BIHARI CHOWDHARY & ANR. versus STATE OF BIHAR & ORS.

• BALAKRISHNA ERADI J. The s]1ort question that arsies foP, c,onsideration in this appeal by special leave concerns the true scope, and application of.Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code.

p. 310, margin D

'The appellants. her~in · ar~ the plaintiffs in a. suit instituted in t)le i\iunsiff's Court, Bihar S'harif, seeking the reliefs of dedaration of title and deliver¥ of possession with mesne profits in respect ot:. the properties descdbed in the plaint. The State of Bihar-the 1st respondent herein is the main defendant in the suit. Prior to the· institution of the suit, the plah1tiffs had issued a uotice to the 1st vespondent-State_:...under section 80 C.P.C. on 18.2.1969 and Exhit>it 2 is a copy ofthe said notice. How·ever; without waiting for othe statutory period of two ~ >n.ths, the plaintiffs instituted the.suit -0n 2.4.1969. In the written statement filed on behalf of the State. of Bihar, it was contended.; inter a!ia, that the suit was not maintain- ~ble for want of proper notice under Section 80 C.P.C .. This ·contentiOn was uphelJ by the trial court which also recorded findings against the pblntiff; on the remaining issues concerning the · ·title to the property and their erititlemwt to reliefs of declaration. · :.and delivery of p'3session. The first appellate. court to which the ·.matter was ca.rried. in appral by 'the plaintiffs dismissed the appeal -on the ground that the plaintiffs' suit was not maintainable inasmuch· as due .notice under Section 80 C.P.C. liad not been given. A ,gecond appeal preferred by the appellants to the High Court at Patna did not meet with any success and it was dismissed in limine, .Hence this appeal by the plaintiffs.

pp. 310–311, margin G

We· are concerned 'in this case with Section 80 C.P.C. as it cStood prior to its amendment, by Act 104 of 1976 (Even under the . .amended provisiop, the position remains unaltered insofar as a suit of this nature is concerned). We s.hall extract the Section as it .stood at the matcr.ial ti me :

p. 311, margin D

"so: No suit shall be instituted against the Government (inclu(ling the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir) or against a public officer .in ·respect of any act · purporting·to be done by such public officer in his official ·capacity, until the expiration of two months next after notice in writing has been dtlivered to, or left at the office offa) in the cas.e-of a suit against the Central Government, except where it ·relates to a railway, a

p. 311, margin D

:Secretary to that Gover~_ment ; ((b)' in the case of a suit against the Central Govern' ment where it relates to a railway, the General

p. 311, margin D

Mana_ger of thatrailway ; {(c) in the (:ase of a suit against the Government of the S~ate ·ofJammu and Kashmir, the Secre- 1at"y , to 'that Governme11t or any other officer authorised by that Government in this behalf;

p. 311, margin D

3.H CQUl\T. (1984} 3 ~.C.R.

p. 312

(d) in. the case of a suit against any-0ther Govern, . inent,. a Secretary to that Government or the

p. 312

Collector of the district ; '

p. 312

*' * and, in t4e case of a public offlcer, delivered to him or lfet at liis office, stating the cause of action, the nami:, description and place of residence of the plaintiff and relief wl1ich be ·claims ; and plaint shall contai\1 a statement that such notice bas been so delivered ot left."

p. 312

The effect of the Section is clearly to impose a bar against the· institution of a. suit against the Government or a public officer in ·respect of any act purported to be dohe by him in his official capa- . city until the expiration of two months after. ~otice in writing has .been delivered to or left.at the office of the Secretary to Government or Collector of· the poncerned district and' in the case of a· public officer delivered to him or left at his office, stating the particulars enumerated in the last part of sub-section (I) of the Section. When we examine the' sch. eme" of.the Section it becomes • obvious .that the Section has been enacted as a measure of public .policy with the object . of ensuring that before a suit is instituted against the Government or a public officer, the Government 6r the . officer concerned is afforded an opportunity to scrutinise the claim in respect of which the suit is proposed to be filed .and if it be found to be a just claim, to take immediate action and thereby avoid unnecessary litigation and save public time and money by settling the claim. wi.thout driving the person, _who has issued the 11otice, to institute the suit involving considerable expenditure and delay. The Government, unlike ·private parties, is expected to consider tlte matter, covered by the n.otice in a most objective manner, after obtaining such legal advice as they may think fit, and take a decision in public inierest within the period of . two months allowed by the Section as to whether the claim is just and reasonable and the contemplated suit should, . t!<ereforc, be avoided by speedy negotiations a:nd settlement.or whether the claim shouJ.d be 1esisted by fighting out the suit if and when it is instituted. There, is' clearly a. public purpose underlying. the mandatory provision o<intained in the Section insisting on the issuance of a notice setting eat the particulars or the ,proposed suit. and giving two months' tillle ·to Government, or a public officer before a suit can be insti-. tuted' against them. T!)e object of the Section is the advancement of justice and the securing of public good by avoidance of unnecessary litigation.

pp. 312–313, margin C

When the language used in the.Statute is clear and unambiguous, if is the plain duty of tlie 'Court to give effect to it ahd considerations of liardship will. not be a legitimate ground for not faithfully implementing the mandate of the legisiature:

p. 313, margin A

The· Judici al Committee of the Privy Council had occ.asion to consider the scope and. effect of Section 80 C.P.C. in an almost similar situation in Bhagchand Dagadusa and ors. v. Secretary of State for India in Council & Ors. l In that case, though a notice had been issued by the plaintiffs under Section 'so C.P.C. on 26th June 1922, the suit was insitituted before the expiry of the period of two montl1s from the said date. It was contended before the Privy Co~ncil, relying on some early decisions High Court of Bombay, that because one of t.he r~licfs claimed in the .suit was the grant of a perpetual injunction and the claim for the said relief would have become infrucluous if the

p. 313, margin A

plaintiffs were to wait for the· statutory period of two months • prescribed in Section 80 C.P:C. before they filed the suit, the rigour of the Section should be relaxed by implication of a suita\Jle exception of a qualification in respect of a suit for emergent relief, such as one for injunction.· That contention did not find favour with the Privy Council ~nd it \Vas held that Section 80 is express, explicit and mand~ory and it admits no implicati.ons or exception's. The Judicial Committee observed :

p. 313, margin A

"To argue as appellants did, that the plaintiffs had a right urgently calling for a remedy, while s. 80 is mere procedure, is fallacious, for s. 80 -imposes a statutory and ur;qualified obligation upon the Court.''

p. 313, margin A

This decision "was subsequently followed by the Judicial Committee in Ve//ayan v. Madras Prol'iF?ce.<"') }'he dictum la'id down . by the Judicial Committee in Bhagchand Dagadusa v; Secre~qry of State.for India:<•) was cited with approval and followed by a Bench (I) 54 I.A. 338 (2) 74 I.A. 223 I.A. 333 314 (1984] 3 of five Judge_s of this Court in Sawai Singlrai Nirnial Chand v. Union of India.(') ·

pp. 313–314, margin A

. It must now be regarded as settled law that a suit against the Government ·or a public officer, to whic4 the requirement of a prioi: notice under. Section 80 C.P.C. is attracted, ·can not be validly ihstituted until the expir>ttion of the period of two months next after ·the notice in writing has been delivered to t_he authorities concerned in the manner prescrib~d for in the Section and if filed before the expiry of tile said period, the suit has to be dismissed as not maintainable .

p. 314, margin A

. On behalf of the appellaf1,ts, strong reliance ·was placed on. the decision of.a learned•Single Judge of the High Court of Kerala in Nani Amnia Nannini Amma v. State of Kera/a.(•) Therein the learned Judge has expressed the view that Sec. 80 is not a provision of public policy .and there is no\hing in the Section expressly affecting the jurisdiction of the ·court to try a suit" instituted before the expiry of the period prescribei! _therein. , The reasons 'stated by the learned Judge in justification of his taking.lite said.view despite the clear pronouncement of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Blzagchand's case do not appeal to us as correct or sound." 'In the light of the conclusion expressed by us in the f~regoing. paragraphs about the true .scope and effect of Section 80 C. P.C., the afore cited decision of the learned Single Judge of the Ketala High ·Court cannot be accepted as laying down good law. •

p. 314, margin A

IIi the result, we confirm the judgment and decree of the High Court and·· dismiss this appeal. The parties will bear the respective costs in this appeat N.V.K. Appeal dismissed

p. 314, margin E

•• (I) Jl966](1) SCR A.I R .. Kerala

p. 314, margin E