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Supreme Court of India

SMT. SHANTI BAI AND OTHERS versus DINKAR BALKRISHNA VAIDYA AND ORS.

Decided
2 March 1994
Judges listed
S. MOHAN (as the open data lists them; this may not name the whole bench)
Disposal
Dismissed

Citations

Official
[1994] 2 S.C.R. 296 · 1994 INSC 102
Also cited as
  • (1994) 4 SCC 85 (4 citing judgments)

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The Court's text

Paragraphs from our copy of the Supreme Court Reports print, with the Court's own paragraph numbers, the printed page and, where printed, the margin letter. The Court did not number this judgment's paragraphs, so they are listed by page. Link to paragraph N with #para-N.

Unnumbered paragraph

MOHAN, J, The short facts leading

p. 298, margin A

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The suit property was originally owned executed a simple mortgage oii 28.4.1947 which represent the entire property for Dinkar S. Vaidya. On or about 7.7,1948, favour of Shankar Goru~i Gore. The purpose was residence and shops. Under the lease-deed, to sub-lesase. The period of lease was Rs.1,500 payable monthly at the rate of Rs.125. from the assignment in the said lease.

p. 298, margin A

Unnumbered paragraph

On 17.2.1949, Shankar Godaji Gore,the sub-lease in respect of entire land in favour Thakur andKrishnabaiSarde, original defendants was for a period of 99 years and 9 months. Rs. 50. Defendants 2 & 3, the sub-lessees portion of tlie land sub let to them. These several persons. They in their turn assigned persons. On 7.11.1949, an area of 4,00 sq. 2 & 3 in favour of Sardar Biwalkar on a rent of 67 years. On the same day of the lease, of fourteen shops to Biwalkar. On 6.12.1952, their rights, title and intere~t in respect of Bayajabai Gan pat Gore, Sundarabai Babasaheb Balasaheb Gore, defendants 6, 7 and 8 respectively.

p. 298, margin C

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In 1952, Dinkar Balkrishna Vaidya, Special Civil Suit No. 89 of 1952 for enforcement mortgagor Awate and defendant No.l to That suit was decreed. In execution of the mortgagee Dinkar Balkrishn~ Vaidya himself land measuring about 1.000 sq. ft. The Symbolical possession was granted on 2.3.1960. pendency of the suit, mortgagee was declared of the Court was appointed as guardian possession of by the Nazir under the provisions

p. 298, margin A

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The Nazir filed Regular Civil Suit Causes Court, Poona for recovery of possession his demand for rent from Shankar Godaji Gore was not complied with. Shankar Godaji Gore assigned his right, title and interest in the shop premises to defendant Nos. 19 and 20. Likewise, ori 27.8.63 defendant No. 5 assigned his right, title and interest in the shop in favour of defendant No. 21. Therefore, another ground of sub-letting was also added. That suit was decreed on 27.11.68, Aggrieved by the said jugdment, Civil Appeal Nos. 279, 354 and 265 of 1969 were preferred against the same. Civil Appeal Nos. 279 and 354 of 1%9 came to be allowed while Civil Appeal No. 265 of 1%9 was dismissed for non-prosecution. Thereupon, the first respondent moved the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. That was numbered as Special Civil Application No. 242 of 1973. By the impugned order dated 15.7.1980, that came to be allowed. Hence, tho present civil appeal.

pp. 298–299, margin A

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The learned counsel for the appellants Shri U. R. Lalit after taking us through the relevant provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging flouse Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'} D " submitts that the lease-deed in favour _pf Shankar Godai Gore specially enabled him to sub-let. Under the lease-deed dated 7.7.1948, Awate the original owner permitted the lessee Shankar Godaji Gore to constrnct therein and give the said building or any portion thereof to any person on lease rent and he could take the income derived therefrom. Therefore, there was clear enablement to sub-lease.

p. 299, margin C

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Under the Transfer of Property Act, there is no bar for a lessee to sub-lease. In such a case that right or interest could be assigned in favour of third party. That was what was done by the lease-deed dated 17.2.1949. The sub-lessees constructed the building and let out a few and assigned their rights in favour of other defendants. It the sub-lessees continued in possession prior to 21.5.1959, they would been entitled to the statutory protection because prior to 1959, if there was sub-letting, the landlord could not proceed to evict. Section 15 of the Act barring sub-lesseescame into force only by amendment Act 49 of 1959, that too, subject to the contract to the contrary. Here is a case of a contrary contract. Under these circumstance the ruling reported in Sardar Total Singh v. Mis Gold Field Leather Works, Bombay, (1985] 2 SCR 563 would squarely apply. No eviction was possible under Section 13{1}(e) of the Act because it must be an unlawful sub-letting. Therefore, there is total protection both under 1959 Act and 1973 Act.

p. 299, margin E

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There is no warrant to hold that first defendant has unlawfully sub-let. In any event, if defendant Nos. 2 and 3 are sub-tenants in accordance with Section 14 of the Act, unless special sub- tenancy is determined, no eviction is possible.

p. 300, margin A

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Mr. S.K Dholakia, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 24, 26 and 27 supporting this argument submits that there is privily of contract between the original lessor and the occupant. The predecessor of the original lessor had authorised the defendant No. 1 to build the superstructure. Defendant No. 1 had absolute right to transfer his interest and having transferred his right of construction to defendant Nos. 2 and 3, the construction was made by defendant Nos. 2 and 3 lawfully and binding on the original lessee as he had not made any cotract to the contrary. The occupants were inducted lawfully as tenants of the superstructilre before 1959 or 1973 and therefore are eligible to the protection available under Sections 14 and 15 of the Act. Even on equity, they are entitled to a decision in their favour. It has been noted by the High Court that some of the occupants are tailors, laundrymen etc. and their livelihood is dependant on these premises. The eviction will entail severe hardship.

p. 300, margin A

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Mr. VA. Bobde, learned. counsel for the respondents submits, np doubt under the original lease date 7.7.1948, a permission had been given to Gore to construct but he never constructed. He created a sub-lease in favour of defendant Nos. 2 and 3. It was the sub-lessees who had put up this building. In relation to the demised property there was no privily of contract between the original lessor and the contesting defendents. Defendants 2 and 3 constructed 14 shops and assigned their right in favour of defendant Nos. 6, 7 and 8. How can these occupants claim the right as sub-tenancy ? Jai Singh Mormji and Ors. v. Mis Sovani Pvt. Ltd and Ors., [J973] 2 SCR 603 clearly lays down that no further sub-lease is possible. That would squarely apply to the facts of the present case. The reliance placed on Tota Singh's case (supra) is not correct, In any event, Section 14 docs not take within it assignments and transfers.

p. 300, margin D

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The short question that arises for our consideration in this case is, whether the occupants, the present appellants who are the assignees from defendant Nos. 2 and 3 can claim the protection of the Act as sub-lessees.

p. 300, margin G

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The original lease-deed date 7.7.1948, between Awate and Gore states in clause 2 sub-clause (1) and (3) as follows:

p. 300, margin G

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"2{1)I have taken the said land on rent for the period of 25 years from the date 7.7.1948 and have taken the same in my possession this day. xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx 2(3) The land is vacant and I shall construct buildings therein as per my wishes and I shall give the said building on any portion thereof to any person on lease rent and I shall take the income

p. 301, margin A

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derived therefrom."

p. 301, margin B

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Admittedly Gore did not put up any construction. However, reliance is placed on Clause 2 sub-clause {3) extracted above to ?Jrge that he had a right of sub-lease because he could build and let it out in favour of any one he liked. In our considered opinion the permission to construct means ·nothing more than an emphasis of the manner of enjoyment of the property. Even then as stated above, Gore never constructed. He leased-out the property in favour of defendant Nos. 2 and 3 by lease-deed dated 17.2.1949. Under clause 2 sub-clause ( d), it is stated as follows:

p. 301, margin C

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"The said land is vacant. We shall construct structures thereon as per our wishes and we shall give the said building or any portion thereof on sub-lease to any person and we shall take the income derived therefrom. We shall obtain the permission required for the said construction. In case your signature or consent is required in

p. 301, margin C

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that matter, you are to give the same."

p. 301, margin E

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These sub-lessees (defendant Nos. 2 and 3) assigned their rights in favour of defendant Nos. 6, 7 and 8 and others who are the appellants. How can they claim protection as sub-lessees? The important point to note here is that the original lessee Gore, defendant Nos. 2 and 3 sub-lessees are no longer before us. They have not filed the appeal. In these cir, cumstances, the principle applicable to this case is as stated in /ai Singh Morarji & Ors. case (supra) that a sub-tenant cannot create further subtenancy. Therefore, we are totally unable to see any scope for application of Section 15 of the Act. The parties are afforded liberty to contract out of the Section. Even then it is only a sub-tenant who could claim protection. If jn law, they are not sub-tenants of the original lessor, this Section is totally Inapplicable.

p. 301, margin F

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Again for the application of Section 14, there must be a lawful sub-tenancy. That is not so here. The occuants were not lawfully inducted into possession as sub-tenants either prior to 1959 or ~973. Therefore, we are unable to accept the contention urged by Mr. U.R. Lalit and Mr.S.K.. Dholakia, learned counsels. Hence, that Section is also inapplicable

p. 302, margin A

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Weighing the equitable considerations, the Civil Appeal was adjourned or effecting a compromise. But the parties have not done so. Therefore, we are unable to grant any relief on that score. The Civil Appeal will stand dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs. R.R. Appeal dismissed.

p. 302, margin B