Supreme Court of India
M/S. S. C. CAMBATTA & CO. PRIVATE LTD., versus THE COMMISSIONER OF EXCESS PROFITS TAX, BOMBAY
- Decided
- 30 November 1960
- Judges listed
- J.L. KAPUR
- Disposal
- Case Allowed
Citations
- Official
- [1961] 2 S.C.R. 805 · 1960 INSC 232
- Also cited as
- AIR 1961 SC 1010
Learned from how other judgments cite this one, in their text or in the official Supreme Court Reports' lists of cases they refer to: each is cited this way by at least two judgments, and at least twice as often as any other citation to this judgment in that report. We hold no commercial reporter's text, only these citation strings.
Cited by
Cited in 1 other Supreme Court judgment we hold.
Counted only in the Supreme Court judgments we hold whose text we could read, not in High Court judgments. We match each citation to a judgment automatically, so a citation we cannot match is not counted. "Cited" says only that a judgment refers to this one, not whether it followed, distinguished or overruled it.
The Court's text
Paragraphs from our copy of the Supreme Court Reports print, with the Court's own paragraph numbers, the printed page and, where printed, the margin letter. The Court did not number this judgment's paragraphs, so they are listed by page. Link to paragraph N with #para-N.
HIDAYATULLAH, J.-These are two appeals, with special leave, against an order of the High Court of Bombay rejecting a petition under s. 66(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act and the order of the Incometax Appellate Tribunal, Bombay, in respect of which the petition to the High Court was made. Messrs. S. C. Cambatta & Co. (Private) Ltd., Bombay, have filed these appeals, and the Commissioner of Excess Profits Tax, Bombay, is the respondent.
p. 806
We are concerned in these appeals with three chargeable accounting periods, each ending respectively on December 31, beginning with the year, 1943 and ending with the year, 1945.
p. 806
The appellants carry on various businesses, and one such business was the running of a theatre and restaurant, called the Eros Theatre and Restaurant. In October, 1943, a subsidiary Company called the Eros Theatre and Restaurant, Ltd. was formed. The paidup capital of the subsidiary Company was Rs. 7,91,100 divided into 7,911 shares of Rs. 100 each. 7,901 shares were allotted to the appellant Company as consideration for assets, goodwill, stock-in-trade and book debts which were taken over by the subsidiary Company, and the remaining 10 shares were held by the Cambatta famify. The assets which were transforred were as follows:
p. 807
Assets:
p. 807, margin C
Assets transferred Rs. 1,28,968 Stock-in-trade Rs. 40,000 Book debts Rs. 100
p. 807, margin C
Rs. 1,69,068 They together with the capital reserve of Rs. 6,21,032 made up the amount of Rs. 7,90,100. In the books of the Sl,lbsidiary Company, the share capital account was shown separately as follows:
p. 807, margin C
Rs. 2,50,000 debited to the various assets account. Rs. 5,00,000 debited to the goodwill account. Rs. 40,000 debited to the stock-in-trade account.
p. 807, margin C
Rs. 100 debited to the book debts account. It will thus appear that goodwill was not shown separately in the appellants' account books, but only in the accounts of the subsidiary Company. In working out the capital of the two Companies for excess profits tax, a sum of Rs. 5,00,000 was claimed as goodwill as part of the Qaphal of the subsidiary Company. Both the Department as well as the Tribunal held that s. 8(3) of the Excess Profits Tax Act. applied; and the goodwill was not taken into account in working out the capital. The Tribunal declined to state a case, but the High Court directed that a reference be made on two questions, which were framed as follows:
p. 807, margin C
"(I) Whether on the facts of the late Tribunal was right in applying section Excess Profits Tax Act?
p. 808
(2) Whether in the computation employed in the business of the assessee, erred in not including the value of the portion thereof?"
p. 808
The High Court by its judgment and ed the first question in the negative in the affirmative. It held that sub-s. (3) of s. 8 of the Excess Profits applicable. It, therefore, hel<j. that should have allowed for the value whatever it thought was reasonable at transfer."
p. 808
When the matter went before the three affidavits and a valuation report architects were filed. The goodwill, according report of the architects, amounted It may be mentioned here that the pany was using the premises under a lease November 20, 1944, for three years April I, 1944, on a rental of Rs. 9,500 The Tribunal came to the conclusion will had been acquired by the business as such, and that whatever goodwill to the site and building itself. They to consider what value should be set will on the date of the transfer of the pany as directed by the High Court. account certain factors in reaching their They first considered the earning capacity ness, and held that prior to 1942 the made profits, and that the name of Restaurant thus by itself had no goodwill They, therefore, considered that the which had. been acquired attached to the trustees had given to the Eros Theatre taurant Ltd., and computing the goodwill as of the lease to the subsidiary Company, Rs. 2 lakhs was a liberal estimate of goodwill in the hands of Eros Theatre rant, Ltd. at the material time.
p. 808
Petitions under ss. 66(1) and 66(2) read withs. 21 of the Excess Profits Tax Act were respectively rejected by the Tribunal and the High Court; but the appellants obtained special leave from this Court, and filed these appeals. , ,
p. 809
In our opinion, a question of law did arise in the case whether the goodwill of the Eros Theatre and Restaurant, Ltd., was calculated in accordance with law. The Tribunal seems to have taken into account only the value of the leasehold of the site to the subsidiary Company, and rejected other considerations which go to make up the goodwill of a business. No doubt, in Oruttwell v. Lye ( Lord Eldon, L. C. observed that goodwill was "nothing more than the probability that the old customers would resort to the old place". The description given by Lord Eldon has been considered always to be exceedingly narrow. The matter has to be considered from the nature of the business, because the goodwill of a public inn and the goodwill of a huge departmental stores cannot be calculated on identical principles. The matter has been considered in two cases by the House of Lords. The first case is Trego v. Hunt ( where all the definitions previously given were considered, and Lord Macnaghten observed that goodwill is f'the whole advantage, whatever it may be of the reputation and connection of the firm, which may have been built up by years of honest work or gained by lavish expenditure of money". In a subsequent case reported in Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Muller & Oo.'s Margarin, Ltd. ( Lord Macnaghten at pp. 223 and 224 made the following observations:
p. 809, margin C
"What is goodwill? It is a thing very easy; to describe, very difficult to define. It is the benefit and advantage of the good-name, reputation, and connection of a business. It is the attractive force which brings in custom. It is the one thing which distinguishes an old-established business from a new business at its first start .................. If there is one attribute common to all cases of goodwill it is the attribute (~) of locality. For goodwill has no independent existence, It cannot subsist by itself. It must be a.tta.ched to a usiness. Destroy the business, and the goodwill perishes with it, though elements remain which may perhaps be gathered up and be revived a.gain".
pp. 809–810, margin C
These two cases and others were considered in two A t l" Th fir t · Da · ll F-.> l C
p. 810
us ra. ian cases. e s 1s nie v. .,.,,era ommissioner of Taxation ( where, Knox, C. J. observed:
p. 810
"My opinion is that while it cannot be said to be absolutely and necessarily inseparable from the premises or to have no separate value, prima facie at any rate it may be treated as attached to the premises and whatever its value may be, should be 'treated as an enhancement of the value of the premises". In the second case reported in Federal Commissioner of Taxation v. Williamson('), Rich, J., observed at p. 564 as follows :
p. 810
"Hence to determine the nature of the goodwill in any given case, it is necessary to consider the type of business and the type of customer which such a. business is inherently likely to attract as well as the surrounding circumstances ............ The goodwill of a business is a composite thing referable in part to its locality, in pa.rt to the way in which it is conducted and the personality of those who conduct it, and in pa.rt to the likelihood of competition, many customers being no doubt actuated by mixed motives in conferring their custom". In Earl Jowitt's Dictionary of English Law, 1959 Edn., "goodwill" is defined thus:
p. 810
"The goodwill of a business is the benefit which arises from its having been carried on for some time in a particular house, or by a particular person or firm, or from the use of a. particular trade mark or trade name".
p. 810
It will thus be seen that the goowill of a business depends upon a. variety of circumstances or a combination of them. The location, the service, the standing of the business, the honesty of those who run it, and the la.ck of competition a.nd many other factors go individually or together to make up the goodwill, though locality always plays a considerable pa.rt. Shift the l?cality, ai;id t~e goodwill ~ay be lost., At the same time, locality is not everythmg. The:~power to attract. custom depends on one or more of the other factors as well. In the case ofa theatre or restaurant, what is catered, how the service is run and what the
pp. 810–811
•t• t "b t I t th d ill compe i ion is, con t ~i ~ e a s~ o e goo w .
p. 811, margin C
From the above; it is marufest that the matter of goodwill needs to be considered in a much broader way than what the Tribunal has done. A question of law did arise in the case, and, in our opinion, the High Court should have directed the Tribunal to state a case upon it.
p. 811, margin C
Civil Appeal No. 776 of 1957 is allowed. The High Court will frame a suitable question, and ask for a statement of the case from the Tribunal, and decide the question in accordance with law. The costs of this appeal shall be borne by the respondent; but the costs in the High Court shall abide the result. There will be no order in Civil Appeal No. 777 of 1957.
p. 811, margin C
O. A. No. 776 of 1957 allowed. JESTAMANI GU~ABRAI DHOLKIA AND OTHERS
p. 811, margin C
v. THE SCINDIA STEAM NAVIGATION
p. 811, margin C
COMP ANY, BOMBAY AND OTHERS (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR and K. N. WANCHoo, JJ.)
p. 811, margin C
Industrial Dispute--:-Employee loaned existing air company, if and when its employ~e'-Air Corporations Act, z953 (XXV II of x953), s.
p. 811, margin C
Section 20(1) of the Air Corporations Act, 1953 (XXVII of 1953)" read with the proviso, is a perfectly reasonable provision and in the interest of the employees- and it is not c;orrect to say that it can apply only to the di-rect recruits of the existing air
p. 811, margin C