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Supreme Court of India

SHAMBHU NATH PALIT versus CORPORATION OF CALCUTTA AND ANR.

Decided
24 January 1978
Judges listed
V.R. KRISHNA IYER (as the open data lists them; this may not name the whole bench)
Disposal
Dismissed

Citations

Official
[1978] 2 S.C.R. 606 · 1978 INSC 13

Cited by

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The Court's text

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Unnumbered paragraph

KRISHNA IYER, J.-We have heard counsel Mr. Chatterjee on two grievances of his clinet. According to him, the land belongs to the petitioner, the huts belong to his tenants, but the municipal assessment is based upon valuation of the land and the huts together. This grievance is taken care of in two ways. The High Court had directed that in regard to each bit of land and hut thereon, there will be particularisation of the assessment separately. on the consolidated valuation. Secondly, there is also provision in s. 202 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') for collection by the owner of the land of so such of the rate as is attributable to the hut which belongsjlot to the owner but to the tenant, if we may pllt it lOQSe!y that way. The details have been spelt out in s. 202 of the Act. We consider s. 202 as more or jess a self-contained code with the result that what is leviable under that provision cannot be prejudiced by the existence of any other provision.

pp. 606–607, margin G

Unnumbered paragraph

Counsel's second grievence is that the provisions of the Thika Tenancy Act stand in the way of the petitioner collecting from his tenant any amount in excess of the rent fixed under the Act. This grievance also has no substance because the Thika Tenancy Act deals with rents wh;le s. 202 deals with rates. The special provision must prevail so far as the rates are concerned and the petitioner is not prevented from collecting sums due under s. 202 in the sha2e of rates. The Thika Tenancy Act does not come in the way of thy petitioner in recovering what is permissible under s. 202 of the Act.

p. 607, margin B

Unnumbered paragraph

.Nor are we able to appreciate counsel's contention that Art 14 of the Constitution is violated. Bastis-horrid hovels, which blot the human-scape of India, still survive in our socialistic pattern-stand as a separate category although as an ugly but inescapable social reality. It is true that the most unfortunate section of the society in Calcutta City dwell in these bastis except those who, unable to afford the luxury even of these bastis, have to seek she,Jter on the pavements. So far as Art. 14 is concerned, the bastis and the dwellers of bastis stand in a tearfully separate class by themselves and a special provision dealing with owners of bastis cannot be challenged as discriminatory. If ever there were any discrimination it Js against the human condition, rather the inhuman condition, of these whom dire necessity drives to occupy these hutments. So far as the_ owners are concerned their position is protected by s. 202 and there cannot be any complaint except abstract, theoretical and imaginary ones, that there is discrimination against them. With these observations, the petition is dismissed. S.R. Petition dismissed.

p. 607, margin C