MAHANT SANKARSHAN RAMANUJA DAS GOSWAMI ETC., ETC. versus THE STATE OF ORISSA AND ANOTHER

HrnAYATULLAH, J.-These are 38 appeals against the judgment and orders of the High Court of Orissa dated November 28, 1956, by which 42 petitions under Art. 2~6 of the Constitution filed by the present appellants and some others were dismissed. The High Court certified the cases as fit

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for appeal to this Court under Art. 132(1) of the \ Constitution.

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The appellants are holders of pre-settlement minor inams in the State of Orissa. Their gr<ints are different both in regard to the time when they were made and the lands involved in them. They were made for performance of services ·of dPi ti< ·s and were classed as Devadayam grants in the revenue papers. The grants in all these cases were not of whole villages but of certain lands and hence their classification as minor inams, and they comprised both the melwaram and kudiwaram rights in the-lands. It is not necessary to refer to these cases separately, • since a single ar;gument was addressed before us involving the consideration whether Notiflcation No.49.71-XV-2154-E.A. dated July 15; 1955, issued by the Orissa State Government, and the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951 (Act l of 1952) amended· by the Orissa Estate Abolition (Amendment) 'Act, 1954 (Act XXVII of 1954) were respectively b(lyond the competence of the StD.te an~ the Orissa_ State Legislat~re.

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By the original Act, all es~ates of the in~er­ mediarios were abolished, and on a notification by the Government; such estates vested in Government. By the amending Act,: the definition of "estate" was widened to cover oven such minor inams, and then the impugned notification was issued. The ,appellants contend that the original Act and the amending Act were jointly or sev.erally beyond the competence - of the State LegislatllrP, and that the notification above-mentioned was void without any effect.

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The Bill resulting in th'e original Act was introduced. on January 17, 1950, and the Act was passed by the Legislative Assembly on September 28, 1951. It was reserved for the consideration of t.hc President, who. gave his assent on January 23, 1952. In the Act, before· its amendment in 1954, "estate". W!IS defined as follows :

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"2(g) '·Estate' 'means any land held by an intermediary and included under one entry in any of the general registers of revenue-paying lands' and' revenile'free lands, prepared and mairitained _ unller the law for the time being in force ·by the Collector of a district, and includes revenue:free·lands'not entererl in any register and all classes of tenureB _or undertenures, or an 'inam esta~e or par:t of an estate."

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By the amending A'ct of' 1954, this definition was rlubstituted by anotheri which read :

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"2(g) 'Estate' includea a part of an estate ancl mPans any land· held by or vested in an· intermediary and included. under . one entry in any revenue roll or any. of the- general registers of rev.enue-paying lands and revenuefree lands, prep'lred and maintamed.undEir the . law relating to land revenue· for the time ,being in force or under any. rule, order,. custom or usage having the force of law, and· includes revenue-free lands not entered in any register or revenue-roll ·and all. classes ·of tenures or under tenures and anyjagir; inam,' or,muafi or other similar grant." 'r· ' ' ·· ·- , ~ . .

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. ·~~ ·····-~-,-. In the origillal Act as well as.in the Act as am~iid.eu, there was a general provision in·s~2(q) which n:;..;.:;· be reacl he7e: ·.. '".

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"( q) ·All· words · and expressions'. used in this Act but not defined in it; shall have; witn reference to any part .of the· State ··of-·Orilisa, the same meaning as defined in the tenancy laws and rules for the time being in force . and

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in the· absence of written· • laws and rules, as . ' recognised iri the. custom . fcir .. the . tlnie . being obtaining in that part 'of the State· of· Orissa.'•

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'' ... ··- In the original Act; a pro'vision was _inserted' -by· s.3 of the amending Act to the'following effect : :: ;

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.: "3. ·For. the ·p;rpose bf· re~noval ()f all doubts it is declared that such' lands arid such rights in relation thereto and such' persons who· hold such lands:aiid such rights as . were heretofore covered. by:•the definitions of tho words 'estate', ancl .,<Intermediary' in the Orissa' Estates Abolition·. Act, 1951, shall not cease "to be so co'verecl merely on the ground that by ·virtue of the provisions of this Act the said definitions have · been'' amended and

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widened in scope.'.'. The meaning of the last provision is clear. It' takes away nothing from the ambit of the old definition, but only adds thereto, as indeed \.he new definition of "estaw" introduced by the amending ' Act shows only too plainly in its terms.

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To comploto the survey of the pronsions which we may have to refer to in this judgment, we first set down the definition of "estate" as given in the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908, which was applied to Orissa. Section 3,2)(d) of th11.t Act defined "estate" as:

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"Any inam village, of which the grant has been made, confirmed or recognised by the Government, notwithstanding that subsequent to the grant the village. has been partitioned amongst the grantees or the successors in

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title of the grantee or grantees." The argument in this caso is based upon this definition, because in defining an 'estate', whole villages which were inam were contemplated and not minor inams of lands only. We shall refor to this later.

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The amending Act was also reserved for the consideration of tho President and was assented to by him. When the Constitution was brought into force, the Bill of the Original Act had already been introduced in the Assembly. On June 18, l 9i)J, bofore the Act was passed by the Legislative Assembly, the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 had been enacted, and Art. 3 lA inserted with retospective operation in the Constitution. Article 3IA pro- Tided:

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"31A.(l) Notwithstanding anything contained in artiolo 13, no law providing for-

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(a) The acquisition by the State of any estate or of any rights thorcin or the extinguishmcnt or modification of any such rights ...

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shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by article 14, article 19 or article 31 ;

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Provided that where such law is a law made by the Legislature of a State, the provisions of this article shall not apply thereto unless such Jaw, having been reserved for the "consideration of the President, has received his assent.

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(2) In this article

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(a) the expression 'estate' shall, in relation to any local area, have the same meaning as that expression or its lo~al equivalent has in the existing law relatmg to land tenures in force in that area, and shall also include any jagir, inam, or

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muafi or other similar grant ...... "

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Article 31, before it was amended, by the constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, provided inter alia that no property shall be acquired for a public purpose unless the Jaw provided for compensation, and either fixed the compensation or specified the principles on which the compensation was to be determined and given. (C!.2). By cl. (3), it was provided that no Jaw such as was referred to in cl. (2) was to have effect unless such law having been reserved for the consideration of' the President had received his assent. Clause ( 4) .~hen provided :

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"(4) If any Bill pending at the commencement of this constitution in the Legislature of a State has, after it has been passed by such Legislature, been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent, then, notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, the law so assented to shall not be called in question in any court on the ground that it contravenes the provisions of clause (2J."

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The combined effect of these provisions of the Constitution was that there could be no compulsory acquisition of property for public purposes, unless the law provided for pay]llent of compensation;

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but the law could not be called in question on this ground if it.had been reser-ved'for.the consideration of the President and had been assented to by him . Th f th p "d . t d" .

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assent o - e res1 en was a con 1t10n prece-

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dent. to ·the effectiveness of the law. By the HUayatu11~.i. ~·'amendment of the Constitution and the addition of , ,. Art. 31A, no such law was to be deemed to be void on _the ground that· it was inconsistent with or took away:' or abridged any of- the rights conferred by

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Ai;t.14,. Art.19 or Art.31~ provided that it had been '" reserved for the· consideration of the President and

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had received. his <ISSent. - By tho definition clause, : '·Art~ 31A(2)(a), the·expression "estate"_ was to have ;:r; thii' 'saine . meaning in'any local 'area,' which it or its

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equivalent'had in'the existing law relating to land · 'tenures ·in ·force ·in -that area but'\vas to include

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among othe-rs any 'inam'.' • '' _ '!~:. _., Th~ contention of the appellants is really two- '.'•' fold.- The first'· iirgliment' is .. that the benefit • of

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.Art; 31A 'might have been' available to the original ..• '.A.ct, as it was a.· la1\'. for the : compulsory acquisition . of :-Property 'fpr.' 'public : purposes but_ not ,,to the '. amendmg Act/ which was not such. a law.: but only

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ariiended. ii.·pi-evious law by enlarging 'the, definition ";of "estate". The 'second argument is that the word '-''(estate" as; defined'in s.2(g) _before its aniendnient did. not: apply''to. pre-settlement minor, inams of : laiidS as it applied only to an "foam estate'', . and

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. an·. "-'inam'; estate"-; had: the meaning which the -'' definition of "estate"· had· in the 'Madras Estates

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Land . Act, viz.;-' only whole "inam villages''. This, . · ·'it is ~rirged, follows from the provisions of· 's.2(q) of . 'the Estates Abolition' Act·quoted earlier. '·' '' ~- r~.r,,,.,,

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"" The' first ·argument ·is Clearly uiiteilable.. It '.'. J~sunies that the.benefit of'.A.rt.3IA is only available

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to:those''Iaws \vhioh .by 'themselves 'provide for . compulsory • acquisiti9n . of property for public pur- ;i poses; and: not. to" laws amenc:Iing such . laws, the assent of the President notwithstanding! This means

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·that the whole of tho law,' original 'and amending, . ;•i·must._ be :•passed :again,•' and be 'reserved for the consideration of the President, and must be freshly assented to by him. This is against tbe legislative practice in this country. It is to be presumed that the President gave his assent to the amending Act in its relation to the Act it sought to amend, and this is more so, when by the amending law the provisions of the earlier law relating to compulsory acquisition of property for public purposes were sought to be extended to new kinds of properties. In assenting to such law, the President assented to new categories of properties being brought within the operation of the existing law, and he, in effect assented to a law for the cvmpulsory acquisition for public purposes of these new categories of property. The assent of the President to the am0nding Act thus brought in the protection of Art. 31A as a necessary consequence. The amending Act must be considered in relation to the old law which it sought to extend and the President assei.ted to such an extension or, in other words, to a law for the compulsory acquisition of property for public purposes.

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Tha argument that this was not an acquisition of an inam estate comprising a whole village and thus outside the Abolition Act itself has no substance. No doubt, these minor inams were not of whole villages. but of lands and the grant included both the warams and there were thus no intermediaries. But they were ini.ms nevertheless, and the Constitution defined and 'estate' an including 'any inam', and the amending Act merely followed that definition. The extended definition in the Constitution and a similar extended definition in the Act thus exclude resort to the general definition clause in s.2(q) of the Abolition Act and the definition of "estate" in the Madras Estates Land Act. The definition of "estate" illtroduced by the amending Act is sufficiently wide to cover such minor inams, and s.2( q) only applies, if a word or expression used in the Abolition Act is ·not defined therein.

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:!GS St:l'HEl\IE COURT REPOHTS [1962J If the minor i.nams arc already within the definition of the word "estate", there is no to go to s.2(q) ' or to any local law definin~ the word. There ean bo no rloubt that if the new definition of"estatc" appliPs to minor inams, then they arc affected by the A bolition Act. This, indred, was conceded.

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Lcamcd counsel for the appcllantH also urged, through somewhat faintly, that the ejusdem genen',s rule should be applied to the definition of "estate" in Art. 31 A(2)(a) as also to tho corresponding new definition in the Abolition Act. This argument proceeds upon an assumption for which there is no foundation. The rjusdem generis rule is applicable where as wide or general torm has to Le cut down with reference to the genus of the particular terms which precede the general words. This rule haB hardly any application where certain specific categories arc 'included' in the definition. The ejw;dem yeneris rule may be applicable to the general words "otlwr similar grant", which would take their colour from the particular categories, "jayir, ina111, or muofi'', which precede them, but the word "inam" is not subject to the same rule. Once it is held that inams of •my kind were included, it makes little difference if thl' inams were of lands nm! not of whole villages. So also tho fact that the holders of such inams cannot be described as intermediaricti, or that they comprised both the melwamm and the kudiu-aram rights. Such a distinction would have significance, if the law abolished only intermediaries and not inams which it did. Section 3 of tho Abolition Aet says :

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"3(1) Tho State Govcrnmont may, from time to time by notification, declare that tho estate specified in the notification has passed to and become vested in the State free from

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all encumbrances." If tho dofinition of tho word "eHt.ate" was wide enough to include a minor inam and a. notification was issued, the consequences of s.3 of the Abolition Act must follow. Such a law is not capable of being called in question on the ground that it abridges any fundamental right conferred by Arts.14 19 and 31, if it has been assented to by the Preside~t. The notification was thus valid, if the law was valid.

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In the result, the appeals fail, and are dis· missed with costs, one set only.

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Appeals dismissed. DHANESHW AR NARAIN SAXENA

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v.

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THE DELHI ADMINISTRATION

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(B. P. SINHA, c. J.,'S. K. DAS, A. K. SARKAR, N. RAJAGOPALAAYYANGAR andJ.R. MuDHOLKAR, JJ.)

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in

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(1)

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The appellant who was an Upper Division Clerk in the office of the Chief Commissioner of Delhi was convicted of an offence under s. 5 (1) ( d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, punishable under s. 5 (2) of the Act. The prosecution case was that R who was anxious to obtain a licente for a double· barralled shot-gun sought the assistance of the appellant who knew him, that the appellant who had nothing to do with the issuing of licences for firearms which was done by the office of the Deputy Commissioner, offered to use his good offices in expediting and furthering the progress of R's application for a licence the appropriate department if he was paid Rs. 2501-, and that when the licence was cancelled on its being found that R was not entitled to it the appellant promised to have it restored if he was paid a further sum of Rs. 180/-. The trial Judge found that the appellant taking advantage of his position as an employee in the Chief Commissioner's office and of R's ignorance and anxiety to get the licence, had induced him to part with the money on the promise that he would get his licence restored. The appellant pleaded that on the facts found no offence under s. 5( ( d) of the Act had been made out and relied on State o/ v. (1959) Supp. 2 S. C. R. 739.

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