Supreme Court of India
MR. 'G', A SENIOR ADVOCATE OF THE SUPREME COURT versus THE HONBLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND JUDGES OF THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
- Decided
- 27 May 1954
- Judges listed
- BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA
- Disposal
- Dismissed
Citations
- Official
- [1955] 1 S.C.R. 501 · 1954 INSC 76
Cited by
We found no other Supreme Court judgment we hold that cites this one.
Counted only in the Supreme Court judgments we hold whose text we could read, not in High Court judgments. We match each citation to a judgment automatically, so a citation we cannot match is not counted. "Cited" says only that a judgment refers to this one, not whether it followed, distinguished or overruled it.
The Court's text
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In the present matter it is enough to say that no question arises about the breach of a fundamental right. Rut as a matter touching the jurisdiction of the Bar Council Tribunal and that of the Bombay High Court was argued, we will deal with it shortly.
p. 501
Mr. G's first objection is that the proceedings before th.e Tribunal were ultra vires because there was no proper order of appointment. At a very early stage he applied to the Registrar and also to the Prothonotary for a copy of the order of the Chief Justice constituting the Tribunal. He was told by the Prothonotary that the order was oral.
pp. 501–502
Mr. 'G' put in two written statements before the Tribunal and did not challenge this statement of fact in either. He contented himself with saying that the order was not "judicial" and so was not valid. He took up the same attitude in the High Court. The learned Judges said-
p. 502
"The record dearly shows that when it came to the notice of this Court .... it was decided to refer this case to the Bar Council under section 10(2) and accordingly a Tribunal was appointed under section 11(1) by the learned Chief Justice of this Court."
p. 502
In his petition to this Court he did not challenge this statement of fact but again confined his attack to the question of the validity of the order. It is evident from all this that the fact that an ora \ order was made was not challenged. We cannot allow Mr. 'G' to go behind that.
p. 502
The next question is whether an oral order is enough : Bar Councils Act does not lay dowf'. any procedure. All it says is- Section 10(2) :
p. 502
" ........ the High Court .......... may of its own motion so refer any case in which it ·has otherwise reason to believe that any such advocate has been so guilty."
p. 502
and section 11 (2) says-
p. 502
"The Tribunal shall consist of not less than three ........ members of the Bar Council appointed for the purpose of the inquiry by the Chief Justice."
p. 502
We agree it is necessary that there should some record of the order on the files but, in our opinion, the order itself need not be a written one ; it can be an oral order given to a proper officer of the Court. In the present case, the letter No. G-1003 dated 29th April, 1953, of the Prothonotary to the Registrar and the letter No. E. 41-09/53 dated the 1st May, 1953, of the Registrar to the Bar Council (office copies of which were retained on the files) are a sufficient record of the making of the order. Mr. 'G' was supplied with copies of these letters an<l so was aware of the fact that orders had been issued. As a matter of fact, we have ' seen the originals of the High Court's office files and find that the names of the three members of the Tribunal are in the Chief Justice's handwriting with his initials underneath. That is an additional record of the making of the order. We hold that an order recorded in the manner set out above is sufficient for the purposes of sections 10(2) and 11(2) of the Bar Councils Act and hold that the Tribunal was validly appointed.
pp. 502–503
Mr. G's next point is that there was no "complaint" to the High Court and so it had no jurisdiction to refer the matter to the Tribunal. This ignores the fact that the High Court can refer a matter of this kind "of its own motion" under section 10(2) of the Bar Councils Act.
p. 503
We have dealt with the merits in the connected case.
p. 503
This petition is dismissed but, here again, we make no order about costs.
p. 503
Petition dismissed. SETH JAGJIVAN MA VJI VITHLANI
p. 503
MESSRS RANCHHODDAS MEGHJI. [MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C.J., S. R. Di1.s, V1v1AN BosE,
p. 503
BHAGWATI and VENKATARAMA AYYAR JJ.]
p. 503
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (XXV/ of 1881) ss. 7, 32, 61, 64, 78-Drawu, liability of-Acceptance-Bill payable at sight -Prese1ltment-Acceptance-Oral-W hether valid.
p. 503
Under section 32 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, the liability of the drawee arises only when he accepts the bill. There is no provision in the Act that the drawee as such liable on the instrument, the only exception being under section in the case of a drawee of a cheque having sufficient funds of the customer in his lands ; even then, the liability is only towards the drawer not the payee.
p. 503
There no substance in the contention that section 0e :'-ct provides for presentmen~ for acceptance only when the bill is payable after sight, and not when it is payable on demand. In a bill payable after sight, there are two distinct stages,
p. 503