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Supreme Court of India

M/S. DALMIA DADRI CEMENT CO. LTD. versus THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX

Decided
28 April 1958
Judges listed
SUDHI RANJAN DAS (as the open data lists them; this may not name the whole bench)
Disposal
Dismissed

Citations

Official
[1959] 1 S.C.R. 729 · 1958 INSC 52
Also cited as
  • AIR 1958 SC 816 (3 citing judgments)

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The Court's text

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BosE J.-1 agree, but want to reserve my opm10n on a point that does not arise here but which the ratio of my learned brother's judgment will cover unless the reservation that I make is set out.

p. 750, margin A

If I judge aright, international opinion is divided about the effect that a change of sovereignty has on rights to immoveable property. The English authorities hold that all rights to property, including those in real estate, are .lost when a new sovereign takes over except in so far as the new sovereign chooses to recognise them or confer new rights in them. But that, I gather, is not the view of the International Court of Justice. According to one of its opil'lions, which I have quoted at p. 426 of Virendra Singh v. State of U ttar Pradesh :

p. 750, margin A

"private rights acquired under existing law do not cease on a change of sovereignty." Certain American cases take the same view though they can be distinguished on the facts. But this view, as I understand it, does not extend to personal rights, such as those based on contract, nor, in any event, does the new sovereign assume any obligations of the old State in the absence of express agreement. I have referred to this at p. 427. In any event, whether I am right in thinking that that is what I might call the international view, I would agree that for our country that is, and should be, the law so far as per. sonal rights are concerned.

p. 750, margin A

In the present case, in so far as the right is claimed on the basis of con tract, it would fall to the ground on any view; and in so far as it is not fo1:mded on contract, it is ari obligation that is sought to be fastened on the new State. There is no contract between the new State and the appellant, so there also he is out of court; and even if there was some agreement or understanding between the high contracting parties, it .cannot be enquired into, or enforced, by the municipal _courts of the new State .. So I agree that, so far as this case is concerned, the ap. pellant must fail. .

pp. 750–751, margin A

' . d . d d t

p. 751

u t my 1 earne d b rot h er s gment groun e o a large extent on the views of the English courts which do not draw .the distinction that I am drawing here. I therefore want to make it clear that this decision must not be used as a precedent in a case in which rights to immoveable property are concerned. Without in any way committing myself to one view or the other, as at present advised, I feel it may be a pity for us to disregard the trend of modern international thought and continue to follow a line of decisions based on the views of an older Imperialism, when we are not bound by them and are free to mould our own laws in the light of modern thought and conceptions about.rights to and in immoveable property. But in so far as the present case is concerned, I agree that the appeal and the petition under Art. 32 should both be dismissed.

p. 751, margin B

Appeal and petition dismissed. A. N. LAKSHMANA SHENOY

p. 751, margin B

v. THE INCOME TAX OFFICER, ERNAKULAM &

p. 751, margin B

ANOTHER

p. 751, margin B

(and connected appeals) (S. R. DAS c. J., VENKATARAMA AIYAR, s. K. DAS,

p. 751, margin B

A. K. SARKAR and VIVIAN BosE JJ.)

p. 751, margin B

·Income Tax--Re-assessment-OriginaJ, assessn:ent under provisions of Travancore, Cochin and Mysore Income-tax Acts- Constitutional changes resulting in Travancore and Cochin, and Mysore becoming Part B States-Extension of Indian Income-tax Act th~e States-Applicability of Travancore, Cochin and Mysore Income-tax· Acts for re-assessment for prior P.eriod-Finanagreement between President of India and Rajpramukh-

p. 751, margin B