BANSIDHAR SHANKARLAL versus MOHD. IBRAHIM & ANR.

Shah, 1. Mohammed Ibrahim (hereinafter called "the plain· tift'.') instituted an action in the Court of the Subordinate Judge. Alipore for a decree in ejectment in respect of land occupied b~ the Luxmi Spinning & Weaving Mins Ltd. as his tenant. The suit was decreed on October 1, 1953. Before the decree was. ;passed, the Company had executed on January 31, 1951 a deed in favour of Bansidhar mortgaging its fixed assets for securing repayment of Rs. 1,25,000/-. After the decree of the Trial ·Court, the Company executed on January 21,, 1954 a second deed also in favour of Bansidhar mortgaging the fixed assets for repayment of an add,itional sum of Rs. 2,00,000/-. The decree -0f the Subordinate Judge in the ]1laintiff's suit was confirmed on August 4, 1954. Against that decree the Company .and Bansidhar preferred second appeal No. 1380 of 1954 to the High Court of Calcutta.~ Dansidhar also filed a suit in the· High Court of Calcutta on its original side to enforce the two mortgages in his favour and obtained a preliminary mortgage decree in the suit -00 May 13, 1955, Another creditor of the Company appliec;l for and obtaine~ on August 22, 1955 an order directing that the Company. be wound up. · The liquidators of the Company and Bansidhar prosecuted the Second Appeal No. 1380 of 1954. The decree of the District Court was confirmed by the High Court in it$ appellate jurisdiction on February 22, 1958. The plain' . tiff then instituted an application for enforcement of the decree in ejectment against the Company without obtaining leave .of the High Court of Calcutta under s. 171 of the Indian Companies Act, 1913. On December 17, 1958, Bansidhar filed a petition contending that the application for enforcement of the decree was not maintainable without leave o( the High Court which ordered that the Company be wound up. On the motion of the plaintiff the Company Judge granted leave to execute the decree. in Second. Appeal No. 1380 of 1954. The Subordinate Judge before whom the proceedings were pending, dismissed the application filed. by Bansidhar, and the order of dismissal was con; firmed by the Additional District Judge and by- the High Court in Second Appeal. Bansidhar's petition for a certificate for appeal to this Court under Articles 133(l)(b) and (c) of the Constitution was also rejected. Bansidhar then prefe.rred two petitions for special leave to this Court-one against the order of the High Court dismissing his Second Appeal against the ordet in the execution proceedings, and the other against the order of the High Court refusing to certify the appeal under Art. L~3(1)(b) and ( c) of the Constitution. This Court dismissed the petition against the order of the High Court in Second Appeal and granted special leave to appeal against the order of the High Court refu- ~ing to certify the case.

pp. 477–478, margin G

The order passed by the High Court in Second Appeal having affirmed the order of the District Court unless the appeal preferred to this Court involved some substantial question of law Qf public or private importance, the case could not be certified under Art. 133 ( 1 )(b) even if the prop6sed appeal involved direc-tly or, indirectly some claim or question respecting property of value not less than Rs. 20,000/-. The High Court.could not also certify the case as a fit one for appeal under Art. 133(l)(c) unless in the view of the Court it raised a question of some gene- :ral or public importance.

pp. 478–479, margin G

Couns.el for the appellant says that the Subordinate Judge was ~ncompetent to entertain the application for executing the decree in Second Appeal No. 1380 of 1954 unless the High Court of Calcutta in its company jurisdiction granted leave to execute the decree under s. 171 of the Indian Companies Act, 1913. Counsel urged that leave of the High Court is by the terms of s. 171 of the Indian Companies Act made a condition precedent to the institution of a proceeding against a Company ordered to be wound up by the Court, and that the application for execution of the decree without in the. first ins,tance obtaining leave of If·~ High Court was entertained without authority. The quest10n sought to be raised in the proposed appeal, it was urged, was. of general or public importance. In any case it was contended that there is conflict of opinion among the Courts in India on the• true interpretation of s. 171 of the Indian Companies Act, 1913, and s. 446 of the Companies Act, 1956 (which replaced s. 171 of the Act of 1913), and the High Court was bound to grant the certificate applied for either under s. 13 ( 1) (b) or under Art. 133(1)(c) or both the clauses.

p. 479, margin A

Our attention is invited to the -decision of the High Court of Calcutta in Har Narain Misra v. Kanhaiya Lal Lohawalla(1) and of the High Court of Andhra Pracjesh in.· Godavari Sugar and Refineries Ltd. v. Kambhampati Gopalakrishnamurthy and' Others('). In these cases it was held that leave of the High Court which has ordered winding up of a Company is a condition pre.l cedent to the institution of proceedings against a Company in liquidation, 3illd that proceeding initiated without obtaining leave of the Court in the first instance must be dismissed.

p. 479, margin E

'!here are, however, other cases which take a contrary view. Nazrr Ahmed v. Peoples Bank of Northern India Ltd.('); Suresh Chandra Khannabish v . . The Bank of Calcutta Ltd.(4). People's Industrial Bank Ltd. v. Ramchandra Shukul('); Roopnarain Ramchandra Private Ltd v. Brahmapootra Tea Co. (India) Ltd. & Anr:{ ).

p. 479, margin F

Section 171 of the Indian Companies Act, 1913 provided that- (I) I. L. R. [193912 Cal. 425~ (2) A.J.R. 1960 A. P. 74. (3) I. L. R. 0942) Lah. 517. (4) <1950) 54 Cal. W. N. 832 F.B. (5) I. L. R. 52 All. 430. (6) 65 Cal. W. N. 1060.

p. 479, margin G

"When a winding up order has been made or a provisional liquidator has been appointed, no suit or other legal proceeding shall be proceeded with or commenced against the Company except by leave of the Court and

p. 480, margin A

subject to such terms as the Court may impose." This section is in terms analogous to s. 231 of the English Companies Act, 1948 (11 & 12 Geo. 6, Ch. 38). The object of s. 171 is plain. It is intended to ensure that the assets of a Company prdeted to be wound up by the Court shall be administered for the benefit of all the creditors, and that some creditol"S only shall not obtabn an advantage over others by instituting or prosecuting proceedings against the Company. This section is intended to maintain control of the Court which has made an order for winding up on proceedings which may be pending against the Company or may be initiated after the order of winding up, and the Court may remain seized of all those matters so that its .affairs are administered equitably and in an orderly fashion.

p. 480, margin A

When the Second Appeal No. 1380 of 1954 was pending before the High Court of Calcutta at the instance of the Company .and Bansidhar against the decree passed by the District Court in ejectrnent, the Company was ordered to be wound up by order of' the High Court of Calcutta and the liquidators were appointed. The liquidators prosecuted the appeal. There is no evidence· on the record whether the liquidators obtained the sanction of the Court under s. 179(l)(a) of the Company's Act 1913. But there is no reason to suppose that the liquidators did not obtain othe simction of the Court. If sanc,tion of the Court under s. · 179 to prosecute the appeal before the, High Court was obtained, and it '.must be so assumed, the contention raised on behalf of Bansidhar loses all significance for an execution application is only a continuation of the suit and tile control of the High Court ensures during the execution proceeding also. If the sanction of the Court has been obtained for the prosecution of the. suit, i~ would be plainly unnecessary to obtain fresh sanction to the institution of execution proceeding at the instance of the successful party. It is true that the sanction obtained by the liquidators is granted under s. 179 of the Companies Act to initiate or entorce a claim of the Company or to defend an action, whereas the leave of the Court to institute or to continue a suit againsr the Company in winding up is obtained under s. 171. It would be giving effect to a technically divorced from the true object of the section to hold that even in a suit filed or prosecuted with the sanction of the Court, the decree may not be enforced by a successful party without leave under s. 171 of the Act.

p. 480, margin C

Even granting that sanction under s. 179 does not dispense with the leave under s. 171 of the Act, to institute a proceeding in execution against a Company ordered to be wound up, we do not think ¢.at there is anything in the Act which makes the leave a condition precedent to the institution of a proceeding in execution of a decree against the Company and failure to obtain leave before institution of the proceeding entails dismissal of the proceediug. The suit or proceeding instituted without leave of the Court may, in our judgment, the regarded as ineffective untill leave is obtained but once leave is obtained the proceeding will be deemed instituted on the date granting leave.

pp. 480–481, margin H

In Buckley on the Companies Act, 13th Edn., at p. 499 it is observed:

p. 481, margin B

"Leave to continue after winding up a debentureholder's · actioo, whether previously or subsequently comrilenced, v.ill be given unl.ess the liquidator is able and willing to give in the winding up the relief which

p. 481, margin B

could be obtained in the action." The Calcutta High Court in Suresh Chandra v. The Bunk '?f Calcutta( examined the decisioTJs of the English Courts m some details and observed that as regards s. 171 of the Indian Companies Act, 1913, the High Court has jurisdiction to grant leave to proceed with the suit or other proceedings against a Company in liquidation even if such leave was not obtained for its commencement. The proceedings may at best be regarded as instituted on the date on which the leave was obtained from the High Court.

p. 481, margin B

Considerlng the question both on principle and authority we are unable to agree with the view expressed by the Calcutta High Court in Har Narain Misra's case( and in Godavari Sugar and Refineries Ltd. case( by the Andhra Pradesh High Court.

p. 481, margin E

Counsel for the appellant, however, urged that this Court is not concerned in this appeal with the correctness of one or the

p. 481, margin E

other of the two conflicting views. Counsel says the Court has. ' only to consider the correctness of the view of the High Court refUsi.ng to grant the certificate. In our judgment, it would be a futile exercise if we come to the conclusion that the view taken by the High Court on the merits of the case is true, still io certitf the case for appeal. The proposed appeal only involves the question about the maintainability of the execution proceeding commenced by the plaintiff and against the Company in liquidation without leave of the High Court which has ordered the company to be wound up. We entertain no doubt that the High Court {I) ·21 Company Cases 110. (2) !. L. R. 392 Ce!. 425.

p. 481, margin E

(3) A. I .R. 1960 A. P. 74. was rightin the view it has taken on the merits and the contentions raised. We do not think that we will be justified in certifying an appeal in which the only question which may be urged is the one on which we have expressed our opinion against the appellant.

pp. 481–482, margin H

The appeal fails and is dismissed. The appellant will pay the costs of the plaintiff in this Court. G.C. Appeal dismissed.

p. 482, margin B