court for its consideration.

p. 827, margin B

Unnumbered paragraph

The appeals are accordingly dismissed. The appellants will pay one set of costs of these appeals to the respondents. S.R. Appeals disnii~sed. 5-206501/77

p. 827, margin B