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Supreme Court of India

SHIVAJI NARAYAN BACHHAV versus STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

Decided
18 August 1983
Judges listed
O. CHINNAPPA REDDY (as the open data lists them; this may not name the whole bench)
Disposal
Case Allowed

Citations

Official
[1983] 3 S.C.R. 651 · 1983 INSC 96

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The Court's text

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CHINNAPPA REDDY, J. Special Leave Granted.

p. 652, margin D

The appeal of the accused to -the High Court was _dismissed su111marily with the one word 'dismissed', placing this Court in a most embarrassing position in dealing with the special leave petition under Art. 136 of the Constitution. Such summary rejection of appeals by the High Court has been disapproved by this Court more than thirty years ago in M11shtaq Hussain v. State of Bombay(') and therGl\f(er, over the years, in .a series of cases from the same High Court : Ramayya v. State of Bombay('), Vishwanath Shankar Be/dar v, $f!'te pf :Maharashtra(•), Siqdanna Appa Rao v. State. of Maharashtra('). Narayan Nathu Naik v. State of Maharashtra('), Govinda Kadutji Kadam v. Stale of Maharashtra('), Shaik Mohamed Ali v. State of Maharashtra('), K. K. Jain v. State of Maharashtra(•), Jeewan (1) S.C.R. 809. (2) A.l.R. 1955 S.C. 287. (3) (1969) 3 s.c.c. 883. (4) A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 977. (5) A. J.R. 1971S.C.1656. (6) A.I.ll. 1970 S.C. !033.

p. 652, margin D

A.f.R. 1973 S.C. 43. (8) A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 243, Prakash v. State of Maharashtra('), Mushtaq Ahmed v State of Maharashtra('), Krishna Vitim Suroshe v. State of Maharashtra('), Sampaia Tatyada Shinde v. State of Maharashtra('), Dagadu v. State of Maharashtra('). We are pained, and not a little perturbed, that despite the long series of judgments all arising from cases from the same High Court, the High Court has not chosen to correct itself and continues in the error of its ways. Except in certain cases when an accused person has pleaded guilty and in petty cases, every person convicted of an offence has a right of appeal ·under the Crim.inal Procedure Code. An appeal may be both against conviction and sentence and on facts and law. A convicted person is entitled to ask an appellate Court to reappraise the evidence and come to its own conclusion. -An appellate Court has the undoubted power to dismiss an appeal in limine. Section 384 of the ·criminal Procedure' Code provides _for it. But, it is a power which must be exercised sparingly and with great circumspection. One would think a conviction for murder and a sentence of imprisonment for life, as in the case before us, were serious enough matters for the High Court to warrant 'admission' of the appeal -and fair and independent 9onsideration of the evidence by the High Court. Summary rejection of the appeal with the laconic expression 'dismisssed' seems to be a drastic step in such cases. To so reject an appeal is to practically deny the right of -appeal. We cannot also overemphasise the importance of the High Court making a speaking order when dismissing a Criminal Appeal in liinine. "The requirement of recording reasons for summary disrpissal, however concise, serves to ensure proper functioning of the judicial process". There must be some indication that the High Court addressed "itself to the questions at issue and had tiie record before it. In the present case there is not even an indication whether the record had been called for and whether it was before the Court. We have little option but to set aside the order of the High Court The High Court may now 'admit' the appeal and deal with it according to law. S,R. • fetitio.n allowed.

pp. 652–653, margin H

(I) A,J.R. 1973 S.C. 278. (2) A.1.R. 1973 S.C, 1122.

p. 653, margin G

A.LR. 1974 S.C 274. •

p. 653, margin G

A.l.R. 1974 S.C. 791. (5) (1981] Cr!. L.J. 7~1,

p. 653, margin G