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Supreme Court of India

EXPRESS NEWSPAPERS LTD. versus THE STATE OF MADRAS

Decided
19 February 1981
Judges listed
A.D. KOSHAL (as the open data lists them; this may not name the whole bench)
Disposal
Dismissed

Citations

Official
[1981] 2 S.C.R. 948 · 1981 INSC 42
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The Court's text

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KosHAL J. A preliminary objection bas been raised by Mr. Rangam to the effect that the certificate granted by the court under sub-clauses (a) and (c) of clause (1) of Article 133 of the Constitution of India, as it then stood, does not conform to legal requirements inasmuch as- (a) it does not specify the substantial question of law which the High Court states require determination;

p. 948, margin D

and (b) no reasons in •upport ol the issu11.nco of th~ certified~ appoar tbocoilt.

p. 948, margin G

The preliminary objection is well fonnded in view of the decisions of this Court in Sohan Lal Naraindas v. Laxmidas Raghunath Gadit(') and in Sardar Bahadur S. Indra Singh Trust v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bengal(').

p. 949, margin A

Faced with this situation Mr. Lalit wanted us tO' treat the appeal as one by special leave and prayed that such leave be granted now afterl condoning the delay. That would have been certainly a reasonable course to follow if it was made out that a substantial question of law really requires determination. We have gone through the impugned judgment and find that no such question is involved at all. We, therefore, refuse special leave, revoke the certificate granted by the High Court and dismiss the appeal but with no order as to costs. P.B.R. Appeal dismissed.

p. 949, margin A

(I) [1971] l S;C.C. 276. (2) [1972] 1 S.C.R. 392.

p. 949, margin C