CHIEF COMMISSIONER, DELHI AND ORS. versus CHADHA MOTOR TRANSPORT CO.

The respond~t carries on the business of col-. lecting, forwarding and distributing goods carried by public carriers in Delhi. On October 27, 1956,. the. Chief Commissioner, Delhi issued a notification under s. 68(2)(ww) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. Under this notification, the respondent and other agents engaged in the business of collecting, forwarding and distributing goods carried by public carriers are required to take out licences. The respondent filed a writ petition in the Punjab High Court challenging cl. (ww) of s. 68(2) and the aforesaid notification on various grounds and asking for an order quashing the notification. A single Judge of the High Court struck down cl. (ww) and allowed the writ petition. He held that the clause was ultra vires and invalid and therefore the notification issued under it was also invalid. His decision was affirmed on Letters Patent Appeal by a Division Bench of the High Court. The appellants have preferred the present appeal from this order after obtaining a certificate from the High Court.

p. 360, margin A

Chapter N of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 provides for control of transport vehicles. · The chapter contains ss. 42 to 68. Section 68(1) provides that a State Government may make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of Chap. N. Section 68(2) provides that without prejudice to the generality of the, foregoing power, rules under the section may be made with respect to all or any of the matters enumerated in •.he various sub-clauses thereof. Clause (ww) of s. 68(2) provides that the State Government may make rules for ''the licensing of agents engaged in the business of collecting, forwarding and distributing of goods carried by public carriers." This clause was in8erted in s. 68(2) by Delhi Act No. 5 of 1954 and also later by Central .Act No. 100 Of 1956.

p. 360, margin D

The High Court held that as the rules framed under s. 68 can ~ made only for the .Purpose of carrying into effect the prov1S1ons of Chap. N, such rules must relate to a substantive provision- of law in the chapter. As there was no substantive provision· in Chap. N requiring agents engaged in the business of collecting, forwarding and distributing goods carried by public carriers to take out licences, the legislature had no. power to enact cl. (ww) of s. 68(2) authorising the framing of rules for the licensing of such agents. The legislature must, in the first #!stance, make a law requiring such agents to take out licences. As the legislature did not make such a law, the clause is ultra vires its powers and is invalid.

p. 360, margin F

We are unable to accept this line of reasoning. Section 68(2) specifically enumerates the matters on which rules under the section can be made for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of Chap. IV. Clause (ww) of s. 68(2) is an expression of the will of the legislature that rules for the licensing of agents engaged in the business of collecting, forwarding and distributing goods carried by public carr!e;s may be made for the purpo~. of carrying into effect the prov1s10ns of Chap. IV. The propos1t10n that the legislature must in the first instance incorporate in the Act a section requiring a class of persons to take out licences before it can enact a section authorising the making of rules for such licensing is unsound and must be rejected.. Within the limits of their legislative powers, Parliament · and the State legislatures have plenary powers of legislation, and they may delegate to an executive authority the power to make rules for the licensing of any class of persons. This law may be open to attack on the ground that it is not on a matter on which the legislature is competent to legislate or on the ground that there is· excessive delegation of legislative power. But it cannot be struck down on the ground that . the fogislature has made no other provision for licensing in the body of the Act. There is no constitutional prOhibition against the making of a law authorising the making of rules on~any topic without the support of another substantive provision of law in the body of the Act. Take Chap. VII of the Motor Vehicles Act dealing with motor vehicles temporarily leaving or visiting India. That chapter contains one section, namely, s. 92. The section provides for the making of rules only. It authl>rises the Central Government to make rules inter a/ia for the grant and authentication of travelling passes, certificates or authorisations to persons temporarily taking motor vehicles out of India to any place outside India and prescribing the conditions subject to which motor vehicles brought temporarily into India from outside India by persons intending to make a temporary stay in India may be possessed and used in India. There is no other substalltive provision of law in Chap. VII or any other Chapter of the Act on the subject of motor vehicles temporarily leaving or visiting India. But the absence of such a substantive provision does not render either s. 92 or the rules made under it invalid. If the Central Government frame• rules under s. 92, such rules must be complied' with.

pp. 360–361, margin H

We, therefore, hold that cl. (ww) of s. 68(2) cannot ·be struck down on the ground that there is no other substantive provision of law in the body of the Act requiring the taking out of licences. On behalf of the respondent it was suggested that the clause is invalid on the ground that it is a law on a subject on which the legisl_a~e is not competent to legisl~te. It was also suggested that 1t 1s bad o_n the ground of excessive delegation of legislative power. The High Court has not struck down the clause on either of these grounds. . Nor has the High. Court considered the othct grounds raised in the petition challenging the validity of the noti· fication dated October 27, 1956. As the High Court has not dealt with the other contentions raised in the petition, the matter must be remanded to the High Court.

pp. 361–362, margin G

In the result, the appeal is allowed, the order of the High Court is set aside and the matter is remanded to the High Court, so that the High Court may deal with it in accordance with law. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs in this Court. G.C. Appeal 11llowed.

p. 362, margin A