ANANTA MUKHI, @ ANANTA HARI versus STATE OF WEST BENGAL

No. 97/C Dated 24-4-71

p. 392, margin A

Whereas I. am satisfied with respect to the person known as Shn Ananta Mukhi Ananta Hari son of Gobardhan @ Gurai of Antpara, Chakbazir, P. S. Deb~a, Dt., Midnapore that with a view to preventing from acting in any manner prejudicial to the s.ec~nty of the State or the maintenance of public order, 1t 1s necessary so to do, I therefore in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section ( 1) read with sub-section (3) of section 3 of the West Bengal (Prevention of Violent Activities) Act, 1970 (President's Act No. 19 of 1970) make this order directing that the said Shri Ananta Mukhi @ Ananta Harl be detained.

p. 392, margin A

Given under my hand and Seal of office.

p. 392, margin C

Sd/- District Magistrate

p. 392, margin D

Midnapore Soon after the detention order, the petitioner was found to be •lbsconding. He was arrested on May 5, 1971 and was served with the order of detention along with the ground of detention and the vernacular translation thereof on the same day. On ,\pril 26, 1971 the District Magistrate of :\1idnapore reported to the. State Government about the making of the detention order rlgainst the petitioner together with the grounds of detention and other necessary particulars. The said report and particulars were considered by the State Government and ori May 4, 1971 the detention order was approved by the State Government. On the same day the State Government submitted a report to the Centrd Government together with the grounds of detention and 0ther necessary particulars. The case of the petitioner was place<l by the State Government before the Advisory Board on June 3, 1971. In the meanwhile, on May 20, 1971 the StatE Government received a representation of the petitioner dated \fay 13, 1971. The s~.'.~ representation was considered by the State GoY('r;iment and was rejected as per order dated June 2. l 971. The representation of the petitioner was then forwarded to th(; Advisory Board. The Advisory Board after considering the material before it, including the representation of the petitioner and after hearing him in person, sent its report to the State Government on July 8, 1971. Opinion was expressed by the Advisory Board that there was sufficient cause for the detention of the petitioner. By an order dated July 16, 1971 the State Government confinned the order of detention of th". re-:itioner.

p. 392, margin D

The petition has been resisted by the respondents and the affidavit of Shri Manoranjan Dey, Assistant Secretary, Home (Special) Department, Government of West Bengal has been filed in opposition to the petition.

p. 393, margin A

We have heard Mr. R. K. Jain who has argued the case llmicus curiae on behalf of the petitioner and Mr. G. L. Mu]>hoti on behalf of the State. One of the contentions advanced by · Mr. Jain is that the detaining authority has taken into consideration facts extraneous to section 3 of the Act in making the order of detention, and therefore the said order is illegal. In this respect we find that in the grounds of detention which were supplied to the petitioner under sub-section ( 1) of section 8 of the Act, the following particulars were mentioned :

p. 393, margin A

"(1) That on 4-10-69, at about 21-30 hrs., you along with 50/60 Naxalite supporters being am1ed with lethal weapons raided the house of Shri Pulin Bihari Manda! of Bhuiyabasan, P. S. Debra in order to kill him. The house owner somehow managed to save his life. You and your associates then looted cash, ornaments, utensils and other properties worth about Rs. 10, 000 from the house.

p. 393, margin C

(2) That on 8-11-69, at about 20.00 hrs., you along with 20/22 Naxalite workers a1n1ed with lethal weapons raided the house of Shri Bistu Pada Bhuiya of Radhakantapur, P. S. Debra and killed his two brothers named Madan Bhuiya and Kshudiram Bhuiya by sharp cutting weapons. You and your associates also looted ornaments and other articles from the house."

p. 393, margin D

lt would appear from the above that according to the grounds of detention, the petitioner along with 50 / 60 other persons armed with lethal weapons raided the house of Pulin Bihari Mandal cm October 4, 1969 at night time and looted cash, ornaments, utensils and other properties worth Rs. 10,000 from the house. It is further alleged that on November 8, 1969 at about 10 p.m. 1he petitioner along with 20 /22 associates armed with lethal weapons raided the house of Bistu Pada Bhuiya of Radhakanta, pur and killed his two brothers Madan Bhuiya and Kshu,:iram Bhuiya by sharp cutting weapons and also looted m;!)amentE md other articles from the house. The above facts would sho\, that the case against the petitioner was covered by clause ( d) of subsection (2) of section 3 of the Act. Sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 3 of the Act read as under :

p. 393, margin E

"(!) The State Government may, if satisfied with ~espect to any person that with a view to preventing

p. 393, margin H

(1972] him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or the maintepance of public order, it is necessary so rto do, make an order directing that such person be detained.

p. 394

(2) For the purposes of sub-section (1), the expression "acting in any manner prejudicial to the- security of the State or the maintenance of public order" means- (a) using, or instigating any person by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible representations or otherwise, to use, any lethal weapon- ( i) to promote or propagate any cause or ideology, the promotion or propagation of which affects, or is likely to affect, adversely the security of the State or the main-

p. 394

tenance of public order; or (ii) to overthrow or to overawe the Govern-

p. 394, margin C

ment established by law in India.

p. 394, margin D

Explanation.-In this clause, 'lethal weapon" includes fire-arms, explosive or corrosive substances. swords, spears) daggers, bo\vs and arrows; or

p. 394, margin D

(b) committing mischief, withm the meaning of section 425 of the Indian ·Penal Code, by fire or any .explosive substance on any property of Government ·or any local authority or any corporation owned or -controlled by Government or any University or other educational institution or on any public building. ·where the commission of such mischief disturbs, or is likely to disturb, public order; or .

p. 394, margin D

(c) causing insult to the Indian National Flag or to any other object of public veneration, whether by mutilating, damaging, burning, defiling, destroying or otherwise, or instigating any person to do so.

p. 394, margin F

Explanation.-In this clause, "object of public veneration" includes any portrait or statue ·of an eminent Indian, installed in a public place as a mark of respect to him or to his memory; or

p. 394, margin G

(d) committing, or instigating any person to commit, any offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term extending to seven years or more or any offence under the Arms Act, 1959 or the Explosive Substances Act, 1908, where the commission of such offence disturbs, or is likely to disturb, public order; or

pp. 394–395, margin G

( e) in the case of a person referred to in clauses (a) to {f) of Section 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, committing any offence punishable with imprisonment where the commission of such off-

p. 395

ence disturbs, or is likely to disturb, public order." The first·allegation discloses that the petitioner and his associate:; were guilty of dacoity, while the second allegation sh9ws that at the time of the. commission of the offence of dacoity, the petitioner and his associates also murdered two persons. As such, according to the grounds of detention, the petitioner and his associatc1 committed offences punishable with death or imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term extending to seven years or more. The aforesaid activities of the petitioner, according to the affidavit of Shri Manoranjan Dey, disturbed public order and the petitioner became a terror to the residents of the locality. We see no cogent ground to take a different view. It is obYious that when such a large number of persons, who were stated to be Naxalite workers, armed with lethal weapons commit the offence of dacoity and dacoity with murder, such offences disturb or are likely to disturb public order. According to sub- ~ect!on (1) of section 3 of the Act, the State Government may, if so satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the securi!:y of the State or the maintenance of public order, it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained. Sub-section ( 3) empowers a District Magistrate to exercise the powers, if so satisfied, conferred by sub-section ( 1).

p. 395, margin B

The activities of the petitioner as mentioned in the grounds of detention, in our opinion, show that they were not of an extraneous character but fell within the expression "acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of State or the maintenance of public order" as defined in sub-section (2) of section 3 of the Act.

p. 395, margin F

The second submission of Mr. Jain is that the order of deten- :ion ·made by the District Magistrate shows that he has not d?'Y applied his mind before making the detention order, as accordmg to the order the petitioner was detained "with a view to pr:venting him from actino in any manner prejudicial to the secunty of 1he State or the m~intenance of public order". It is urged that the District Magistrate should have specified in the order. as !O whether it was necessary to detain the petitioner from actmg 1!1 any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or whether was necessary to detain him from acting in any manner pr.:judicial to the maintenance of public order. The District Magistrate, according to the learned counsel, could have also, if fact; so warranted, passed an order for detention of the petitioner cu both the above grounds but he could not make an indefinite order by using the word "or" in the same and stating that it was necessary to detain the petitioner with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner "prejudicial to the security of the State or the maintenance of public order". The. order, it i~ stated, is a mechanical reproduction of the statute and shows that there. was not due application of the mind before the orda· was made.

pp. 395–396, margin G

The above contention has been resisted by Mr. Mukhoti and in our opinion, is not well founded. We have reproduced sub· lieCtion (2) of section 3 of the Act earlier and it would appear therefrom that a comprehensive definition has been given of the .expression "acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or the maintenance of public order''. The definition shows that the whole thing has been clubbed together and no separate definitions have been given, one in respect of "acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State" and an· other in resptct of "acting in any manner prejudicial to the main· tenance of public order". The various acts which have been specified in the different clauses of sub-section (2) of section 3 fall within the compendious expression "acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or the maintenance of public order", and it would not, in our opinion, introduce a.a infirmity in the detention order if it is stated therein that it iJ; necessary to detain a detenu with a view to prevent him frorr. acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the Stat~ or .the maintenance of public order. .

p. 396, margin C

It is no doubt true that if a statute mentions different grounds for the detention of a person, the order ~ detention should specify distinctly the ground or grounds for which the detenu has bee:i ordered to be detained and it would not be permissibk to state that the detenu has been ordered to be detained for ground (a) "or" ground (b). The use of the word "or" woulc .show in cases falling under such a statute, an element of casualness in the making of the order as held by this Court in the case of Jagannath Misra v. State of Orissa.( The detenu in that case had been ordered to be detained under rule 30 ( 1 )( b) o: the Defence of India Rules, 1962 and according to the order of detention, the order had been made with a view to preventing the detenu "from acting in any manner prejudicial to the defence of India and civil defence, the public safety, the maintenance m tt966] 3 s.c.R. 134, public order, India's relations with foreign powers, 1he mainten· ance of peaceful conditions in any part of India or the efficien conduct of military operations". This Court observed :

pp. 396–397, margin F

"There is anotner aspect of the order which leads to the same conclusion and unmistakably shows casualness in the making of the order. Where a number of grounds are the basis of a detention order, we would expect the various grounds to be joined by the conjunctive "and" and the use of the disjunctive "or" in such a case makes no sense. In the present order however we find that the disjunctive "or" has been used, showing that the order is more or less a copy of s.3(2)(15) without any application of the mind or the authority concerned to the grounds which apply in the present

p. 397, margin A

case.·· The above principle would, however, not apply in the case of a person ordered to be detained under the Act with which we are dealing· because of the special definition given in sub-section (2) of section 3 of the Act of the expression "acting in any nianaer prejudicial to the security of the State or the maintenance of public order". According to the definition, each one of the activities mentioned in the various clauses of the said sub-section constitute.; an act "prejudicial to the security of the State or the maintenance of public order". The presence of the word "or" in the definition itself tends to show that the use of that word in the order is not impermissible and there was no element of casualness or absence of due application of the mind in the making of the impugned order. ·

p. 397, margin C

In the case of Dr. Ram:Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar.and Ors. (1}, this Court while expounding the words "maintenanc public order'', observed :

p. 397, margin E

"one has to imagine three concentric circles : Law and order represents the largest circle within which is the next circle representing public order and the smal-

p. 397, margin G

lest circle represents the security of the State." The above observations were relied upon by this Court in the subsequent case of Madhu Limave v. Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Monghyr and Ors. ( and it was observed : ----· - 0) (1966] I S.C.R. S.C.R.

p. 397, margin G

''The expression 'public or<lcr' includes absence of all acts which arc a daqgcr to the security of th e State Jnd also acts which arc comprchen<le<l by the expression 'order publiquc' explain ed above but not acts

p. 398, margin A

which disturb only the serenity oE others." ln the case of State of West Bengal v. As/wk Dey & Ors. etc. etc. (Cr. Apptal No. 217 to 223 of 1971 decided on November 19, 1971) while delaling with different claus.es :of section 3, this Court observed :

p. 398, margin A

"That, disturbance of public order in a State n1ay in turn prejudicially affect its security, is also undeniable. Fairly close and rational nexus between these clauses and the maintenance of public order and security of the State of West Bengal is writ large on the face

p. 398, margin C

of these clauses." It would-follow from the above that though all activities prejudi- : cial to the security of the State and those which are prejudicial to -the nlaintenance of public order. are not identical, because of close nexus ·between maintenanc·e of public order and security of State, there is bound to be some overlapping. As the expressions "acts prejudicial to the maintenance of public order" and "acts prejudicial to the security of the State" have not been separately defined but have been put together in the same definition with the disjunctive "or" in between them, the use of the word "or" in the detention order would not, in our opinion, so adversely affect the. said order as may justify the quashing of that order.

p. 398, margin C

We are fortified in. the above conclusion-- by a recent decision of th\s Court in the case of Shyµmal Monda! v. State of West Bengal(1). In that case too the impugned order of detention stated that the District Magistrate·- was satisfied that it was necess::iry. that the p~titioner should ·be - detained with a view to prevent hiin fro~ acting ~n any n1anner prejudkial to the security of the State or the n1aintenance of public order as provided by section 3 (1) of the A~t. Argument was advanced on behalf of t11c: deteri~ that i_hc . order' of ~etention ,. was illeg::U inasmuch as the petitioner ha<l not been informed as- to· how his ...__ (1) .\.I.It: (1971) s.c. 2384. activity was prejudicial to the security of the State. It was pointed out that as both the matters, namely,. the maintenance Gf public order and the security of the State had been mentioned in the order of detention, it must be taken that the detaining authority had taken into account extraneous and irrelevant matters in passing the order of detention. It was further submitted that it was not clear whether the detaining authority passed the order to prevent the detenu from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or for maintenance of public order. The above contentions were repelled by this Court and reliance was placed upon the definition given in subsection (2) of section 3 of the expression "acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or the maintenance of public order". It was observed :

pp. 398–399, margin F

"It will be seen that the Act itself furnishes a dictionary meaning for the two expressions and a perusal of clauses (a) to ( e) clearly shows that any of the matters referred to therein will be both "prejutlicial to the security of the State or the maintenance of public order.

p. 399, margin C

We are not inclined to accept the contention on behalf of the petitioner that it is only sub-clause ( 1) of clause (a) of section 3(2) which deals with the matters, _which adversely affects the security of the State. In fact that very sub-clause refers to the matters mentioned therein as affecting the security of the State or the maintenance of public order. Therefore, in this case the grounds of detention cannot be held to be. vague nor can the order of detention be held to be invalid on the .. g_round .. that.-the- petitioner must have been detairied only to prevent him from acting i!Pally manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and not to the security of the State."

p. 399, margin D

Although an attempt was made to assail the correctness of

p. 399, margin H

the above view, we find, for reasons stated earlier, no cogent 13-Ls87SupCI/72 ground to take a different view. The result is that the petition A fails and is dismissed.

pp. 399–400, margin H

In view of the opinion of the majority the Writ Petition is dismissed. · . s.c. Petition dismissed .

p. 400