STATE OF GUJARAT versus BHOGILAL KESHAVLAL & ANR.

J.-This appeal on' certificate from a judgment of the Gujarat High Court raises a question as to thd validity or otherwise of a fresh notification issued by the Government of Gujarat under s. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, consequent upon an earlier notificationj .under s. 6 of the Act being discOIV'ered to be invalid.

p. 285, margin D

The first respondent in this case owned certain land bearing Final J>lot No. 38 forming part of Town Planning Scheme No. III (Ellis~ bridge) situate within the city of Ahmedabad. At the request of the second respondent Sri Ayodhya Nagar Co-operative Hous,ing Society Ltd., registered under the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act, 1925, Mw deemed to be registered under the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act, 1961, formed with the object of enabling its members! to construct houses, the State Government on Augusr 3, 1960 issued a notifieatioii

p. 285, margin C

~...._,....~,·-·· ·• ____________________ under s. 4 stating that. the land was likely to be needed for a public purpose. This was followed by a notification of the State Goverii· ment dated August 21, 1961 under s. 6 of the Act stating that the hmd was to lJe acquired at the expense of Sri Ayodhya Nagar Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. for the public purpose specified in column 4 of the schedule annexed thereto. The public purpose specified in column 4 of the schedule was 'For construction of houses for Sri Ayodhya Nagar Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., Ahmedabad.' The entire expense of. the acquisition was to be borne by· the second respondent, i.e., the Co~operative Hoilsing Society . . The first respoo-~ dent moved the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution challenging the validity of t11e notification under s. 6 on the( .ground that the acquisition of the land for a public purpose at the expense of the second respondent was legally invalid. On December 4. 1961 the High Court issued an ad interim injunction restraining the appellant from proceeding with the acquisition proceedings. While this writ pelition was pending, the State Government by its notification dated May 27, 1963 cancelled the notification under s. 6. On Septetmber 10. 1964 the State Government issued a fresh notification under s. 6 stating that the land was tO! be acquired at theJ public expense, for the public purpose specified-in column 4 of the schedule. The public purpose specified in column 4 in the schedule was 'For housing scheme undertaken by Sri Ayodhyru Nagar C~operative Housing Society Ltd.'

pp. 285–286, margin C

The High Court following its earlier decision in Dosabhai Ratansha Keravala v. State of Gujdl'at & Ors.(l) struck down the second notification unde.r. s. 6 dated september 10, 1964. 'It held inter alia that (1) the first notification under s. 6 issued on August 21, 1961 being. an acquisition for a society at its cost, was. valid and. the Government could have proceeded to complete the acquisition tmder it but, 'under a false sense ofl apprehension as to its validity, the Government cancelled it on May 27. 1963. There was no justification for cancelling the first notification under s. 6 and even if the Government wanted to cancel it out of a feeling of apprehensi0111 as to its validity, the Government need not have taken one year and ten months to do so. (2) After the issue of the first notification under s. 6 on August 21, 1961, the- notifi- · cation dated August 3, 1960 under s. 4 was exhausted and, therefore, could not be used to support the second notification issmxl under s. 6 on September 11, 1964. (3) The cancellation of the fir~t notification under s. 6 by the notification dated May 27, 1963 did not have the effect of reviving the notification under s. 4 so as to make it available for supporting the second notification onder s. 6. The second notifi- (1970) 11 Guj. L.R. 361. cation under s. 6 not being supported by any notification under s. 4 WaS consequently invalid. ( 4) A notification unde.r s. 6 in order to be valid must follow within a reasonable time after the issue of a notification under s. 4. The notification under s. 4 was issued; on August 3, i960 and the socond notification under s. 6 on September l 0, 1964 and there was, thus an interval of about fo\W years and one month between the two notifications. This interval of time. could not be regarded as reasonable. Even tested by the yardstick of reasonable tim~ provided by the legislature in the second proviso introduced in s. 6

pp. 286–287, margin A

the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1967,. namely three years, the period of about four years .and one month between the two notifications under s. 4 and s. 6 would be dearly unreasonable. The socond notification must, therefore, be beld to be invalid on this ground also.

p. 287, margin B

We are clearly of the opinion that the High Court was in error in striking down the second notification under s. 6 issued on September 10, 196 4. in Valjibhai Muljibhai Soneji v. State of Bombay( the Court held that the Government has no power to issue a notifica-. tion for acquisition of land for a public purpose, where the compensation is to be entirely paid by a company. The first notification issued by the Government under s. ·6 for acquisition of the land for a public purpose, at the expense of the socond respondent, the Co-operative Society, was, therefore, invalid. The State Government was, therefore; justified in issuing the second notification under s. 6 after remov-

p. 287, margin C

ing the lacuna i.e., by providing for acquisition of the land for the said ~ public purpose, at public expense. ·

p. 287, margin E

In an endeavour to suppo.rt the ju~gment, counsel for the first respondent advanced a three~fold contention. It was urged, firstly, that su~cessive notifications cannot be issued under s. 6 placing reliance on State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. v. Vishnu Prasad Sharma & Ors.(2) It was pointed out that the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1967 had a limited scope and it validated only successive notifications issued under s. 6 in respect of different parcels of land but did not validate successive notifications in respect of the same land. Further, it was urged that the Act was not retrospective in oper.ation and, therefore, the validity of the second notific"<ltion dated September ~0, 1964 h~d to be adjudged with reference. to the pre-amendment law, Le., accordmg to the law as declared by this Court in Vishnu · Prasad Sharma's case. Secondly, it was urged, on the strengt!h of the doci-

p. 287, margin E

[1964] 3 S.C.R. 686. (2) {1966} 3 S.C.R. 557 . sion in Dosabhai Ratansha Karevala's case (supra) that a notification under s. 4 is. exhausted when it is followed by declaration under It was urged that the first notification under s. 6 dated August 1961 was valid and the High Court was, therefore, justifi~l in holding that with its canc~llation, the notification under s. 4 lapsed. Thirdly, it was urged that there was unreasonable delay in issuing the second notification under s. 6 and, this, by itself, wasl sufficient to invalidate

pp. 287–288, margin H

In Vishnu Prasad Sharma's case the Court held that ss. 4, and 6 are integrally connected and present a complete scheme for sition and, therefore, it was not open to the Government make cessive declarations under s. 6. Wanchoo J. (as he then was), speaking for himmself and Mudholkar J., observed :

p. 288, margin B

"It seems to us clear that once a declaration under s. 6 is made, the notification under s. 4{1) must be exhausted, for it has served its purpose. There is nothing in ss. 4, 5-A and 6 to suggest that s. 4(1) is a kind of reservo1r from which the government may from time to time draw out land and make declarations with respect to it successively. If that was the intention behind sections 4, 5-A and 6 we would have found some indication of it in the language used therein. But as we read these three sectiOills together we. can only find that the scheme is. that s. 4 specifies the locality, then there may be survey and drawing of maps of the land and the consideration whether the land is adapted for the purp6se for which it has to be acquired, followed by objections and making up of its mind by the government what particular land out of that locality it needs. This is fqllowed by a declaration under s. 6 specifying the particubr land . needed and that in our opinion completes the process and the notification under s. 4(1) cannot be further used thereafter. At the stage of s. 4 the land is not particularised but only the locality is mentioned; at the stage of s. 6 the land in the-locality is particularised and thereafter it seems to us that ~he notification under s. 4( 1) having served its purpose

p. 288, margin C

exhausts itself." Snrkar J., in a separate but concurring'judgment, observed :

p. 288, margin G

"My learned brother has said that ss. 4, SA and 6 of the Act have to be read together and so read, the conclusion is clear that the Act contemplates only a single declaration under. s. 6 in respect of a notification under s. 4.'' . Aften rejecting the contention that the Government may have difficulty in making the plan of its projects complete at a time, particulaly where rthe project is large, and therefore, it is necessary that it should have lXJWer to make successive declarations under s. 6, he observed :

pp. 288–289, margin G

''I cannot imagine a Government, which has ,vast resour~ ces, not being able to make a complete plan of its project at a time. Indeed, I think when a.plan is made, it is a camp- . Iete plan. I should suppose that before the Government start-; acquisition proceedings by the issue of a notification under s. 4, it has made its plan· for otherwise it cannot state in the notification, as it 'has to do, that the land is likely to be needed. Even if it had not then completed its plan, it would have enough time- before the making of a declaration under s. 6 to do so. I think, therefo.re, that the difficulty of the Government, even if there is one, does nt't lead to the conclusion that the Acd contemplates the making: of a number of declarations under s. 6."

p. 289, margin A

In the present case, the question, however, does not arise as the 'first notification under s. 6 dated August 21. 1961 being invalid, the ·Government was. not precluded fromJ making a second notification. Due to the invalidity of the notification under s. 6, the notification under s. 4 still held ~e field and on its~ strength another notification unde.r s. 6 ·Could be issued. It is, therefore, not necessary to deal with the effect of the validating Act.

p. 289, margin D

The matter is squarely covered by the decision of the Court in: ·Girdharilal Amratlal Shodan & Ors. v. State of Gujarat & OrY.(l) ·The Court rejected the contention that' by cancelling the first notffica- ·tion under s. 6, as here, the Government must be taken to have with- -drawn from the acquisition and consequently could no~ issue a second llOtification under s. 6. There also the first notification under s. 6 was invalid and of no effect, as the Government had no power to issue a notification for acquisition for a public purpos~ wherd the compensation was to be paid entirely by a company, as held by this Court in .Sham Behari & Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. (2) .

p. 289, margin E

It will be noticed that in Girdharilal Amratlal Shodan's case the ~ ~acts were i~entic.al. On August 3, 1960 the Government of Gujarat JSsped a notification under s. 4 in respect of certain land falling in Final Plot No. 460 of th~ Town Planning Scheme No. III of Elisbridge in the city of Ahmedabad, stating that the land was likely to be needed for a public purpose, viz., for construction ·of houses for Sri Krishna- (]) [1966] 3 S.C.R. 437. (2) fl964] 1 6 s.c.R. 636. kunja Government Servants' Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. · On July 18, 1961 the State Government issued a notification under s. 6 stating that the land was to be acquired for the aforesaid public purpose at the expense of Sri Krishnakunj Government Servants' Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. On September 22, 1961, the landholder fileci a writ petition in the High Court for an order quashing the notification under s. 6. During the pendency of the-proceedings, the Government issued a notification dated April 28, 1964 c~cellii1g the aforesaid notification dated July 18, 1961. On August 14, 1964 the Government issued a fresh notification under s. 6 stating that the Ian~ notification under s. 6 stating that the land was neede~ be acquire~ at the public expense for a public purpose viz., for the housing scheme undertaken by Sri Krishnakunj Government Servants' Co~openitive Housing Society Ltd.

pp. 289–290, margin G

The contention was that by cancelling the first notification under s. 6, the Government must be deemed to have withdrawn from the acquisition and cancelled the notification under s. 4, and therefore,could not issue the 5econd notification under s. 6, without issuing a fresh notification: under s. 4. It was also urged that the power of the· State Government to issue a notification under s. 6 waS' exhausted, and the Government could not issue a fresh notification unde.r s. 6. The Court rejected both the contentions observing :

p. 290, margin C

"Having regard to the proviso tq s. of the Act, a dccla~ ration for acquisition of the land for a public purpose could only be made if the compensatiotn tol be awarded for it was: to be paid wholly or partly out of public revenues or some fund controlled ur managed by a local authority. The Govern~ ment had no power to issue · a notification for' acquisition for a pubic purpose where the compensation was to be paid ·entirely by a company. The notification dated July 18, 1961 was, theref01re, invalid and of no effect, see· Shyam Behari v. State of Madhya Pradesh. The, appellants filed the writ petition challenging the aforesaid notification on this ground. The challenge was justified and the notification was liable to be quashed by the Court."

p. 290, margin E

"The State Government realised that the notification was

p. 290, margin G

invalid, and without waiting for an order of Court, cancelled · the notification on April 28, 1964. The cancellation was in recognition of the invalidity of the notification. 111e Government had no intention of withdrawing from the acquition. Soon after the cancellation, the G·ovemment issued a fresh notification under s. 6 whereas in this case the notifi-

p. 290, margin G

·--------- ------- (Sen, J.)

pp. 290–291, margin B

291 cation under s. 6 is incompetent and invalid, the Govern

p. 291

. . fi . men may treat as me echve and issue a fresh notification d

p. 291

. . h . b un er s. 6. T h w at, m su stance, the Government did in this case. The cancellation on April28, 1964 was no more than

p. 291

u recognition of the invalidity of the earlier notification.'' The first notification issued under s. 6 on August 21, .l961 was obviously invalid and of no effect. By the issue of this notification the Go\'ernment had not eiTecti\·cly execciscd its powers under s. 6. ' In the circumstances, the Government could we~ issue a fresh notification under s. 6 dated September 10, 1964.

p. 291

In State of Gujarat v. Musamiyan Imam Haidl!r Bux Raz:vi & Anr. etc. (') this Court v.-hile <reversing the decision of the Gujarat High Court in Dosabhai Ratansha Kerravala (supra) on which the High Court based its decision, has laid down two important principles : {I) In vie'v: of the decisions of this Court in Pandit ilumdu Lal & Ors. v. The Stare of Punjab & Ors.,(2) Ratilal Shankarbhai & Drs. v. State of Gujarat & Ors.C) and Ram Swarup v. The District Land Acquisitioll Offir:er, Aligarh & Ors.(4) the acquisition of land for a co-operative housing society is a public purpose. The GoYernment is the best Judge to dctcnninc whether the purpose in question is public purpose or not; and, it cannot be said that housingj scheme fat a limited number of persons cannot be construed to be a public purpose inasmuch as the need of a section of the public may be a public purpose. (2) When a notification under s. 6 is invalid, the government may treat it as incfi~tive and issue a fresh' notillc'atio,n under s. 6, and nothing in s. 48 of the -Acr precludes the government from doing so, as held by this Co:.:rt in Girdlz.arilal Amratutl Shodan.

p. 291, margin B

The I ligh Court had not the benefit of these de~isions _when it held that acquisition of land foe co-operative houstng soctcty was not a public purpose and therefore. tho first notific:Ition dated August 21, 1961 i-;sucu under s. 6 of the Ac~ was valid. The sub:~tratum on Which the ucci~ion of tho I Jigh Court rests has, th;;-.rd~r~, dl_sappcared . ih' 1 c · . .t·. ·h··' the dectston State of

p. 291, margin F

> ourt Jn !t-fusam1 \'llll's case utsltngUJs Madhya Pradesh & O;s. v. Vishnu PrasaJ SJwrm~ & . Ors (supra) by qu bo The d~iston m Vzsltnu Prasad

p. 291, margin F

Jng the passage ref~?.rrt'd to a ve. · .. . . Sharrnu·, case is not an authority for the proposttion that where n notific-..ttion unucr is found to be invaliu it cannot be fot.lowcd by

p. 291, margin G

s 6 ~on ~nder s.. 6. In fact, the decision of thej Ihgh Court OJ Supp. S.C.R. 28. (2) [1961] 2 S.C.R. 459. t3) A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 984. (.H A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 2390.

p. 291, margin G

counter to what it had observed in Dosabhai Ratt~nsha Keravala's case, after referring the decisions of this Court in Vishnu Prasad Sharma's case and Girdharilal Amratlal Shodan's case :

p. 292, margin A

"If the first s. 6 notification is invalid, that is, non est, s. 4 notification cannot be regarded as exhausted, for its purpose is yet unfulfilled; its purpose could be fulfilled only by issue of a valid notification under s. 6.'·

p. 292, margin A

There. remains the question whether the High Court was right in quashing the second notification under s. 6 on the ground of unreasonable delay in its issuance. The respondent had taken any such ground in the writ petition filed by him. The High Court was, therefore, not justified in observing that 'the appellant had not explained the delay by filing any affidavit'. We fail to appreciate that if there was no ground taken, there could be no occasion for filing of any such affidavit. Further, the delay, if any, was of the respondent's own making_ He had challenged the first notification unJer s. 6, presumably on the ground tlmt the acquisition being for a public purpose, could not be made at the expense of tho second respondent. The challenge was justified and the Smte Government, therefore, withdrew the first notification under s. 6 without waiting for an order of the High Court The cancellation was in recognition of the invalidity of the notification. The Government had no intention of withdrawing from the acquisition. Thereafter, Government issued a fresh notification. under s. 6 making a declaration for acquisition of the bnd for a public purpose at public There is nothing in the Act which precludes tbe Government from issuing a fresh notification under s. 6. if the earlier notification found to be ineffective. delay of one year and fou.r months between the date of cancellation and the issue of the second notification c:nnnot regarded to b" unreasonable, in the facts and circumsmnces of the case. In somewhat similar circumstan~ ces, this Court recently in Gujarat Stat~ Transport Corpn. v.

p. 292, margin B

held the delay of about fifteen years in making the seco.nd notification under s. 6 not to bo unreasonable. We cunnot, therefore, uphold the High Court's decision that tho second notification must be struck down on the ground of delay.

p. 292, margin E

In the result, the appeal succeeds and' is allowed with costs, tbe

p. 292, margin G

of the High Court is ~et asiJc, and the writ petition the first re~pondcnt is dismis~ed. Responuent No. 1 shall hear. the costs. N.K.A.

p. 292, margin G

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p. 292, margin G