Supreme Court of India
VINEET KUMAR versus MANGAL SAIN WADHERE
- Decided
- 5 January 1984
- Judges listed
- A.P. SEN
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
Citations
- Official
- [1984] 2 S.C.R. 333 · 1984 INSC 6
- Also cited as
- (1984) 3 SCC 352
- AIR 1985 SC 817
Learned from how other judgments cite this one, in their text or in the official Supreme Court Reports' lists of cases they refer to: each is cited this way by at least two judgments, and at least twice as often as any other citation to this judgment in that report. We hold no commercial reporter's text, only these citation strings.
- Not shown
- 1 other citation string that other judgments attach to this one, on evidence too thin or too divided to publish.
Cited by
Cited in 10 other Supreme Court judgments we hold. The 5 most recent:
- LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA versus SANJEEV BUILDERS PRIVATE LIMITED & ANR.
- SHANKARLAL NADANI versus SOHANLAL JAIN
- SOUTH KONKAN DISTILLERIES & ANR. versus PRABHAKAR GAJANAN NAIK & ORS.
- SHRI MUNDRI LAL versus SMT. SUSHILA RANI AND ANR.
- MUNI LAL versus THE ORIENTAL FIRE AND GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD. AND ANR.
Counted only in the Supreme Court judgments we hold whose text we could read, not in High Court judgments. We match each citation to a judgment automatically, so a citation we cannot match is not counted. "Cited" says only that a judgment refers to this one, not whether it followed, distinguished or overruled it.
The Court's text
Paragraphs from our copy of the Supreme Court Reports print, with the Court's own paragraph numbers, the printed page and, where printed, the margin letter. The Court did not number this judgment's paragraphs, so they are listed by page. Link to paragraph N with #para-N.
MISl\A, J. The present appeal by special ·!eave.is.directed against the ju~gnient of the High' C'ourt of Aliaha'!iad dated· 20th July, 1983 disposing of a revisi~n under s.25 of the Small Causes C~urt Act arising out of suit for eviction of the appellant from the premises in suit. · ' - · · ·
p. 335, margin E
The respondent filed a suit for ~viction and for arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation pendente lite and future.on.the allegation that the appellant was inducted as a tenant of the premises in suit on a monthly rent of Rs. 250 on. 7fh F~bruary, 1972, that · the building .in suit was constructed in 1971 under the co-operative housing scheme of the State Bank of India for whkh the Bank advanced Joan. T.he building in suit was assessed to house'artd water tax 'on !st October, !,971 and as such the buildin,g was ilot covered. by the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent ·and Eviction) · Act, 1972 (hereinafter· referred to as the New Rent Act for short), :and that the defendant defaulted in the payment of rent despite notice . dated 24th March, 1977. The Respondent therefore terminated the. · tenancy of the appellant.
p. 335, margin F
The clai111 was resisted by the appellant on the ground that the building in question was constructed in J968 and that it wa.s covered by the new Rent Act. His•flirther stand was th.at rent. had been cleared upto 6th April, 1977 and th~re was no default in ihe payment of rent. He also challenged the service and the validity of the notice termiilati11g his tenancy. Tlie appellani also claimed;he adjustment ·of Rs. 1000 spent by him towards the repairs of the premises. By a later amend.men! it was further pl~aded that the plaint having not been amended so as to bring the ~uit under the provisions of1he new Rent Act the suit was barrnd by s.20 ·of the Act.
p. 336, margin A
The. Third Additional District Judge negatived the defence and decreed the suit for eviction as also foT recove·ry of arrears of rent and damages for use and oceur.ation. Ti1e learned Judie held ·that thebuilding was exempt from the o-peration of the nrw Re.nt Act on two grounds. The first ground was based upon ·sub-s.(2) of s.2 which provides th,it nothing in this Act shall apply to. a building durii1g the period. of ten. years. from the date on which its construction is completed. The second ground. wJs based upon the proviso to sub-s. (2) .of s.2,' which ·contemplates that where a huildii1g has ·been constructed substantially out of funds by way of loan or advance from the. State Government, or. Life Insurance ·Corporation of India or a bank or a co-operative society,· and the· period ·or repayment' of such · loan or advance.exceeds the aforesaid period of ten years, then reference in this sub-section to a period of ten years shall be deemed to be a reference to a period of fifteen years or the period ending .with the date of actual repayment of . each loan or advance,. including° interest, whichever is shorter. As the last instalment of the loan was paid in Ma.rch 1981. instead of ten years the building should be fifteen years old to attract the provisions bf the new Rent Act. He also held th'!t the appeUant !md failed to prove that he spent ·Rs. 1000 towards repairs of the premises. The learned Judge overruled the other pleas of the appellant and decreed .the suit as prayed for.
p. 336, margin C
The appellant feeling aggrieved preferred a revision in the High Court. It was contended for the appellant that th.e building in question had been constructed by a co-operative society and the landlord had ·purchased it from the society and, therefore, the view taken by the ·learned Judge that the building was constructed substantial!y out of funds obtained rr;m. the sources mentioned in the proviso to s.2(2) of. the new Rent Act was manifestly erro11eous. The High Court, however, did not express any concluded opinion . and rest contended by observing that it was not 1iecessary to examine· the suqmission in any detail or to express any cllncluded opinion abo.ut it for disposal of the present revision. The High Court, however, accepting the finding or' the learned Additional Distric\ Judge that. the. building in question wiU be dec;ncd to have been completed on I st October, 1971, the date of assessment of house tax and water tax held that the ·building was not ten years old on. the date.of the suit and. therefore, the new Rent Act had n.o applica\ion to the building iii suit and the appellant cannot get any protection of tlle new Rent Act.
pp. 336–337, margin F
The High Co.urt confirmed the findings of the trial Court on all other points except the finding about the arrears of rent. In the 9pinion of the High Court admittedly a sum of Rs. 1000- had been paid by the appellant to the landlord through a crossed cheque dated !6th August, 1976 which was received by the landlord on .15th September, 1976.. 13ut when the plaintiff was in the witness box payment by cheque was not specifically plit lo him and it has noc been esta~ blished as to for which period the payment by cheque was made. The counter-foil of the cheque book also did- not specify the period for which this payment by cheque was made. The High Court, however, did not endorse the fir1ding of the Additional District Judge that the payment through the cheque may have been made by the appellant towards rent for some period. prior to April 7; 1976 and held it to be manifestly erroneous and •without any . basis.
p. 337, margin B
In the result High Court allowed the 'appeal in part and· set aside.the decree of the trial court relating to the recovery of Rs. '3158-30 as arrears of rent for the period between.AJ?ril 7, 1976 and April 25, 1977 and remanded the case to _the trial court for redetern1ination of the amount of rent in arrears payable by the appellant after affording opportunity to 'the plaintiff to explain the .payment of the amount of Rs. 1000- .through cl1eque dated A.ugust 16, 1976. The-trial court was further directed to afford opporiuuity to the parties to adduce further evidence in regard to this aspect. · ·
p. 337, margin D
The appellant has now approached this Court with an ~pplication for special leave to appeal.
p. 337, margin G
On the date of summary hearing of the applicati6i1 under Art 136 of the Constitution.we granted special leave and with the consent of the coup.sel for t\te parties .,ye finally :heard the appeal to obviate . further delay. · • '.
pp. 337–338, margin G
. .
p. 338
SUPREME couR.t REPORTS . [1984] 2 S.C.R. 338
p. 338
· The only point argued before this Court is. whether the. premises which was not ten years' old on the date of the suit and was exempted from the oper.ation of the new .Rent AC!, ca'n be governed by it if ten years. expired during the pendency of the litigation. In order -to appreciate the co~te'htion of the parties it will be relevent at this stage_ to refer to s. 2 of the new rent Act. It· pertinently reads : • ,
p. 338, margin A
"2. ·Exemption fr'Om oper~tion of Act.-(1) nothing in this. Act shall apply to-- (a) . . . . .. ' .... (b) . . . . . . . ..... (c) .. . . . . . . . . . . (d) ............ (e) . . . . . . . . . . . . . (f) ··any building built and held by' a society registered under the Societies· registration Ac( 1860 (Act No. LVIIT of 1860) or by a co-operative society, company orfi.rm and intended solely for its own occupation or for the occupation of any of its officers or servants, whether on rent ot free. of rent, or as a guest house, by whatever. name ca~d, for the occupation of persons having dealings
p. 338, margin A
with it in the ordinary course of business.· · (2) Except as provided in sub-secti~n (5) of Section. 12, sub-section.(IA-) of section 21; sub'section (2) of Section 24, Sections 2.4-A, 24-B, :>4-C or su_b-section (3) of Section 29, n<;ithing in this Act .shall apply to a building during a period of ten years froin the date .on which its construction is completed : · · Provided that where any·· building is constructed substantially out of funds obtained by way of 10an or advance froin the Sta~e Government or the Life Insurance Corporation oflndia or a bank or a co-operative society or the Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam Vika:s Parishad, and 'the ,period of · repayment of such _loan or advance exceeds the aforesaid period .. of ten years then the referenc;e in this sub-section to the period often years shan be deemed to be a reference to the period of fifteen years or the -period ending with the date of actua~repayment of each loan or advance·(including interest),. whichever. is shorter. ·
p. 338, margin D
.. v . . (Misra, J.) . Explanation J.-For the purposes of this sub-section,- (a) the construction of a building shall be deemec! to have been completed on the date. on which the completion thereof is reported to or otherwise recorded by the local authority having jurisdiction and in, the case ofa buiJ-· . ding subject to assessment; the date on which th.e first assessrnent thereof .comes into effect and where the · said dates are different, the earliest ~f the said dates, and in the ab's.ence of any such 'report, record _or assessment, the date on. which it. is actually occupied (not . including ·occupation merely· for the purposes of supervising the. construction or guarding the building under constructtion) for th~ first time :
p. 339
Provided that there may be different dates of completio.n of construction .. in· respec.t of different parts of a ·building which are .either designed as separate units ~ or are occupied separately by the landlord and one or more ·tenants or by. different tenants ; Explanation IL- .................................... . Explanation Jil.-A building shall be qeemeci to be con. structed substantiaJly out ·of funds obta.ined from sources mentioned in the p1:oviso, if the funds obtain.ed from one or more of such .sources account for more than one-half of the cost of construction."
p. 339, margin C
Section 2 of tlie Act provides various kinds of buildings. to which the new Rent Act has no application. Sub-sectio'n (2) of contemplates tha.fthe new Rent Act.will not apply to a building during. a period of ten years from the date oti. which its construciion is com- . ·pleted. · Explanation I to sub-s. (2) enumerate~ the dates o~ which the building shall be deemed to have been completed :- (i) The date on which the completion thereof. is reported to or otherwise recorded by' the local authority having
p. 339, margin C
. jurisdiction. · (ii) In case of °building subject to assessment, that date on ·
p. 339, margin G
which. the first assessment there~.f eornes into effect. (iii) Where ihe said d·ate~ are different, the earliest of the said.
p. 339, margin G
dates.
p. 339, margin H
.. • (iv) Tn the absence of any such report, record or asse.ssment · the date on which it is actually occupied for the first ..
pp. 339–340, margin H
·time:
p. 340, margin A
Tn the case in hand the·building was subject to assessment therefore it will be deemed.to have been completed on the.date of assessment which was lst October, 1971.· The Additional District Judge has found that the ·building will ·be deemed'to have been completed. on the date of assessment of the house \vhich been accepted by the High Court. ' · •
p. 340, margin A
The moment a building becomes ten years old to be reckoned from the date of completion. the. new Rent Act wot1ld become applicable. Admittedly· the building was not. ten years old on the date of suit. But during th2. pendenc:y of the litigation it complet'd ten years .. Then the question arises whether the new Rent Act will be attracted the building completes ten years during the course of litigation. The Additional District· Judge decided tlic case .on 23rd February 1982: By that time the building in question had completed ten years.
p. 340, margin B
. The trial court. however, relying on a recent decision of this Court -in Om Prakash Gupta. v .. Dig Vijandrapa!. Gupta"' refused to apply the new Rent Act to ihe building in question. Tn that case a contention was raised that the building will be deemed to have been constructed on the date of occupation on 16th June, 1967 and not on the date of the first assessment and if that be so, the appellant would be entitled to the bei1efit of s.39 of the Act on the. date when the revision came to b~ decided by the High Cofot on 23rd March, 1978. This ·cot1rt, however, held that it is the date of the first assessme11t which will be deemed to be the date of completion of the c6nstruction in the circumstances of the case and in that view of the matter tile buildirtg · had not becom' more than ten years old on the date when the revision came to be decided by the. High Court and, therefore, there was no question of giving the benefit of s.3? of the Act to the appellant .It was not al'.all necessary in .that case. deal the question \Vhe1her _the appellant would be entitled to the benefit of s.39 as the building had not beco1ne ten years old on .'the date when the reviSion· petition was heard. Jn the insta1lt case, however, the bniJding had become more thah _ten yea)"s old durii1g the pendency of the l_igitation_ and, t!1erefo_re, th~ questio1~ assumes importance the present case, . (I) [1982t 2 S.C.C. 61.
p. 340, margin D
It may be argued that the Court had to decide the case on the basis of cause of actwn that accrued prior to the date .of filing .the suit and not on a new. cause of action, bui this question need nc5t detain us as it· is coveted by decision of this Cour! in Pasupati
p. 341, margin A
01 Venkates1~ar/11 v. Motor and General T'rade~s Dealing with a similar· question this Court observed :
p. 341, margin A
· "It is basic to our processual jurisprudence that the right to relief .must be judged to exist as on the date a suitor ins· titutes the legal proceeding. Equally clear is the principle that procedure is th,. ha.ndmaid and not the mistress of the judicial process. ff fact, arising after the /is has come to eourt and has a fundamental impact on the right to relief or the manner of moulding it, if brought diligently to the J10tice of the tribunal, it cannot blink at it or be blind to events which· stultify or render 'inept the decretal remedy. Equity justifies bending the rules of procedure, where no specific provision or fairplay is not violated, with a·view to p~omote substirntial justice'-;subject, of course to the absence of.other disentitling . factors or just Circun1stances. ·Nor can .ve. conteniplate any 'limitation .·ori this power to take note of updated facts to confine it to the fria·I Court.. Tf the litigation pends, the power exists, abs·ent . other special cirCu1nstances· ~epeliing r1JSort to that course in law or ju_stice. Rulings on this ·point are ·1egiC?n, even as situations for applications of this equitable · rule are myriad. We affirm the' propositi.on that for maki1rnthc, right or remedy claimed ".by the party just and meaningful as also legally and. factually in accord with the current realities. the Court ·can, and in many cases must. take cautious cong"' n.i.sancc of events and developments subseq,,uent to the institu-. tion of the proceeding provided the r~les of fairness to both sid~s are scrupulously o.bey~d. "·
p. 341, margin A
Normally amendment is not allo;,.ed ·if it changes the cause o( action. But it is well reco.gnised that where th.e aine~1dment .does not COllStitute an addition of a llC\V cause ·of action, or raise a· new , case; but amounts to no more than adding to ·the facts already on the record the amendment, would be allowed even after the statutory period of· lin1itation. Th~ questiqn in the present case is .whether by seeking the· benefit of s,39 or the new Aci there . is a ·Change ·in ·the cause of action. A.K. Gupta & Sons. Da111odar s.c.c.
p. 341, margin E
10 Valley C;rpor~iion this Court dealing with the catis.e of action observed as foilows :
p. 342, margin A
"The expression "cause of action" il) the· present context· does llOt mean" every fae\ which it· is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to .succeed". as was said in Cooks v . . Gi/l in a differentcontext,. for if it were so. no material fact
p. 342, margin A
could evei: be amended or ·added and, of course, no one
p. 342, margin A
I. would want to. cha.nge or add an immaterial allegation by· amendment. That 'expression for the. present purpose only means, a new clai,m made on a new liasi~ co.nslituteci by new . facts. Such a .view was taken in Rabinson v. Unicos Property Corporation LtJ.<3l and it seems to us to be the only possible view t~ take. Any oth~.r view would make. the rule futile."
p. 342, margin A
The appellant' in th~ present case only seeks the protedion of the new Rent .Act whith becanie applicable to the premises in question ·during .the pendency of the litigation:· We. see no reason why the benefit of the new Rent Act be not given to the a ppelJant. · Section 20 of the new 'Rent Act provides a· bar to a suit for .eviction of'a tenant except on the specified grounds as provided in. the sect.ion. Sub·
p. 342, margin C
section (4) of s.20 stipulates that in a;ny suit for eviction on the grounds .. mep'tioned in cl, (a) to sub·S. {2),•.viz. the arrears of n;nt, if af the first hearing of the suit the tenant in default pays all arrears of rent .to the landlord or deposits. in court the entire. an1ount of rent and damages for use and occupation oft.he building due from him, such domages for use and occupation being· calculated· at th.e same rate as rent together with inter~st' thereon at the rate of nine per cent per 'tnnum and the land.lord's. cost of the suit in rcspeet thereof after . deducting there froin any amount al<eady deposited by the tenant under sub·s .. (I) ·of s.30, the court' may, in lieu of passing a decree for eviction on that ground, pass ail order relieving the tenant against · his Fab'iity for eviction ·on. that' ground .. Sections 39 and 40.of the new rent Act. also indicate that the.-bcnefit of the new Act will be · given to. the. tenant' if the conditions contemplated in. those sections are satisfied. ·Section 39 also indicates that 'the parties are entitled to ·make necessary arriendment in thei:r· pleadings and to adduce addi~ . tional evidence where necessary.' ·
p. 342, margin C
. ' .
p. 342, margin G
For the reasons given above the appeal must' succeed, It is accordingly allowed in par\ and_ the· judgment and 'decree of the High (1) [1966] I S.C.R. 796. , (2) [1873] LR B C.P. 107, 117 [1962] All. E.·R. 24. Court is set aside in so far as it relates io eviction but ihe judgment of the High Court setting aside the decree for arrears of rent and remanding the case to the trial court remains intact, and the case is sent back to th.e III Additional District Judge who will apply the new· Rent Act and give the protection of the new Act to .the appellant and wi11 give him an opportunity to deposit the dues contemplated by s.39 of the new rent Act after firsi determining whether any amoµnt is due from the appellant towards rent as directed by the High Court. ·The costs here will abide the result. S. R. Appeal alfowed in part.
pp. 342–343, margin G