Supreme Court of India
CHANDER BHAN GOSAIN versus ST ATE OF ORISSA & ORS.
- Decided
- 5 April 1963
- Judges listed
- S.K. DAS
- Disposal
- Directions issued
Citations
- Official
- [1964] 2 S.C.R. 885 · 1963 INSC 88
Cited by
We found no other Supreme Court judgment we hold that cites this one.
Counted only in the Supreme Court judgments we hold whose text we could read, not in High Court judgments. We match each citation to a judgment automatically, so a citation we cannot match is not counted. "Cited" says only that a judgment refers to this one, not whether it followed, distinguished or overruled it.
The Court's text
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SARJURj.-This is an appeal against the order of the Deputy Registrar directmg the present case to be rc~istered as nine appeals and requiring the appellant to pay nine sets of court-fees. The Deputy Registrar had relied on two cases of this Court, namely, Laju;anti Sial's case (Petition for Special Leave No. 673of1959) and Kishinchand Chellaram's
p. 886
(Civil Appeals No. 462 to 465 of 1960). We do not think that these precedents cover the present case.
p. 886
In Lajwanti's case there were a number of applications under s. 66 (2) of the Income-tax Act (or reference of the same question. There were in fact a number of separate references but they were dealt with by one judgment from which the appeal to this Court arose. That was really a case of five appeals for the common judgment must be taken to have been delivered in each of the di:!!erent reference cases.
pp. 886–887
Kishinchand Ghellaram's case is also not helpful because there four applications by four different assessees had been · made for reference of three identical questions arising in each assessment case under s. 66 (1) of the Income-tax Act. Though it appears that there was one order of reference to the High Court and the High Court treated the case as a single case of reference, it could be said that there were in fact a number of references.
p. 887
The present case however originated out of one petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution challenging the validity of various assessment orders. Obviously here, there was only one proceeding. It could not be said that there were as many proceedings as there were assessment orders for the petitioner had by a single petition callenged them all together. When an appeal is taken to this Court from the judgment of the High Court in such a petition, it is impossible to contend that· there are more agpeals than one. Therefore, the appellant before us is liable only to pay one set of court-fee and other charges as in a single appeal. Action may be taken accordingly by the office, if necessary, by refunding the excess char~es made.
p. 887