SMT. PADMINI KUNWAR JU SAHIBA versus STATE OF VINDHYA PRADESH. (NOW MADHYA PRADESH)

W J.-This is an appeal on a certificate . . granted by the Judicial Commissioner of Vindhya.

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p d h Th b. ff fi ra es . e rte acts necessary or present purposes are these: The appellant filed a petition under Art. 226 of the. Constitution praying that the order of the Deputy Commissioner, Panna, issued on December 29, 1953, to the effect that the appellant's rights in certain villages would be resumed from January l, 1954, in pursuance of the notification of the Government of Vindhya Pradesh dated December 20, 1953, under s. 5 of the Vihdhya P~adesh Abolition of Jagirs and Land Reforms Act, No. XI of 1952 (~ereinafter called the Act) resuming all jagirs with a gross annual :ncome of Rs. 1,000/- or above, be quashed. The appellant's case was that she was granted as a special case a Lambardari·lease in certain villages by His Highness the Maharaja of Panna on December 7, 1945, for a period of thirty years and had been in possession thereof in accordance with the terms of the lease. The appellant contended that she. was not· a jagirdar within the meaning of the Act and thus the said notification did not apply to her lands and the order issued by the Deputy Commissioner under the said notification was therefore without the authority of law and liable to be quashed. She contended further that she was not a jagirdar under any law, rules, regulations or orders governing jagirdars irl force in any part of the State, and therefore her lands could not be resumed in the manner in which the resumption-had been made.

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The petition was opposed on behalf of the State and it was contended that the appellant was a jagirdar within the meaning of that term in the Act. The learned Judicial Commissioner held that the appellant was an Ijaredar and therefore a jagirdar within the meaning of s. 2 (1) (c) of the Act. In oonsequenoe he dismissed the petition. An application was then ma.de for a certificate to appeal to th!a,Court, which was granted and that is how the appeal has come up before us.

p. 908

The only q uestiou that falls for our decision is whether the appellant can be said to be an Ijareda,r within the meaning of s.·2 (1) (c) of the Act. A "ja.girdar " is defined in s. 2 ( 1) ( c) a.s meaning "any person recognised as a J agirdar under any law, rules, regulations or orders governing Jagirde.rs in force in any part of the State and ineludes an .Ilakedar, a Pawaidar, a sub-Pawaidar (in direct relation with the Government or otherwise), an Ijaredar, au Ubaridar, a Zamindar, a Muafidar and a Grantee of Jagir land from a Jagirdar." "Jagir land" is defined ins. 2 (I) (d) as meaning" any land in which or in relation to which any jagirdar has rights as such in respect of land revenue or any other kind. of revenue." Under s. 5 of the Act it is provided that "as soon as may· be after the commencement of this Act, the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint a date for the resumption of any class of jagir lands and different dates may be appointed for different classes of jagir-111-nds. " It was under this provision that the notification resuming je.gir-lands with a gross annual income of Rs. 1,000/- or above was issued.

pp. 908–909

It is not in dispute that the lands were not granted to the appellant by the Ruler of Panua as a. jagir. It is also not in dispute that the appellant was not recognized as a. jagirdar under any law, rules, regulations or orders governing jagirda.rs in force in any pa.rt of the State. The contention on behalf of the State was that the appellant is included in the inclusive pa.rt_ of the definition of the word "jagirdar" in s. 2 (1) (c) as she was an Ijaredar. Now the words used in the inclusive part of the definition have not been defined anywhere in the Act. It appears that some of those. words are words of common use while others are not. For example, the Rewa. Land Revenue and Tenancy Code deals with a Pawaidar, a sub.Pawaidar and Ilakedar who is a big Pawaidar. It is not clear whether the ot.her words used in the inclusive part of the definition of" jagirdar" appear in any other laws in force in the various States which amalgamated to form the State. of Vindhya Pradesh, though the word "Ubarida.r" appears to be somewhat uncommon and must have Rome special local significance. It will

p. 909

therefore be not unreasonable to hold tha.t where these . . words used in the inclusive pa.rt of the definition appear in a.ny la.w in force in a,;y part of the State, they must have tha.t meaning; but if they do not a.ppea.r in any such law they must be given their ordinary meaning. The Judicial Commissioner in his judgment says that" an Ijaredar a.s such has not been defined under any la.w relating to la.nd revenue a.nd tenancy in force in any pa.rt of Vindhya Pradesh." Therefore, the word "lja.redar" must be given its ordinary meaning. Now the ordinary meaning of the word "Ija.ra" from which the word "lja.reda.r" is derived is a. lease or farm ~f land revenue or other proprietary right a.s distinguished from a patta or lease of la.nd for cultivation, though sometimes it is used to indicate just a. lease of la.nd of any kind. The question then is wha.t meaning should be given to the word "Ija.redar ... ins. 2 (1) (c) of the Act. We are of opinion that considering the setting in which the word "Ija.redar " has been used in the section, it must ta.ke colout from it a.nd cannot be held to mean a.ny lease of la.nd of whatever .kind. In the setting in which the word is used it should in our opinion be confined to person holding a.n Ija.ra which is a. lease. or farm of la.nd revenue or other proprietary right a.s distinguished from other kinds of leases of land.

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The next question is whether the lease in this particular case is a. lease of la.nd revenue or other proprietary right as distinguished from lease of la.nd of other kinds. The lease in the present ca.se is called a. La.mbarda.ri lease, though it a ppea.rs tha.t the system of La.mba.rda.ri leases wa.s abolished in the State of .l:'a.nna long ago a.s a.ppea.rs from pa.ragra.ph (2) of Cha.p. II of the Revenue Administration Ma.nua.l of the Pa.nna. State prepared by J. E. Goudge, Settlement Officer, Bundelkha.nd States, in 1907. It ha.s been stated in tha.t pa.ragra. ph tha.t " th~ system of La.mba.rda.ri lea.see ha.a been abolished a.nd rents will in future be realised by the Da.rbar direct from· ea.ch tenant through the za.minda.rs of the village." Za.minda.r in tha.t a.rea. is a petty village official for the purpose of collecting rents a.nd has no interest in the la.nd from which he collects rent. It does appear from this paragraph that a La.mbardari lease originally was a kind of of land revenue; but such leases were abolished in area. from which this case comes long ago. It is that this lease is ca.lied a Lam bardari lease but mere name will not matter and we have to see whether this was a lease of land revenue.

pp. 910–911

This brings us to the terms of the lease. The starts by saying that the villages given in lease an average annual income of Rs. 1,242/4/· payable two instalments in the months of June and December. The lease is to last for thirty years and the lessee to pay the entire amount (namely, Rs. 1,242/4/-) lease money which will remain the same. for the whole period of thirty yea.rs. The lease also provides that within this t.ime any settlement is made and revenue is increased or the Lambardar increases income by inhabiting the villages, the La.mbardar herself will be entitled to reap this additional benefit. The lease further provides that if for any reason rent of land is decreased then the Lambardar will be entitled to any decrease in the lease money. clear from these terms that the Lambardar stood to gain nothing by this lease and no part of the revenue was left to her except where there was increase in revenue on account of a future settlement. The lease further provides that if during the period lease the Lambardar makes any improvements, i.e., plants, groves and orchards, makes bandhB and bandhia (i.e., large and small dams) she will be entitled at end of the lease to sell or mortgage them and benefit of the improvements will go to her. Lastlyand this is an important term of the lease-it provided that the lessee's right to mortgage and sell lands will be governed by the laws of the State the law is amended afterwards it will be governed the amended laws. These clauses in the lease clearly show that what the appellant was getting was merely a lease of land revenue but actual rights lands including the right to cultivate them herself. Reading therefore the lease as a whole it does appear that it is a mere lease of land revenue or proprietary right. It is something more and actually gives the lessee the right to a.II lands which were not in the a.ctua.l cultivation of tenants at the time of the lease. The lessee wa.s entitled to make improvements, to plant groves and orchards and to make dams- large and sma.11. She was a.lso entitled to mortgage a.nd sell the lands .which she might bring into her own cultivation in a.ccorde,nce with the Ia ws of the State. It is difficult under the circumstance• to hold that this wa.s a mere Ija.ra and the appellant was a mere Ija.redar within the meaning of that word as mentioned above. There is a certain element of lease of Ia.nd revenue in this lease though that was not likely to bring any profit to the appellant;. but the lease is much more than a mere ljara of this kind and actually confers on the appellant rights in land not in the a.ctn ii cultivation of the tenants at the time of the lease. In the circumstances we cannot agree with the learned J udicia.l Commissioner that the transaction evidenced by this lease is a mere Ijara in the sense explained above and the appellant is a mere Ijaredar who comes within. the meaning of that word in s. 2(l)(c). The lease in our opinion confers rights in lands a.nd is much more than an I jar a. In the circumstances the appellant cannot be held to be a mere ljaredar covered by the definition of that word as used in s. 2(l)(c). The case of the appellant in our opinion is similar to the case put forward in. Petition No. 392 of 1954 with respect to Khandela estate (see Thakur Amar Binghji v. St.ate of RajMthan(')). There also wa.s an Ijara or lease on payment of an a.nnua.l assessment of Rs. 80,00 I and it wa.s held that it was not covered by the terms of the Raja.sthan La.nd Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act. The present case in our opinion is similar and we are of opinioa that the lease granted in this ca.se cannot make the appellant a mere Ija.redar within the meaning of tha.t word ins. 2(l)(c). We therefore allow the ap}>t;lal and set aside the order of the Deputy Comm{ssioner resuming the appellant's villagPs. The appellant will get her costs from the State of Madhya Pradesh, which is the successor to the State of Vindhya Pradesh.

pp. 911–912

Appeal allowed. a ~07.

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