STATE OF WEST BENGAL versus BEJOY KUMAR BOSE ETC. ETC.

GosWAMI, J. CThese appeals by certificate are from the common • judgment of the alcutta High Court of 28th May, 1975 disposing of three Criminal Misc. Revisions Nos. 304, 318 and 371 of 1975. There is a common quemon of law and will be disposed of by this judgment.

p. 383, margin E

Briefly the facts are as follows :

p. 383, margin E

A complaint was made against the accused by Shri J. F. C. Mc. Mohan, Dock Manager, Calcntta Port Commissioners, to the South Port Police Station alleging offences under Sections 120-B/420/379/ 466/468/471. IP.C. against several accused including the respondents who happened to be public: servants at the material time, The State Government issued a Notification No. 3165-.J on 8-4-1970 under Section 4 of the West Bengal Criminal Law Amendment (Special Courts) Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) allotting the said case for trial to the Third. Additional Special Court, Calcutta constituted under the provisions of the said Act for trial of the offences mentioned in the· schedule to that Act. There is no dispute about the particular order of allotment of the case to the Special Court under the said Act. Folio.wing the Notification of April 8, 1970 the State of West Bengal through Ranajit Roy, Snb-Jnspector of Police, filed a complaint before the Third Additional Special Court, CalcuttaJ on 11-9-1970 detailing all the allegations against the accused and indicating the material facts that transpired in the course of thei invostigation of the case. The Special Court J u<lge after perusal of the complaint and hearing the Public ProSC1:Utor took cognizanc:e of the case under Section1 409 /109 and 409 /34, I.P.C. which ate offe!lC!li m011tioned in the schedule of th• Act. The learned Jndge thereupon issued processes against the respondent and other accused.. In due conrse trial commenced. The prosecution after examining witnesses closed its case on May 2, 1974,

pp. 383–384, margin E

7" The Court framed charges against four accused including the respondent and discharged the remaining two accused by a lengthy order with reasons on 26-2-1975. Charges were framed under various sections. including Sections 409 & 420 read with 120-B, I.P.C. . The respondent moved the Calcutta High Court in revisioa for quashing the trial on March 25, 1975. The High Court allowed the Petition on 28th of May, 1975 and grant.eel certificate to appeal to this Court under Article 134 (I) ( c) of the Constitution on March 26, 1976. Hence these appeals.

p. 384, margin A

The High Court accepted the contention of the respondoot that no legal and valid cognizance of the offence was taken by the learned Jndge, Special Court and, therefore, the entire proceedings became vitiat.ed and hence were quashed. The. High Court in disposing of the matte.in this way followed two earlier Division Bench decisions of the said Court in Sudhir Chandra Bhattacharjee vs. The State, Criminal Appeals Nos. 23 to 26 of 1961 decided on 29th March, 1967 and Sftyama Saran Das Gupta vs. The State, decided on 11th April, 1975.

p. 384, margin C

The question that falls for decision in these appeals relates to the cognizance of the offences by the Special Jndge. .under the Act. A~ the preamble shows, the Act provides for too more speedy trial-and more effective punishment of certain offences specified in the schedule thereto. Section 4( 1) of the Act provide.~ that notwithstanding anything contained ·in the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 or in any 0U1ec liiw, the offences specified in the schedule shall be triable by Special Courts only : Provided that when trying any case a Special Court may also try any offence other than an offence specified in the schedule, with which the accnsed may under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, be charged with the same trial. There is, however, 110 dispute that the offences charged are exclusively triablB by the Special Court.

p. 384, margin D

Section 5 of the Act which is material for onr purpose may be read :

p. 384, margin F

"A Special Court may take cognizance of offences, in the marmer laid down in clauses (a) & (b) of sub-se.ction ( l) of Section 190 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 without the accnsed being committed to his Court fOr trial, and in trying the accused persons, shall follow the procedure pres" cribed by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, for the trial of warrant cases by Magistrates, instituted otherwise than

p. 384, margin F

a police report." This Section underwent some changes by two amendments in 1956 and· 1960. Prior to the amendments, Section 5 (1) did not contain the words "in the manner laid down in clauses (a) & (b) of sub-section (I) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898" and the words "instituted otherwise than on a notice renort." We are not concemed in tbei;e. appeals with the amendment of 1956 by which the words "instituted· otherwise than on a police report'' were inserted.

p. 384, margin G

It may be of interest to nota that in a case under the unamended section before the Special Court this Court had to deal with the question of cognizance canvassed before it in Ajit Kumar Pah't vs. State of West Bengal('). This Court held on the terms of the provisions of the unamended section 5(1) of the Act as follows :-

p. 385, margin A

"The word "cognizance" has no esoteric or mystic signi- . ficance in criminal law or procedure. It merely means-become aware of and when used with reference to a Court or Judge, to take notic2 of judicially. It was stated in Gopal Marwari v. Emperor( by the learned Judges of the Patna High Court in a pass11ge quoted with approval by this Court in R. R. Chari v. State of Uttar Pradesh(") that the word, 'cognizance' was used in the Code to indicate the point when the Magistrate or Judge takes judicial notice of an offence and th&t it was a word of indefinite import, and is not perhaps always used in exactly the same sense. As observed in Emperor v. Sourindra Mohan Chuckcrbutty('), "taking cogniz.allce does not involve any formal action; or indeed action of any kind, but occurs as soon as a Magistrate, as such, applies his mind to the suspected commission of an offence." ...... It appears to us therefore that as soon: as a special judge receives the orders of allotment of the calle passed by the State Government it becomes vested witk jurisdiction to try the case and when lt receives the record from the Government it can apply its mind and issue notice to the accused and thus start the trial. of the proceedings assigned to it by the State Gov611Ulloo.t."

p. 385, margin A

The above decision of this Court could have concluded the matt«, but it is pointed out by Mr. A. K. Sen, appearing on beha.lf of the ·respondent that in view of the amendment of: Section 5 ( 1) of the Act by the West Bengal Act XXIV of 1960 introducing the words "in, the manner laid down in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (I) of Section 190 of the Code of Criminal ProcedW'e, 1898", the legal position has completely changed. He submits that it is now obligatory for the Special Judge to examine the complainant wider Seeton 200, Cr.P.C. prior to taking cognizance of the offence. Since in the present case, proceeds the argument of Mr. Sen, the Special Judge took cognizanoo merely on the complaint of the Sub-Inspector of Police without proceedin)! in accordance with Section 200, Cr.P.C., the entire proceeding.~ are vitiated.

p. 385, margin E

We are unable to accede to. the above submission of Ml'. Sen. It is true that the amendment has introduced the manner of taking oognfaance in a=dance with Section 190(1) (.a) & (b). Cr. P.C. appearing in Chapter XV of the Criminal Procedure Code, 11$98, but the legislature in this ruuendh1ent, at the samn time, has advisedly omitted to include (l) [1963] Supp. (I) S.C.R .. 953 at 965-966. (2) A.l.R. 1943 Pat. 245. (3) {1951'] S.C.R, 312, 320. (4) [1910] 1.L.R. 37 Cal. 412, 416. Section 200, Cr.P.C. and the oilier provisions of the next Chapter which is Chapter XVI dealing with "complaints to Magistrates".

pp. 385–386, margin F

It is clear that under Section 4(2) of .the Act, the allotment by the State Government to the Special Judge of a case involving of scheduled offences vests the necessary jurisdiction in,· the Special Judge to proceed to trial and is, therefore, equivalent to that Court's taking cognizance of the offence (See Ajit Kuma1' Pa/it's case (Supra). Because of the amendment of Section 5 (2) in 1960, it may be now open to the Special Judge to apply his judicial mind to the complaint apart from allotment of the case in order to come to a decision as to whether he is satisfied on the materials laid before him at that stage to take cngnizance of the offence and proceed to trial. If he chooses to examine the complainant' or any witnesses before issuing process against any accused, there is nothing in law to prevent him from doing so. If he doe not do so and is satisfied on perusal of the complaint after allotment of the case by the Government that an offence has been disclosed against definite persons, no valid objection could bti taken against his taking cognizance on the written complaint without complying with the provision of Section 200;Cr.P.C. No grievance can be made then that the Special Judge has not examined the complainant under Section '.!00, Cr.P.C. prior to issuing of process.

p. 386

Section 200, Cc.P.C., in terms, comes into play after taking cognizance of an offence by a Magistrate (See Gopal Das Sina/ii and othe,.s v. State of Assam and another('). There is, therefore, i10 merit in the 5ubmission that taking cognizance of the offence in this case is invalid for which thel whole trial is vitiated.

p. 386, margin C

The words "in.the manner laid down in clauses {a) and (b) of Sub- 5ection (1) of Section 190 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898" do not automatically introduce the provisions of Section 200, cr.P.C. of Chapter XVI, nor do the above words in Section 5(2) of the Act mandatorily compel the Special Judge to resort to the provisiom of Chapter XVI.

p. 386, margin C

Apart from this, Chapter XVI in terms refers to "complaints to Magistrates" and thereby excludes Special Judges who are to be guided by the special provisions of the specW Act in the matters provided therein. There is nothing in Section 5 ( 1) of the Act even after the amendment in 1960 to compel the Special Judge to comply witll the provisions of Section 200, Cr.P .C.

p. 386, margin E

The objection of the rei:pondents to the trial i• on the •core of the invalidity of the cognizance taken by the Special Judge on perusal of the written complaint after allotment of the case by the Government for the sole reason that the complainant had not bee!1i examined under Section 200, Cr.P.C. prior to issuing of process. The objection is dearly untenable for the reasons given above.

p. 386, margin F

The appeals are, therefore, allowed and th6 judgment of the Hirh Coort is set aside. Since the case is an old one, trial before the Special Judge shall be expedited: i.R. Jf.pp~lils arlowed.

p. 386, margin G

(1) A.I.R. 1961 S.C., 986, ~88 & 989.

p. 386, margin H