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Supreme Court of India

CENTRE FOR DEVELOPMENT OF ADVANCED COMPUTING, PUNE versus COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE, PUNE

Decided
27 February 2002
Judges listed
B.N. KIRPAL (as the open data lists them; this may not name the whole bench)
Disposal
Appeal(s) allowed

Citations

Official
[2002] 2 S.C.R. 103 · 2002 INSC 102

Cited by

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The Court's text

Paragraphs from our copy of the Supreme Court Reports print, with the Court's own paragraph numbers, the printed page and, where printed, the margin letter. The Court did not number this judgment's paragraphs, so they are listed by page. Link to paragraph N with #para-N.

Unnumbered paragraph

In the instant case, duty is sought to be levied by the respondent by taking recourse to the extended period of limitation under Section 11 A of the Central Excises Act.

p. 104, margin A

Unnumbered paragraph

The plea of the appellant is that it was established as a research organisation and had even been importing goods from abroad and getting exemption from payment of customs duty on the basis that it was a research organisation. In reply to the show cause notice in paragraph 2.3 it has been specifically stated that the appellant was under a bona fide belief that the goods emerged during the research and experiments were fully exempt from payment of duty and therefore, no further compliance with the provisions of Excise Law was called for. Mr. Lakshmikumaran submits that in view of this explanation, the provisions of Section 11 A proviso were not applicable and he further submits that in actual fact the products supplied by the appellant emerged out of their research activity and no excise duty was payable.

p. 104, margin B

Unnumbered paragraph

We are unable to agree with the learned counsel that what was supplied by the appellant would come within the meaning of the expression "that the goods are produced during the carrying out of experiments or research". It is quite obvious that the appellant had a technical expertise to manufacture sophisticated equipment on the orders placed on it even though the appellant is a Research & Development Organisation. As a result of its research it had acquired sufficient acumen to be able to manufacture the equipment tailormade for the use of the purchaser. The equipment so manufactured in supply cannot be regarded as being a product of research.

p. 104, margin D

Unnumbered paragraph

We, however, agree with the learned counsel for the appellant that on the facts of the present case, the extended period of limitation would not apply. Our attention has been drawn to the fact that the main object as per the Memorandum of ~s.~ociat\on ~hereby the appellant was established, was to carry out research etc. Furthermore, by letter dated 12th July, 1988, the Department of Electronics had recognised the appellant as a research and development unit. A similar recommendation was also made on 7th May, 1991 by the Ministry of Science and Technology, Government of India. Such. recommendation entitled it to make imports from abroad without payment of customs duty. Under the circumstance, there is no reason to conclude that the appellant would not have believed that the goods manufactured by it and supplied were not liable for payment of excise duty. There does not appear to be any tangible basis for the Department to come to the conclusion that there was wilful suppression for evasion of duty by the appellant. This being so, while duty was leviable on the goods manufactured by the appellant the Department, however, could not invoke the extended period of limitation of five year under Section I IA of the Act.

pp. 104–105, margin F

Unnumbered paragraph

For. the aforesaid reasons, this appeal is allowed R.P. Appeal allowed ..

p. 105, margin B