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Supreme Court of India

KULJIT SINGH ALIAS RANGA versus LT. GOVERNOR OF DELHI & ORS.

Decided
20 January 1982
Judges listed
Y.V. CHANDRACHUD (as the open data lists them; this may not name the whole bench)
Disposal
Dismissed

Citations

Official
[1982] 3 S.C.R. 58 · 1982 INSC 6
Also cited as
  • (1982) 1 SCC 417 (2 citing judgments)

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The Court's text

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CHANDRACHUD C. J. The question as regards the scope of the power of the President under article 72 of the Constitution to commute a sentence of death into a lesser sentence may have to await examination on an appropriate occasion. This clearly is not that occasion because in so far as this case is concerned, whatever be the guidelines observed for the exercise of the power conferred by article 72, the only sentence which can possibly be imposed upon' the petitioner is that of death and no circumstances exist for interference with that sentence. Therefore we see no justification for saying that in refusing to commute the sentence of death imposed upon tb,e petitioner into a lesser sentence, the President has in any manner . transgressed his discretionary power under article 72. Undoubtedly, the President has the power in an appropriate case to commute any sentence imposed by a· .court into a lesser sentence ayd as said by Chief Justice Taft in James Shewan & Sons v United States('), the "executive clemency exists to afford relief from undue harshness or evident mistake in the operation or enforcement of the criminal law" and that the administration of justice by the courts is not necessarily or certainly considerate of circumstances which may properly mitigate guilt. But the question as to whether the case is appropriate for the exercise of the power conferred by Article 72 depends upon the facts and circumstances of each parti- .c:ular case. The necessity or the justification for exercising that power has therefore to be judged from ¢a~e to case. In fact, we do not see what useful purpose will be 11i;qieved by tqe petitioner by (I) 69 L Ed. 527 at 535.

p. 59, margin C

ensuring the imposition of any severe, judicially evolved constraints oo the wholesome power of the President to use it as the justice of a case may require. After all, the power conferred by Article 72 can be used only for the purpose of reducing the sentence, not for enhancing it. We need.not, however, go into that question elaborately because in so far as this case is concerned, we are quite clear that not even the most liberal use of his mercy jurisdiction could have persuaded the President to interefere with the sentence of death imposed upon the ·petitioner, in view )larticularly of the considerations mentioned by us in our judgment in Kuljeet Singh @ Ranga v. Union of India & Anr.('). We may recall what we said in th~t judgment that "the death of the Chopra children was cau.sed by the petitioner and his companion Billa after a savage planning . which bears a professional stamp", that the "survival of an orderly society demands the extinction of the life of per'°ns like Ranga and Billa who are a menace to social order and security'', and that "they are professional murderers and deserve no sympathy even in terms of the evolving standards of decency of a mature society".

p. 60, margin A

The petition is accordingly dismissed. •

p. 60, margin C

We have heard Shri R. K. Jain as amicus on behalf of the accused Billa. We see no substance in Shri Jain's contentions also.

p. 60, margin C

The order of stay of execution of the death sentence which we had passed in favour o.f the accused Ranga and Billa as also the general order of stay are hereby vacated. If in any specific case or cases there is an express crder of stay, it will not be affected by the order which we are passing today. S,R. Petition dismissed.

p. 60, margin E

(1) [1981) 3 S.C.R. sq.

p. 60, margin F