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Supreme Court of India

USHA HARSHAD KUMAR DALAL versus M/S. ORG SYSTEMS AND ORS.

Decided
6 January 2000
Judges listed
S.P. KURDUKAR, S.S.M. QUADRI (as the open data lists them; this may not name the whole bench)
Disposal
Dismissed

Citations

Official
[2000] 1 S.C.R. 57 · 2000 INSC 6
Not shown
1 other citation string that other judgments attach to this one, on evidence too thin or too divided to publish.

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The Court's text

Paragraphs from our copy of the Supreme Court Reports print, with the Court's own paragraph numbers, the printed page and, where printed, the margin letter. The Court did not number this judgment's paragraphs, so they are listed by page. Link to paragraph N with #para-N.

Unnumbered paragraph

Some of the J:.asic and admitted facts of the case before us are that under the Leave and Licence agreement dated September 7, 1970, the premises in question was given to Suhrid Geigy Trading Ltd. for peri9d of five years. This licence was never renew.:d. During the subsistence of this Leave and licence Agreement, Bombay Rent Act came to be amended · and such of the liccncees who were in possession pursuant to a valid !icence on 1st of February, ! 973 shall be deemed to have become the tenant of the landlord in rnspect of the premises or any part thereof in its possession (Section 15A inserted by Maharashtra 17of1973). When the Receiver took - the symbolic possession, Suhrid Geigy Trading Limited was in occupation and by virtue of section 15A of the Bombay Rent Act such a Licensee shall be deemed to be a tenant. The first respondent came in possession in 1979 pursuant to the amalgamation scheme approved by the Gujarat High Court on December 24, 1987. In view of these admitted facts the question is as to whether induction of tht: first respondent in the premises without leave of tht: court and/or without any intimation to the Court Receiver will be valid or otherwise. is well settkd principle that when a Court Receiver is appointed in rcspcct of any property it is said to be in custodia legis and court holds the property for the benefit of the true owner. The Court Rtcciv~r acts on behalf of the court. Even the court receiver will have no power to deal with such property without the leave of the court. It is the duty of the Court Receiver to maintain the status quo and also to protect the property from being put to waste or allow it to diminish its value. The Court Receiver cannot encumber the property in any manner without the leave of the court. lt is the obligation of the Court as well as the Court Receiver to preserve and maintain the property as far as possible and practicable in the same form when it was taken in possession. If these pnnciples are borne in mind, in our view, it is quite dear that when the possession of the property was taken by the Court Receiver in 1978, Suhrid Geigy Trading Limited was in occupation and the Court Receiver took symbolic possession thereof. It must be presumed that Suhrid Gcigy Trading Limited was very much aware of the appointment of the Court Receiver. In Anthony C. Leo's case (Supra) admittedly the tenant was in occupation of the premises before the Court Receiver took symbolic possession. The tcn;mt had committed certain breaches and had resorted to unauthorised and illegal activity prior to the filing of tht: civil suit. The landlord who had a cause of action under the Bombay Rent Act did not file any proceedings under the said Act for necessary reliefs before the appropriate forum. The landlord filed a suit on the original side of the Bombay High Court and got the Receiv..:r appointed for the suit property. In that suit the landlord took out a C..1t/S to evict tht: tenant on the gr~ttnd that he has committed bn:ach of lease agreement inasmuch it carried out construction of lofts and put up two stand-type boxes on the outer wall for storage of gas cylinders and air~conditioning units. In the Ch!S it was pray,;d that the Court Rt:c..:iver be din:ch:d to remove the said lofts and the said box-type stands. The High Court granted the relief to tht: landlord in the said Ch/S and it was against this order the tenant had filed the appeal in Court. Therefore, the admitted position that flows fromAnthony C. Leo's case is that the landlord had a cause of action before the filing of the civil suit in the High Court to initiate proceedings for appropriate reliefs under the Bombay Rent Act in the competent court but he did nut do so. When the Receiver came tu be appointed in the suit fiied by the landlord on the original side obviously he could nut have b.:tter rights to enforce the cause of action accrm:d under the Bombay Rent Act. It is in these circumstances this Court in paragraph 34 has observed as under :

pp. 64–66, margin F

Unnumbered paragraph

"34. lt appears to us that since the court must be presumed tu be fully unbiased in deciding the allegation of unauthorised and illegal activities of a tenant causing prt:judice against the lawful owner in the matter of preservation and maintenance of the property pendente lite, the necessity of ad.indication of such dispute by another court by bringing a legal action before it, as a matter of course, is neither necessary nor expedient. It, however, should be made clt:ar that if for the purpose of deciding the dispute of unauthorised and illt:gal activity afkcting maintenance and preservation of the property in custodia lt:gis it bi:comes necessary tu determine i:lllY right claimed under a statute or flowing from some action inter partes as may be pleaded and required to be decided, it is only d1::sirable that the court would refrain from such determination in the summary proceeding initiated before it on the complaint of the receiver or a party to the suit and the court will direct the receiver tu seek adjudication of the dispute bdon: a competent court by bringing appropriate legal action. Save as aforesaid, it will not be correct to contend that in no case the court exercising control and supervision of the property in suit by appointing a receiver will be incompetent even to pass direction against a third party for the purpose of preservation of th~ property, once such third p<>rty pleads defonce in justification of his action. The question of summary adjudication by the court appointing the receiver or relegating the receiver tu a regular suit for adjudication of the dispute concerning third party will depend on

p. 66, margin C

Unnumbered paragraph

the nature of dispute and the defence claimed by the third party."

p. 66, margin G

Unnumbered paragraph

The above observations in our opinion is the ratio of the judgment in Anthony C. Lev case (Supra) and it would not be correct to read the said judgment to mean that if the trespasser or any person who obtains the possession after the Receiver took over symbolic possession or actual possession of the property and if such person pleads that he is a tenant the only remedy fur the Court Receiver is to approach the Rent court under the Bombay Rent Act. For instance, a person who is put in possession as an agent of the Receiver inducts a strangt:r and if such a third person claims a tenancy the question is whether Receiver should be directed to adopt the proceedings under the Bombay Rent Act for appropriate declaration and reliefs. If such a course is n:quired to follow, in our opinion, the very object of Order XL Rule 1 & 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure would be defeated. The High Court in our opinion has totally misread and misinterpreted tht ratio of Anthony C. Leo's case (supra). We must, however, make it clear that we are not laying down a broad proposition that in every case the Receiver can resort to the summary proceeding of ilii~ nature. The question would have to be decided by the Court with reference to the pleadings of the parties and the proof thereof. On perusal of the judgment of the High Court we find that the High Court has not considered variow, rival contentions raised by the parties in their pleadings. The High Court has also nut considered the effect of non-renewal of the Leaw and Licence Agreement after the expiry of its period nor it had considered the effoct of Sections 15 and 15A of the Bombay Rent Act. The High Court has also not considered what would be the effect of changes · in the composition of Subrid Geigy Trading Limited after the Receiver took the symbolic possession. All these various factual and legal contentions will have to be considered bearing in mind the provisions of tht: Bombay Rent Act as well as Companies Act.

pp. 66–67, margin G

Unnumbered paragraph

Mr. C. Mukund, learned Advocate appearing for the first respondent, however, urged that the judgment in Anthony C. Leo's case (supra) squarely applies to the facts of the present case and the rights of the first respondent cannot be adjudicated by taking recourse to the summary proceedings. The Court Receiver if so advised may adopt the proper proceedings undt:r the Bombay Rent Act before the competent court. He urged that the judgment of the High Court does not call for interference. We see no substance in any of these contentions.

p. 67, margin F

Unnumbered paragraph

In the result the impugned judgment and order dated 8/9.12.1997 passt:d by the learned singlt: Judge of the High Court on Ch/S No. 436 of 1996 is quashed and set aside and the matter iF remitted back to the High Court for disposal in accordance with law.

pp. 67–68, margin G

Unnumbered paragraph

In the circumstance then: will be no order as to costs. R.C.K. Appeal dbposed of.

p. 68, margin A