Supreme Court of India
M/S. P. VAIKUNTA SHENOY & CO. versus P. HARI SHARMA
- Decided
- 31 October 2007
- Judges listed
- A.K. MATHUR
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
Citations
- Official
- [2007] 11 S.C.R. 725 · 2007 INSC 1110
- Also cited as
- AIR 2008 SC 416
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The Court's text
Paragraphs from our copy of the Supreme Court Reports print, with the Court's own paragraph numbers, the printed page and, where printed, the margin letter. Link to paragraph N with #para-N.
This appeal has been filed against the impugned judgment of the Karnataka High Court dated 25.03.2000 in R.F .A No. 531 of 1997. We have heard learned counsel for the parties D and perused the record .
p. 727, margin C
The plaintiff-appella,nt has alleged that he was carrying the business of commis;iio.n ·The defendant was having an areca nut (supari) g~ge.n Md he used to supply the areca nutsto the plaintiff. The defendant used to receive money from the plaintiff off and on, which the plaintiff used to advance him to secure regular supply of the areca nuts. It was alleged by the plaintiff that defendant had borrowed Rs.72,044.43 paise as per the ledger account regql<lfly maintained by the plaintiff. Hence the plaintiff filed a suit for recovery of this amount with interest at the rate of 18 per cent per annum.
p. 727, margin C
The defendant denied the plaintiffs' case and advanced the plea that plaintiff was a money-lender ang he did not have a licence as required by the Karnataka Money Lenders Act, 1961. Consequently, the defendant ~lleged that the suit was not maintainable as the plaintiff had J10t tMen a licence under the aforesaid Act.
p. 727, margin C
The Trial Court decreed the suit of the plaintiff but the said decree was set aside by the High Court. Hence this appeal.
p. 727, margin C
Learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant has submitted that the plaintiff was not a money-lender as defined in Section 2(10) of the Karnataka Money Lenders Act. The aforesaid Section 2(10) states that a money-lender is one who "carries on the business of money lending in the State". Section 2 (2) defines the business of money lending as follows:- ' Business of money lending means business of advancing loan whether or not in connection with or in addition to any other business'.
pp. 727–728, margin C
Learned counsel for the respondent submits that in view of the aforesaid definitions the appellant was clearly a money-lender. We do not agree.
p. 728, margin B
It may be mentioned that the purpose of the Act was to prevent the malpractice of oppression by money-lenders to take advantage of peoples' poverty.
p. 728, margin C
In the money lending business the object of the money-lender is to earn interest on the loan he has advanced. In the present case the object of advancing the loan by the appellant wa~ not to earn interest thereon but to ensure the regular supply of areca nuts. Though, no doubt, interest at the rate of 18 per cent per annum was charged on these loans yet that was not the principal object of advancing the loan.
p. 728, margin D
In business various methods are adopted by a businessman for ensuring the smooth running of his business. Very often, one of the methods is that the businessman advances money to his supplier of goods to ensure that the supplies are regular and are made to him rather than being diverted to other parties. There is nothing illegal in this practice and it is widespread.
p. 728, margin E
When we construe the provisions of the Karnataka Money Lenders Act we must see the object for which it was made a:nd we have to adopt the purposive construction.
p. 728, margin E
As observed by this Court in New India Sugar Mills v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, AIR (1963) SC 1207, p. 1213 : [1963] Supp 2 SCR 459] :- "It is a recognized rule of interpretation of statutes that A expressions used therein should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonize with t~e object of the statute, and which effectuate the object of the legislature". (See also the decisions mentioned in G.P. Singh's ''Principles of Statutory Interpretation: 9th Edition 2004 at Page 110). B
pp. 728–729, margin G
To give an example, under the U.P. Bhoodan YagnaAct, 1953 the lands which were donated by large landholders could be allotted to 'landless persons'. It was held by this Court in UP. Bhoodan Yagna Samiti v. Braj Kishore, AIR (1988) SC 2239: [1988] 4 SCC 274 that the expression 'landless persons' should be interpreted to mean landless C peasants and not landless businessman. If a literal meaning was given to the expression 'landless persons' then even a very rich businessman who possessed hundreds of crores of rupees can claim allotment of a piece of land on the ground that he was a landless person as he owns no land. That could not possibly be the object of the Act. The object of the Act D was to give land to landless peasants only.
p. 729
In view of the above discussion we are of the opinion that a purposive interpretation has to be given to the definition of money-lenders. From this angle the appellant could not be said to be a money-lender as E he was not really doing the business of money lending in the strict sense but was only advancing loans to secure the regular supply of areca nuts.
p. 729
Ir. view of the above this appeal is allowed, impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside and the judgment of the trial court is restored. No order as to costs F S.K.S. Appeal allowed.
p. 729