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Supreme Court of India

N. K. V. BROS (P) LTD. versus M. KARUMAI AMMAL AND ORS. ETC.

Decided
21 March 1980
Judges listed
V.R. KRISHNA IYER (as the open data lists them; this may not name the whole bench)
Disposal
Dismissed

Citations

Official
[1980] 3 S.C.R. 101 · 1980 INSC 50
Also cited as
  • (1980) 3 SCC 457 (37 citing judgments)
  • AIR 1980 SC 1354 (31 citing judgments)
  • (1980) SCC(CRI) 774 (6 citing judgments)

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The Court's text

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KRtSllNA IYER, J.-Sri Ramachandran, ably assisted by Sri K. Ram Kumar, presented the case of the petitioner for special leave, as persuasively as the facts permit but while we were impressed with the industry and advocacy of counsel, we heartily dismiss this petition. Why heartily? Because the High Court, if at all, has erred in favour of the petitioner, not against him.

pp. 101–102, margin B

The Facts : A stage carriage belonging to the pet1t1oner was on a trip when, after nightfall, the bus hit an over-hanging high tension wire resulting in 26 casualties of which 8 proved instantaneously fatal. A criminal case ensued but the accused-driver was acquitted · on the score that the tragedy that happened was an act of God! The Accidents Claims Tribunal, which tried the claims for compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, came to the conclusion, affirmed by the High Court, that, despite the screams of the passengers about the dangerous over-hanging wire ahead, the rash driver sped towards the lethal spJt. Some lost their lives instantly; several lost their limbs likewise. The High Court, after examining the materials, concluded :

p. 102, margin A

"We therefore sustain the finding of the Tribunal that the accident had taken place due to the rashness and negligence of R.W. 1 (driver) and consequently the appellant

p. 102, margin C

is vicariously liable to pay compensation to the claimant." The plea that the criminal case had ended in acquittal and that, therefore, the civil sait must follow suit, was rejected and rightly. The requirement of culpable rashness under section 304A I.P.C. is more "drastic than negligence sufficient under the law of tort to create liability. The quantum of compensation was moderately fixed and although there was, perhaps a case for enhancement, the High Court dismissed the cross-claim; also. Being questions of fact, we are obvi- ·ously unwilling to re-open the holdings on culpability and compensation.

p. 102, margin D

Road accidents are one of the top killers in our country, specially w"iien truck and bus drivers operate .nocturnally. This proverbial recklessness often pmuades the courts, as has been observed by us 'Car lier in other cases, to draw an initial presumption in several cases ·based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Accidents Tribunals must take special care to see that innocent victims do not suffer and drivers and owners do not escape liability merely because of some :doubt here or some obscurity there. Save in plain cases, culpability [must be inferred fr0m the circumstances where it is fairly reasonable. The court should not succumb to niceties, technicalities and mystic maybes. We aro e:nph1sising this aspect because we are often distressed by transport operators getting away with it thanks to judicial laxity, despite the fact that they do not exercise sufficient disciplinary control over the drivers in the matter of careful driving. The heavy economic impact of culpable driving of public transport must bring' owner and driver to their responsibility to their 'neighbour'. Indeed, the State must seriously consider no-fault liability by legislation. A second aspect which pains us is the inadequacy of the compensation or undue parsimony practised by tribunals. We must remember that judicial tribunals are State organs and Article 41 of the Constitution lays the jurisprudential foundation for state relief against accidental disablement of citizens. There is no justification for niggardliness in com· pensation. A third factor which is harrowing is the enormous delay in disposal of accident cases resulting in compensation, even if awarded, being postponed by several years. The States must appoint sufficient num)!r of tribanals ani the High Courts should insist upon quick disposals so that the trauma and tragedy already sustained may not be magnified by the injustice of delayed justice. Many States 'Te unjustly indifferent in this regard.

pp. 102–103, margin D

We have been taken through a few intricate legal submissions by counsel bat We d!~line to interfere u~i!r Article 136 of the Consti· tution especially where human misery is pitted against operational negligence. P.B.R. Petition . dismissed.

p. 103, margin C