Certo Is this judgment real?
Beta, Supreme Court only. We check Supreme Court of India judgments only for now: a High Court citation reads "Not in our corpus", which never means it does not exist.

Supreme Court of India

PRAKASH CHAND AGARWAL & ORS. versus M/S. HINDUSTAN STEEL LTD.

Decided
15 September 1970
Judges listed
M. HIDAYATULLAH (as the open data lists them; this may not name the whole bench)
Disposal
Dismissed

Citations

Official
[1971] 2 S.C.R. 405 · 1970 INSC 194
Also cited as
  • (1970) 2 SCC 806 (8 citing judgments)

Learned from how other judgments cite this one, in their text or in the official Supreme Court Reports' lists of cases they refer to: each is cited this way by at least two judgments, and at least twice as often as any other citation to this judgment in that report. We hold no commercial reporter's text, only these citation strings.

Not shown
1 other citation string that other judgments attach to this one, on evidence too thin or too divided to publish.

Cited by

Cited in 2 other Supreme Court judgments we hold.

Counted only in the Supreme Court judgments we hold whose text we could read, not in High Court judgments. We match each citation to a judgment automatically, so a citation we cannot match is not counted. "Cited" says only that a judgment refers to this one, not whether it followed, distinguished or overruled it.

The Court's text

Paragraphs from our copy of the Supreme Court Reports print, with the Court's own paragraph numbers, the printed page and, where printed, the margin letter. The Court did not number this judgment's paragraphs, so they are listed by page. Link to paragraph N with #para-N.

Unnumbered paragraph

The appellants before us who come by way of certificate from the High Court seek stay of a suit which has been restored to file by the High Court. At the very start we put to the counsel how certificate could have been granted in this case when the judgment and order of the High Court were not final. The counsel brought to our notice the case of Rame~h and another v. Gemlalal Motilal Ratni and others( and says that his case is covered by this ruling. This was a case in which the only question to be considered was whether Art. 13 3 of the Constitution was applicable in the two cases decided when the claim in rhe original suit or appeal to this Court was above Rs. 20,000/-. This particular question was not before the coun at all. Indeed, the Constitution contemplates the filing of an appeal by certificate only A.I.R. S.C. against a judgment decree or final order of the High Court. Jt does not contemplate bringing an appeal in a suit which is stm a live suit and in which further proceedings arc to be taken. This has been the consistent view not only of this Court but also of the Privy Council. The leading case from the Privy Council is V. M. Abdul Rahman and 9thers v. V. D. K. Cassim a11d Sons and another('). There is a catena of cases in the High Courts and also in this Court that the judgment, decree or order from which appeal is brought to this Court must put an end lo the litigation between the parties. This was reaffirmed in Mis. Jethana11tl and ~?ns v. The State of Uttar Pri!desh(2) approving the view of the P:ivy Council referred to. Indeed, we could cite on this aspect of the case quite a large number of procedlmts from various courts in India. In the present matter; the suit was decreed in the absence of the defendant who applied to have the decree set aside and gave reasons for it. The trial court did not accede to the prayer but the' High Court held that the matter was governed by 0. 9 r. 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure and that there were valid reasons for setting aside the ex-parte decree. As a result of the setting aside of the decree the suit is very much alive today and this cannot be treated as a final adjudication of µte suit itself. The certificate granted by the High Court in such circumstances was , premature and was not competent. We accordingly set aside the certificate and dismiss the appeal. There shall be no order as to costs. Y.P. Appeal dismissed.

pp. 405–406, margin F

Unnumbered paragraph

t. I.~.

p. 406, margin D