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Supreme Court of India

M/S. ECONOMIC TRANSPORT ORGANISATION ETC. versus DHARWAD DISTT. KHADI GRAMUDYOG SANGH ETC.

Decided
31 March 2000
Judges listed
M. JAGANNADHA RAO, M.B. SHAH (as the open data lists them; this may not name the whole bench)
Disposal
Dismissed

Citations

Official
[2000] 2 S.C.R. 888 · 2000 INSC 181
Also cited as
  • (2000) 5 SCC 78 (2 citing judgments)

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The Court's text

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Unnumbered paragraph

The petitioner is a common earner govered by the Carriers Act, 1865. It contends that under Section 14(1)(d) of the Consumers Protection Act, 1986 the Consumer Fora can direct payment of compensation to the consumer for loss or injury suffered by the consumer due to the 'negligence' of the opposite party and hence the burden of proof is on the complainant. It is contended that

p. 888, margin G

Unnumbered paragraph

889 Section 9 of the Caniers Act which 'imposes burden on the defendant or the common earner to prove absence of negligence cannot therefore be applied so as to shift the onus to the canier to prove absence of negligence.

p. 889

Unnumbered paragraph

In view of the recent Judgment of this Court dated 28th March,, 2000 in Palel Roadways Limited v. Birla Yamaha Limited, in C.A. No. 9071 of 1996, we are of the view that the liability of the common carriers is that of the insurer. It was held there that Section 9 of the Caniers Act, 1865 applies to matters before the Consumer Fora under the Consumers Protection Act. It was also held that the principle underlying Section 9 of the said Act relating to burden of proof is a principle of common law and has been incorporated in Section 9 of the Carriers Act. Even assuming that Section 9 of the Caniers Act, 1865 does not apply to the cases before the Consumer fora under Consumers Protection Act, the principle of common law above mentioned gets attracted to all these cases coming up before the Consumer fora. Section l4(1)(d) of the Consumers Protection Act had to be understood in that light and the burden of proof gets shifted to the caniers by the application of the legal presumption under the common law. Section 14(1)(d) has to be understood in that manner. The complainant can discharge the initial onus, even if it is laid on him under Section 14(1)(d) of the Consumers Protection Act, by relying on Section 9 of the Caniers Act. It will therefore be for the canier to prove absence of negligence. It has been held in like circumstances that a defendant in a suit on the basis of a negotiable instmment can discharge the onus lying on him under Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act by relying on another presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act under which if a plaintiff does not produce the accounts in his personal custody an adverse inference can be drawn against the plaintiff. Kundanlal v. Custodian, Evacuee Properly, AIR (1961) SC 1316.

p. 889, margin A

Unnumbered paragraph

With the above observation and following the above said Judgment in the case of Patel Roadways, we dismiss the special leave petitions accordingly. T.N.A. Petitions dismissed.

p. 889, margin F