PADAM SEN AND ANOTHER versus THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

RAGHUBAR DAYAL J.-This is an appeal by Padam Sen and Shekbar Chand against the order of the Allaha.bad High Court dismissing their appeal against the order of the Special Judge, Meerut, convicting them of an offence under s. 165-A of the Indian Penal Code. The High Court granted leave to apptJ:· against its m~~ , .

p. 885

One Genda Mal, father of Shekhar Chand, appellant No. 2, sued Mithan Lal and others in the Court of the Additional Munsif, Ghaziabad, for money on the basis of promissory notes executed by the defendants in his favour. The defendants apprehending that the plaintiff would fabricate his books of account with respect to payments made by them, applied for the seizure of the account books of the pla.intiff. The Additional Munsif, by his order dated March 27, 1954, appointed Sri Raghubir Pershad, Vakil, Commissioner to seize those books of account. The Commissioner accordingly seized those books and brought them to Ghaziabad. ·

p. 885

The appellants were convicted by the Special Judge under s. 165-A of the Indian Penal Code for having offered bribe to the Commissioner for being allowed an opportunity to tamper with those books of account. Their conviction was upheld by the High Court.

p. 885

The two Courts below have found that the appellants went to the Commissioner's Office on March 30, 1954, and offered him Rs. 900 as bribe. The appellants do not challenge these findings of fact recorded by the Courts below. Their only contention is that Sri Ra.ghubir Persha.d, the Commissioner, was not a public servant, and therefore oven on the basis of the findings of fact arrived at by tbe Courts below, they did not commit any offence undor s. 165-A of the Indian Pena.I Code.

pp. 885–886

It has been contended for tho appellants that tho appointment of Sri Raghubir Persha.d as Commissioner was null and void as the Additional M unsif had no power to appoint a Commissioner for the purpose of seizing the account books of tho plaintiff on an application by the defendants, the power of a Civil Court to issue a commission being limited by the provisions of s. 75 and Order XXVI of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter ca.lied the Codo), and the Court having no inherent power to appoint a Commissioner for any purpose not mentioned in s. 75 and Order XXVI of thb:~~de. On bohalf of the State it is urged that the Court can appoint a Commissioner in the exercise of its inherent powers saved by s. 151 of the Code for purposos which do not come within the provisions of s. 75 and Order XXVI of the Code.

p. 886

It is further submitted for the Stato that even if the Additional :.\lunsif had no power to appoint the Commissioner for soizing the books of account, Sri Ra.ghubir Pershad would be deemed to be a public servant in view of Explanation 2 to s. 21 of the Indian Pena.I Code because ho was in actual possession of the situation of a public servant for he acted as Commffisioner and was recognized as such by the appellants and others connected with the civil suit.

p. 886

Section 75 of the Code empowers the Court t-0 issue a commission, subject to conditions and limitations which may be prescribed, for four purposes, viz., for examining any person, for making a local investigation, for examining or adjusting accounts and for making a partition. Order XXVI lays down rules relating to the issue of commissions and allied mattors. Mr. Chatterjee, learned coun\!01 for the appellants, has submitted that the powers of a Court must be found within the four corners of the Code and that when the Code has expressly dealt with the subject matter of commissions in a. 75 the Court cannot invoke its inherent powers under s. 151 and theMby add to its powers. On the other hand, it is submitted for the State, that the Code is not exhaustive and the Court, in the exercise of its inherent powers, can adopt any procedure not prohibited by the Code expressly or by necessary implication if the Court considers it necessary, for the ends of justice or to pre;vent abuse of the process of the Court.

pp. 886–887

Section 151 of the Code reads: ,

p. 887

"Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent powers of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court". The inherent powers of the Court are in addition to the powers specifically conferred on the Court by the Code. They are complementary to those powers and therefore it must be held that the Court is free to exercise them for the puposes mentioned in s. 151 of the· Code when the exercise of those powers is not in any way in conflict with what has been expressly provided in the Code or against the intentions of the Legislature. It is also well recognized that the inherent power is not to be exercised in a manner which will be contrary to or different from the procedure expressly provided in the Code. ·

p. 887

The question for determination is whether the impugned order of the Additional Munsif appointing Sri Raghubir Pershad Commissioner for seizing the plaintiff's books of account can be said to be an order which is passed by the Court in the exercise of its inherent powers. The inherent powers saved by s. 151 of the' Code are with respect to the procedure to be followed by the Court in deciding the cause before it. These powers are not powers over the substantive rights which any litigant possesses. Specific powers have to be conferred on the Courts for passing such orders which would affect such rights of a party. Such powers cannot come within the scope of inherent powers of the Court in the matters of procedure, which powers have their source in the Court possessing all the essential powers to regulate its practice and procedure. A party ha.s full rights over its books of account. The Court ha.a no inherent power forcibly to seize its property. If it dc>es so, it invades the private rights of the party. Specific procedure is la.id down in tbe Code for getting the relevant documents or books in Court for the purpose of using them a.a evidence. A party is free to produce such documents or books in support of its case a.a be relevant. A party can ask the help of the Court to have produced in Court by the other party such documents as it. would like to be used in evidence and are admitted by that party to be in its possession. If a. party does not produce the documents it is lawfully called upon to produce, the Court has the power to penalize it, in 1~ccordance with the provisions of the Code. The Court ha.a tbe further power to draw any presumption against such a. party who does not produce the relevant documi>nt in its possC1ssion, especially after it has been summoned from it. Even in such cases where the Court summons a. document from a. party, the Court has not been g'i ven any I?ower to get hold of the document forcibly from the possession of the defaulting party.

pp. 887–888

The defendants had no rights to these account books. They could not lay any claim to them. They a.pplird for the seizure of these books because they apprehended that the plaintiff might make such entries in those account books which could go against the case they were setting up in Court. The defendants' request really a.mounted to the Court's collecting documentary evidence which the defendants considered to be in their favour a.t that point of time. It is no business of tho Court to collect evidence for party or oven to protect the rive.I party from tho evil consequences of making forged entries in those account books. If the plaintiff does forge entries and uses forged entries a.s evidence in the case, the defendants would h11.ve ample opportunity to dispute those entries and to pro,·e them forgeries.

p. 888

We are therefore of opinion that the Additional Munsif had no inherent power to pass tho order appointing a. Commissioner t-0 seize the plaintiff's account books. The order appointing Sri Raghubir. Pershac;l as Commissioner for this purpose was therefore an order passed without jurisdiction and was therefore a null and void order.

pp. 888–889

Learned counsel for the State, Mr. Mathur, has submitted in the alternative that the impugned proce: <lure adopted by the Additional Munsif comes within certain provisions of the Code and has referred to r. 5 of Order XXXVIII and rr. l(b) and 7 of Order XXXIX and r. I of Order XL of the Code. We do not agree with this contention. The impugned order was not passed under any of these provisions. It was clearly an order which the Additional Munsif purported to pass in the exercise of the inherent powns of the Court. The order was : _

p. 889

"It is strange that an application of this kind has been made at this late stage, after over 2 years. However, in the interests of justice, issue commission to Sri Raghubir Pershad. He must go and recover Bahi Khatas for the year 1951 from the plaintiff and produce the same in Court. Fees Rs. 20, plus T. A. Report within six days. Costs of the commission will not be taxed."

p. 889

Fnrther, the provisions of r. 5 ()f Order XXXVIII are to prevent a decree that may be passed being rendered infructuous and r. l(b) of Order XXXIX is applicable where the defendant threatens to dispose of his property to defraud creditors. None of these provisions has any application to the facts of the present case. Rule. 7 of Order XXXIX empowers the Court, on the application -~ any party to a suit, to make an order for the detention, preservation or inspection of any property which is the subject-matter of such suit or as to which any question ma.y al'ise therein. The account books of the plaintiffs were not 'property' which were the subject-matter of the suit nor such that about them a question could arise in the suit. The account books could, at best, have been piece of evidence, if the plaintiff or the defendant had cared to rely on them. We therefore hold that the Additional Munsif had no power under the Code to appoint the Commissioner for seizing the plaintiff's books of account.

p. 889

[ l 96 l]

p. 890

Lastly it was urged for the State that oven if the appointment of Sri Raghubir Pershad as Commissioner was null and void as the Additional Munsif had no jurisdiction to appoint a Commissioner for seizing tho account books of the plaintiff, Sri Raghubir Pershad shoukl he treated to be a 'public servant' in view of Explanation 2 to s. 21 of the Indian Penal Code. It has not been disputed for the appellant that if the appointment of Sri Raghubir Pershad as Commissioner had been valid, he would have been a public servant in view of the Fourth Clause to s. 21 of the Indian P<mal Code. Explanation 2 to s. 21 reads:

p. 890

"Wherever the words 'public servant' occur, they shall bo understood of every person who is in aeotual possession of the situation of a public servant, whate,·er legal defect there may be in his right to hold that situation." The contention for the State is that though there was a legal defcctin Sri llaghubir Pershad's appointment

p. 890

Commissioner on account of the Additional Munsif having no power to appoint a Commissioner for the purpose of seizing the plaintiff's books of account, that will not affect his being a public servant as he was in actual possession of thu situation of a public servant. We do not agree with this contention, and arn of opinion that the Explanation applies only when there be a post in existence. The Explanation does not apply when there is no pre-existing post or when the person appointing has no authority to appoint.

p. 890

The word 'situation' according to Webster's :New International Dictionary of tho English Language, means: position or place 0¥ employment, pie.co, office; aH a situation in a store. The apposite meaning for the purposes of this Explanation would be' otlico '. •Office' again, according to the same Dictionary, means a special duty, trust, charge or position, conferred by an exercise of governmental authority and for a public purposo; a position of t.rust or authority cnnforred by an a.ct of governmental power; a right to exercise a public function or employment a.nd receive the emoluments (if any) thorcto belonging; as, a.n executive or judicial office ......... In a wider sense, any position or place in the employment of the government, especially one of trust or authority. Th0 Dictionary further notes the differences in the connotations of the various words office, post, appointment, situation and place and says : Office commonly suggests a position of (especially public) trust or authority; and situation emphasizes the idea of employment, especially in a subordinate position; as, to seek a situation as governess, as private secretary.

pp. 890–891

It is therefore clear that it is necessary for the application of this Explanation ·that the person concerned should be in actual possession of the pre-existing office of a public servant: If there be no office or post, there could be no question of any person's being in actual possession thereof, and of the person concerned coming within the terms of this Explanation. There was no post or office of a Commissioner in existence. All that happened here was that Sri Raghubir Pershad was authorized to seize and keep certain documents in his possession. In the present case there was neither any existing office of Commissioner, nor the Additional Munsif had power to appoint Sri Raghubir Pershad as Commissioner for the purpose of seizing the plaintiff's account books and .therefore this Explanation does not apply to the appointment of Sri Raghubir Pershad as Commissioner. It follows, therefore, that Sri Raghubir Pershad cannot be held to be a public servant.

p. 891

We therefore accept the contention for the appellants and hold that Sri Raghubir Pershad was not a public servant and that therefore the appellants did not commit any offence under s. 165-A of the Indian Penal Code by their offering him money in order to have an opportunity to tamper with the books of account which were in his custody. We therefore allow the appeal, set aside the order of the Court below and acquit the appellants of the offence under s. 165-A and direct that the fine, if paid, be refunded. The appellants are on bail and therefore the bail bonds will be cancelled.

p. 891

Appeal allowed.

p. 891